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Abstract 
            
 
Despite impressive progress in technical skills, the rate of adverse events in 
surgery remains unfavourably high. The variation seen in surgical outcomes may 
be dependent on the quality of ward-based surgical care provided to post-
operative patients with complications, specifically, the recognition, 
communication and response to patient deterioration. This process can be 
termed escalation of care and is an underexplored area of surgical research. 
This thesis demonstrates the impact of delays in the escalation of care 
process on patient outcome. The facilitators of, and barriers to, escalation of care 
are then identified and described in the context of the UK surgical department.  
In order to prioritise areas within the escalation of care process amenable to 
intervention, a systematic risk assessment was conducted revealing suboptimal 
communication technology and a lack of human factors education as key failures. 
To ensure that communication technology intervention was conducted based on 
evidence, several exploratory studies describe the current methods of 
communication in surgery and explore areas of innovation and intervention.  
Following this, a human factors intervention bundle was implemented within a 
busy surgical department, which successfully improved supervision, escalation 
of care and safety culture. 
This thesis describes, for the first time, escalation of care in surgery and 
outlines important strategies for intervention in this safety-critical process. To 
date, ward-based care has been one of the most under-researched areas in 
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surgery, despite its clear importance. The tools to improve escalation of care in 
surgery have been described and initial attempts at implementation have 
demonstrated great promise. Future use of these strategies should benefit 
surgeons and other clinical staff of all grades and ultimately, the surgical patient. 
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1 Thesis introduction 
            
 
 
In this introductory chapter the key principles of quality and safety in surgery 
will be outlined through the discussion of several seminal papers in this area 
from the last two decades. The structure of surgical training in the United 
Kingdom (UK) will then be described alongside the structure and roles of each 
individual within a typical surgical team. The clinical environments and patients 
that a junior surgeon will typically encounter during their initial training will 
then be explored. Following this, the escalation of care process and its 
application to surgery will be introduced. Lastly, the role of important ward-
based surgical care stakeholders such as the doctor, nurse and patient will be 
described in the context of patient safety and escalation of care. 
 
1.1 Quality and safety in surgery 
Primum non nocere or ‘first, do no harm’ is the principle which underpins 
modern medical practice. Doctors spend a minimum of five years at university; 
the majority of time is spent learning disease processes and how to intervene in 
that process to preserve or improve the patient’s quality of life (e.g. medication 
or surgery). Whilst this knowledge should inherently help doctors to avoid 
causing harm, it is not explicit. An adverse event can be defined as an “instance 
that indicates that a patient has received poor quality care”; therefore, according 
to this definition all adverse events are, to some degree, preventable1.  
It was only within the last quarter of a century that the sheer scale of 
preventable harm suffered by patients became apparent2. In 1991 Brennan et al. 
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reviewed the medical records of 30,195 patients and found that 3.7% of patients 
suffered an adverse event in hospital and that over a quarter of these were due 
to medical negligence. Another decade passed and in 2001 Vincent et al. reported 
a retrospective record review of 1,014 British patients. They found that that 
10.8% of hospital patients suffered an in-hospital adverse event and that half of 
these events could be considered preventable3.  
Around this time, research in surgery reached a turning point. High-
impact reports from the USA4,5 and UK6,7 were published and encouraged a 
culture with accountability but without blame. The realisation came that a 
different approach was needed, the ‘systems approach to surgery’ was born8. 
Vincent et al. postulated that high-quality surgical skill, team performance and 
equipment would enable a surgeon to achieve a 90% success rate for a high-risk 
operation. However, they argued that improvement of surgical skill would only 
play a small part in reducing mortality from that high-risk operation from 10% 
down to 1%. They advocated optimisation of decision-making, teamwork and 
communication to achieve true high-performance. In order to optimise these 
critical facets of surgical performance, a deep understanding of surgical training 
and team structure is required. 
 
1.2 Structure of surgical training in the UK 
The first step on the road to becoming a surgeon is to graduate from medical 
school with a degree in medicine. In the UK, medical schools typically offer two 
types of medical degree, undergraduate and postgraduate. An undergraduate 
degree is awarded to a successful student who entered a medical course directly 
from secondary school and is typically a five-year course. A postgraduate degree 
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is awarded to a student who attends medical school after achieving a previous 
degree, usually a Bachelor of Science (BSc). Postgraduate medical courses are 
typically four years in length. When studying for a medical degree the student is 
exposed to one to two years of pre-clinical lectures and seminars before two to 
three years of clinical studies in both hospitals and primary care (general 
practice surgeries and the community). To graduate from medical school, 
students must be successful in their “finals “ examinations (with the addition of 
modular examinations and coursework for some institutions). These 
examinations typically include a mixture of written papers and role-playing 
assessments (known as Objective Structured Clinical Examinations or OSCEs)9. 
Once a graduate has successfully completed medical school they will 
undertake two years of foundation training. Newly qualified doctors are eligible 
to begin practice with provisional registration from the General Medical Council 
(GMC). Provisional registration allows the newly qualified doctor to apply to pre-
approved Foundation Year 1 (FY1) training posts only and there are some 
limitations to their practice (such as restricted prescribing)10. An FY1 doctor is 
also referred to as a House Officer (HO) in the UK.  
Progression from FY1 to the second year of foundation training (FY2) is 
competency based with the doctor being assessed using an electronic portfolio 
and annual review of their progress. Once the first foundation year of training 
has been completed a doctor is then eligible for full registration with the GMC 
and can also register as an independent prescriber. For the surgically minded 
candidate, progression from FY2 is dependent on a competitive application to a 
training region through a national scheme. If a candidate is successful they 
become a Core Surgical Trainee (CT) for two years. Depending on the region 
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within which the doctor is appointed they may participate in a themed or un-
themed two-year core-training scheme (CT1 and CT2). A combination of four 
and six-month rotations in any of the nine surgical specialties 11 readies the 
doctor to apply for specialist training in surgery. An FY2, CT1 or CT2 doctor is 
colloquially referred to as a Senior House Officer (SHO). Core and foundation 
training are both relatively recent phenomena, prior to this medical training was 
less firmly structured until the ‘Modernising Medical Careers’ programme was 
introduced in 2005 and remains current. 
A further competitive application process follows and if the candidate is 
successful they are assigned to a training region for a further period of specialist 
training (ST). The length of training depends on the specialty but is not less than 
six years; the clinical grades are denoted numbers according to the year of 
training (e.g. ST4). To be eligible for specialist training, a trainee must have 
gained membership of one of the Royal Colleges of Surgeons in the UK (MRCS). 
Membership is attained through passing a series of written and oral 
examinations in anatomy, pathology, critical care, history taking, clinical 
examination, communication and practical procedural skills.  
To achieve independent practice privileges a specialist trainee must pass 
a final exam to achieve the status of Fellowship of the Royal College of Surgeons 
(FRCS). After the exam has been passed and the specialist-training programme 
has been completed successfully the surgeon is awarded a certificate of 
completion of training (CCT). This certificate allows the surgeon to begin 
independent practice as a consultant and enter himself or herself on the 
specialist register, held by the GMC. 
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During the course of their career, a surgeon is expected to keep up to date 
with evidence based medicine and practical procedural skills. To this end, there 
are several courses most surgeons will attend during the different stages of their 
career. Foundation doctors will attend the Advanced Life Support (ALS) course 
to teach them how to participate in medical emergency scenarios and a Basic 
Surgical Skills (BSS) course, which covers the basics of open and endoscopic 
surgery. The core-trainee will usually attend a course to enable them to pass the 
MRCS exam, alongside the Advanced Trauma Life Support (ATLS course), which 
introduces the principles of trauma care, and the Care of the Critically Ill Surgical 
Patient (CCrISP) course, which teaches surgeons how to care for patients in a 
high-dependency or intensive care setting. The specialty-trainee will usually 
attend courses relevant to their surgical subspecialty (e.g. a colorectal trainee 
may attend a colorectal anastomosis course), however, the uptake of minimally 
invasive and laparoscopic surgery over the last two decades12 has meant that 
endoscopic courses are also commonly attended by trainees wanting to hone 
their skills. Consultant surgeons are obliged to attend courses to keep up to date 
with advances in their specialty and to maintain their technical and non-
technical skills. Indeed, all licensed doctors in the UK must revalidate their 
fitness to practice every 5 years; this process is overseen by the GMC. 
 
1.3 Surgical team roles 
The surgical team refers to a multidisciplinary group of healthcare professionals 
charged with ensuring that the pre-operative, intra-operative and post-operative 
care of a patient is conducted safely. A large group of people are involved with 
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this including nurses, surgeons, anaesthetists and theatre staff. In this thesis I 
will principally focus on the surgeons.  
Each general surgical patient in a UK hospital has a consultant surgeon 
who holds overall responsibility for their care; this consultant and his/her team 
look after their patients during normal hours (usually 8am-5pm), they are 
known as the day team. Outside of these hours an on-call team is responsible for 
the emergency care of all general surgical patients in the hospital13. 
The day surgical team usually consists of one or more FY1 doctors, one or more 
SHO doctors, one or more ST surgeons and a consultant. Medical students are 
commonly assigned to a consultant’s team for training and learning. The on-call 
team consists of similar grades of doctor, with a consultant in charge.  
The make-up of the on-call team is decided on a rota basis in most 
surgical departments. However, there is a push from the Royal Colleges of 
Surgeons (England, Edinburgh and Glasgow) and various surgical associations 
(e.g. the Association of Surgeons of Great Britain and Ireland) for Emergency 
General Surgery (EGS) teams to become the norm and handle emergency service 
provision for surgical care, this phenomenon is not confined to the UK14. An EGS 
team consists of similar members to a standard on-call team, the difference being 
that the members of the team in EGS are on-call throughout normal working 
hours during the week. This leads to greater continuity of care for patients and 
training for surgeons15 as the emergency and elective surgical commitments of 
the consultant are kept separate16.  
One of the principal reasons that EGS teams have been implemented is 
the European Working Time Directive (EWTD). The EWTD is a European Union 
initiative designed to combat the effects of doctors working long hours and 
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becoming fatigued so as to improve safety for patients17,18.  This approach is not 
unique to Europe; in the United States of America (USA) there has also been a 
reduction of duty hours for trainee doctors, though it is less restrictive18. Whilst 
the rationale behind implementation of the EWTD was sound, there have been 
allegations that it negatively impacts on the continuity of patient care and the 
quality of surgical training19,20. As such, the roles of members of the surgical on-
call team have been the subject of increased scrutiny21. 
The role of the FY1 doctor on the surgical team is to learn the basic ward-
based skills required to look after surgical patients. The FY1 supports the rest of 
the team by performing tasks such as organising scans, placing intravenous lines 
and documenting the plan from ward rounds in the clinical notes. In addition 
they attend structured teaching, training and audit sessions. When on-call, the 
FY1 doctor may also be tasked with assessing and admitting patients from 
general practitioners to the surgical ward depending on the policy of the 
department they work within15. 
The SHO on the surgical team continues to consolidate the ward-based 
skills they acquired during their FY1 appointment by supporting the FY1 with 
ward tasks. However, the SHO is also commonly required to participate in 
outpatient clinics and operating theatre lists so their role is more varied than 
that of the FY1 doctor. When on-call, the SHO is responsible for receiving patient 
referrals from the emergency department (ED) and also participates in 
emergency operations (usually as an assistant)15. 
ST surgeons are more commonly known as registrars. They lead the daily 
ward round if the consultant is absent, consent patients for operations and then 
either assist in or perform the surgical procedure in the operating theatre. They 
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also participate in outpatient clinics and the multidisciplinary team (MDT) 
meeting for cancer patients22. Furthermore, the registrar needs to be available to 
junior team members for advice about patient care, especially if a junior surgeon 
wants to escalate the care of a deteriorating patient to the registrar23. The 
registrar usually acts as the link between the consultant and the more junior 
members of the team; as such they have a crucial co-ordination role within the 
team and help to decide on daily activities and supervision of the juniors. 
Consultant surgeons are the senior members of the team. They have 
gained a license to practice independently and have admission rights to the 
hospital(s) they hold a contract with. Consultants have a managerial as well as 
clinical role. Their clinical role is similar to the registrar in that they lead ward 
rounds when available, run operating lists, outpatient clinics and MDT meetings. 
However, they are also responsible for ensuring that patients are operated upon 
and investigated within government defined waiting list periods and ensuring 
that the clinical team functions smoothly. When the registrar or consultant are 
on-call they remain responsible for the care of their ward patients but usually 
are removed from clinic and/or theatre lists to see patients in the Emergency 
Department (ED) or Surgical Assessment Unit (SAU)24. 
 
1.4 Junior surgeons experience of the wards and of patients 
One day a final year medical student, the next day a doctor. Junior surgeons 
begin life as an FY1 after an induction period at the hospital where they are 
doing their first rotation. Their predecessor introduces them to the wards and 
staff at the hospital and helps to prepare them for their first day of work. On 
their first day the SHOs and registrars supervise them very closely. Initially, their 
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tasks are ward-based: documentation in the medical notes, patient discharge 
prescriptions and basic procedures (such as venepuncture).  
The phenomenon called the “August effect” is routinely discussed in the 
media and medical literature. It is the hypothesis that the increase in morbidity 
and mortality in UK hospitals coincides with the commencement of new FY1s 
starting their clinical career25,26. This situation is not unique to the UK, in USA the 
new doctors start in July and the term “July effect” has been coined27. As well as 
the more administration based tasks; junior surgeons (FY1s and SHOs) may be 
asked to see deteriorating patients under their consultant’s care during normal 
working hours. If they are on-call they may be asked to assess any surgical 
patient so it is imperative that junior surgeons know how to recognise and 
initially treat deteriorating patients. 
 
1.5 Context of escalation of care 
The process of recognizing patient deterioration and communicating this to a 
senior colleague who is in a position to implement definitive treatment is termed 
escalation of care. Escalation of care is a critical process in the promotion of 
patient safety. For the escalation of care process to start for a ward patient, a 
ward nurse needs to recognise the signs of initial deterioration, which should 
then be communicated to a doctor; although, there are many different potential 
routes to escalation which may be subjective or objective in nature (shown in 
Figure 1A). Nurses may base their concerns on abnormal physiological values 
(e.g. tachycardia or hypotension) or the patient may complain of symptoms (e.g. 
difficulty breathing or abdominal pain)28.  
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Figure 1A Routes to escalation of care 
 
 
Junior surgeons are often the first doctor asked to assess deteriorating 
ward patients29. The junior surgeon is not expected to provide definitive 
treatment in most instances (e.g. they wouldn’t be expected to take a patient for 
emergency surgery); however, it is vital that they possess the skills required to 
recognise a post-operative complication and clearly communicate the patients’ 
current status to a registrar or consultant who can implement definitive 
treatment. It is also vital that the senior colleague contacted by the junior 
recognises the need for an urgent opinion and goes to the patient swiftly. Both 
junior and senior surgeons need multiple skills to ensure escalation of care is 
successful.  
Most of the focus of surgical research in the 1990s and first half of the 
2000s was the exploration of technical (i.e. procedural) skills and patient 
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outcomes30,31.  However, since 2005, the non-technical skills (NTS) of surgeons 
and other operating theatre staff (e.g. anaesthetists, nurses) have come into 
focus. This is because technical skills in surgery are now not thought be sufficient 
to maintain a high-quality of performance over time32. The roles of 
communication, leadership, situational awareness, stress management and 
teamwork in surgical performance have been the subject of recent research with 
reports commonly concluding that NTS have a significant impact on the quality 
of patient care.  
Similarly, after a period of surgical research focusing on the operating 
theatre, more recent research has branched into exploring the surgical ward and 
other environments33,34. There remains a drive to improve care in the operating 
theatre through education of NTS35, however, the realisation has come that no 
matter how good the intraoperative care of a patient is, complications may still 
occur. It is the recognition and management of post-operative complications that 
is now the cornerstone of the movement to improve surgical patient safety.  
As well as better care for the individual patient, well-performed escalation of 
care may produce significant efficiency savings for healthcare providers.  
Consider the case of a splenic trauma patient, if splenic bleeding is swiftly 
recognised the patient can have urgent radiological embolization. If successful 
this patient can be subsequently managed on a surgical ward. If the bleeding is 
not noted quickly the patient may need emergency anaesthesia followed by 
laparotomy (opening of the abdominal cavity) and removal of the spleen. After 
major surgery the incidence of complications is much higher than with minimally 
invasive techniques36 and the length of stay is longer, meaning the health burden 
to the patient and the financial burden to the health provider is much higher. 
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Furthermore, if the patient requires admission to an intensive care unit (ICU) or 
high-dependency unit (HDU) there are further cost implications. 
 
1.6 What if escalation of care isn’t successful?  
The delayed recognition of bleeding in the hypothetical case detailed previously 
illustrates the implications to the patients, staff and healthcare providers. 
However, not all patients recover from a post-operative complication, no matter 
how early it is recognised and treated. Mortality rates have long been reported 
as the primary outcome measure in high-impact interventional research 
studies37. Whilst inpatient mortality is a very useful indicator of care quality and 
patient safety it does not have the ability to discriminate between patients who 
were critically unwell on their arrival at a hospital and those who suffered a 
complication during their inpatient stay. Because of this, a quality indicator 
termed ‘failure to rescue’ is increasingly being reported in surgical research. 
Failure to rescue, conceived by Silber at al. in 1992, can be defined as the 
death of a patient following a post-operative complication38. Failure to rescue 
may be a more sensitive quality indicator than mortality rates as it only takes the 
care of the patient following the occurrence of a complication into account. The 
quality of care provided to patients on the surgical ward39, and the quality of 
postoperative handover40 are beginning to be investigated in surgery and may 
play an important role in the variation of patient outcomes between different 
hospitals and geographical areas. This relationship will be explored within this 
thesis. In order to further understand the contribution of escalation of care to 
failure to rescue and other patient outcome measures we must first understand 
 33 
the systems approach to surgery and define the roles of healthcare professionals 
and patients in escalation of care and patient safety.  
 
1.7 The systems approach to surgery and adverse events 
The roles of doctors (and allied health professionals) cannot be understood until 
the role of human error in adverse events has been explained. An error describes 
an act, which is, in hindsight, realised to be potentially detrimental to a person or 
group of people. In healthcare an error can lead to patient harm, hence why the 
study of error in surgery has become such a focus in recent years41. Brennan et 
al. have shown us how common errors and adverse events are in healthcare but 
it is important to clearly distinguish between errors and adverse events. An error 
presents the potential for patient harm to occur; an adverse event defines the 
patient harm that has occurred. For example, a surgeon who forgets to prescribe 
prophylactic antibiotics prior to major abdominal surgery has committed an 
error; the patient has suffered an adverse event when they develop a wound 
infection. What is important to realise is that an error will not always result in an 
adverse event. The patient in this scenario may not develop a wound infection, 
despite the error occurring. Furthermore, the error may not propagate through 
the whole clinical team. Even though the surgeon has forgotten the antibiotics 
the anaesthetist may remember to do so.  
This analogy introduces us to Reason’s “Swiss cheese model” of accident 
causation42. Reason argued that all high technology systems (including 
healthcare) have several layers of defences against accidents and errors. These 
may take the form of administrative defences against lapses such as the safety 
checklists introduced into operating theatres from the aviation industry, 
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technological defences such as alarms or may simply be reliant on healthcare 
staff. If one of these defences should fail, the others should prevent the error 
progressing to an adverse event. However, if all the defences fail (Reason 
described this as the holes in the Swiss cheese lining up) errors can propagate 
through the missing defences and cause an adverse event (see Figure 1B). 
 
Figure 1B Reason’s model of accident causation 
 
Reproduced from: Reason, J. (1990) Human Error: University Press, Cambridge. 
 
This model is one of the cornerstones of the systems approach to surgery 
described above. Reason advocated that multiple healthcare professionals and 
systems should be responsible for high-quality patient care. The Swiss cheese 
model acknowledges the inevitability of occasional human error and mitigates 
for it by desiring multiple layers of defence and shared accountability.  
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The importance of this model to escalation of care cannot be 
underestimated. Studies have shown that patient deterioration can be detectable 
for extended periods of time before any permanent harm occurs, especially if 
there are changes in the patients vital signs43. This means that there are multiple 
opportunities for deterioration to be recognised and acted upon prior to any 
harm. The patient, nursing staff and medical staff of varying grades will all have 
the opportunity to do this, however, if all the holes line-up (i.e. they all miss this 
opportunity) the complication may go undiagnosed and deterioration be allowed 
to continue, resulting in harm to the patient. The holes in the system may be due 
to human error or latent failures (inadequately designed procedures or 
equipment failure). The reason this is so important in healthcare is that patient 
deterioration is a dynamic process with uncertain transition points. Some 
deteriorating patients may be very resilient and escape permanent harm despite 
prolonged deterioration. Other patients with multiple comorbidities (such as 
renal failure or diabetes) may deteriorate far more rapidly and suffer permanent 
harm more quickly, despite the correct management being implemented (see 
Figure 1C).  
Other safety-critical industries such as aviation have more static 
processes. For example, if there is a mechanical fault with an aircraft that would 
cause it to crash after takeoff, as long as this fault is discovered prior to takeoff 
then the adverse event will be prevented (though this would still be classified as 
a near miss). In healthcare, even if the fault is discovered, the process that 
eventually leads to patient harm may already have started. 
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Figure 1C Importance of patient comorbidities to odds of recovery 
 
The potential role of clinical human factors and technology in improving 
surgical patient safety cannot be ignored as they have been successful in several 
other industries44. Technology has revolutionised many areas of medicine in 
recent years and the potential for improved patient monitoring devices and 
communication technology is very exciting. Clinical human factors can be defined 
as  “enhancing clinical performance through an understanding of the effects of 
teamwork, tasks, equipment, workspace, culture, organisation on human 
behaviour and abilities, and application of that knowledge in clinical settings45.” 
The integral role of human factors in escalation of care and attempts to improve 
it through a combination of human factors and technological innovation will be 
described in this thesis. Furthermore, an understanding of the roles of the main 
stakeholders in the escalation of care process should produce a better 
comprehension of the human and technological factors that can facilitate or 
impede it. 
 
1.8 The role of patients in patient safety and escalation of care 
Whilst patients are not bound by any professional responsibility to raise 
concerns with a health professional when they feel unwell, they will not 
infrequently be the first person aware that they are not well. Symptoms of illness 
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usually precede reliable signs and physiological deterioration (i.e. changes in the 
vital signs) may be further delayed due to compensatory mechanisms. As the 
central theme of healthcare the patient should be placed at the centre of the 
escalation of care process and be involved in research exploring it46. Sir Robert 
Francis published a wide-ranging enquiry exploring the failings of a single NHS 
Trust in response to reports of high-mortality and frequent episodes of medical 
negligence. Francis reported, among other things, that patients were not being 
listened to sufficiently and recommended that a common culture of ‘putting the 
patient first’ was needed.  Patients should be encouraged to swiftly contact a 
nurse or doctor should they feel unwell but the factors that make this more or 
less likely are not yet known, they will be explored in this thesis.  
 
1.9 The role of nurses and other allied healthcare professionals in patient 
safety and escalation of care 
Nurses and other allied healthcare professionals (e.g. Health Care Assistants or 
HCAs) are responsible for the day-to-day care of ward-based patients. They are 
assigned to one particular ward and take part in a rota-based shift-working 
system. HCAs, staff nurses and senior staff nurses work two types of shift, a night 
and a day shift. Charge Nurses and Sisters are in a charge of a ward and tend to 
work fewer long days and night shifts in exchange for managing their staff. One 
of the most crucial jobs assigned to nurses is the monitoring and care of patients 
post-operatively, especially the regular recording and interpretation of vital 
signs and calculation of an early warning score47.  
Whilst there are protocols in place to ensure that deteriorating patients 
are recognised and that this recognition is acted upon, these protocols have had 
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mixed success48. When a patient is deteriorating a nurse is tasked with ensuring 
basic measures are in place (e.g. oxygen therapy in the setting of decreased 
saturations or analgesia for post-operative pain). However, they must also 
ensure that help is sought from a doctor in a position to treat the patient, this is 
escalation of care. In the UK, this is often done by initially contacting a junior 
surgeon (such as the HO or SHO) who may either decide that they can manage 
the patient or re-escalate up the chain of seniority.  
The decision to escalate care is not always as simple as protocols would 
suggest. Nurses care for multiple patients at the same time and the importance of 
distinguishing chronic disease with an acute complication is very important (e.g. 
low oxygen saturations in a COPD patient versus a young, post-operative patient 
with a chest infection).  Nurses’ standards of conduct and performance are 
defined by The Code, which dictates that nurses must recognise and work within 
the limits of their competence49. Recognising the limits of competence is 
something that can be done with experience; however, more junior staff 
members do not have this to fall back on. The ALERT™ course (Acute Life-
Threatening Events, Recognition and Treatment) was founded in 1999, to train 
staff in recognising patient deterioration and treatment of the acutely unwell 
patient. Some NHS Trusts have made this course mandatory for nurses so (along 
with training from senior nurses and clinicians) nurses should be comfortable 
escalating care to a senior colleague. Whilst this thesis will principally focus on 
the role of surgeons in escalation of care, the overall process is so complex and 
requires interprofessional care, so the role of nurses will be carefully considered 
in several of the chapters. 
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1.10 The roles of doctors in patient safety and escalation of care 
Doctors hold overall responsibility for maintaining high-quality care for patients 
in hospital. Their general role is defined by the GMC guidance in Good Medical 
Practice and the role of surgeons is more closely described in the Royal College 
of Surgeons of England’s Good Surgical Practice50,51. Regarding patient safety, 
doctors must promote a culture of openness and safety in clinical care. Multiple 
demands are placed on doctors and they can range from clinical (escalation of 
care referral from a nurse) to administrative (create audit presentation or 
complete patient discharge papers), the complexity in the doctor’s role is 
prioritisation of these multiple demands. The doctor must complete the most 
clinically urgent task first and the ability to prioritise tasks in this manner is a 
crucial skill. This is especially true in the care of surgical patients, where the time 
to intervention for a patient with a post-operative complication can be the 
difference between mortality and survival52.  
In order for the escalation of care process to be successful for a 
deteriorating patient, a combination of technical and non-technical skills are 
required (one of the most important skills is good communication). Good 
Surgical Practice instructs surgeons to listen to the views of colleagues and 
respond to any concerns they may have. This means a doctor is duty-bound to 
promptly assess a deteriorating patient when asked to by a nurse or more junior 
surgeon. However, this doesn’t mean they will always be free to do so. It is 
crucial therefore, to have accurate knowledge of the skills and experience levels 
of all colleagues working together in the surgical team53. Junior surgeons will not 
be experienced enough to make critical management decisions (e.g. return a 
patient to the operating theatre) but vital temporising measures such as fluid 
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administration, oxygen therapy and key investigations (radiological and 
pathological tests) are within their remit. These skills can determine the 
outcome for the patient and their future quality of life so it is vital that surgeons 
are trained in the recognition, communication and management of deteriorating 
patients.  
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1.11 Thesis aims 
The over-arching aim of this thesis is to conduct a comprehensive examination of 
the escalation of care process in surgery and implement strategies aiming to 
improve safety for the surgical patient.  
 
The specific aims of this thesis are: 
1. To explore the link between the quality of escalation of care and patient 
outcome measures including failure to rescue (chapter 2) 
2. To identify facilitators and barriers to escalation of care in surgery 
(chapters 3 and 4) 
3. To risk assess escalation of care in surgery so as to identify areas with 
potential for intervention (chapter 5) 
4. To investigate communication pathways and the role of communication 
technology in escalation of care (chapters 6 and 7) 
5. To develop and validate a metric aiming to assess and improve 
information transfer during escalation of care (chapter 8) 
6. To develop a human factors intervention bundle and assess its impact on 
supervision, escalation of care and safety culture in a UK surgical 
department (chapter 9). 
 
In order to address these aims, the structure of this thesis is further separated 
into three key phases: 
1. Describing the escalation of care process, its current landscape in 
healthcare and problems with the process 
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2. Understanding the problems with escalation of care and identifying 
improvement strategies 
3. Development and implementation of interventions to address the 
problems with escalation of care 
A schematic representation of the thesis structure is presented in Figure 1D.  
 
Figure 1D Thesis structure 
 
 
  
Describing escalation of care 
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Development and 
implementation of interventions 
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1.12 Phase 1 
Describing escalation of care and its current landscape in surgery 
It is initially important to develop an understanding of what is involved in the 
escalation of care process and how deviations from good practice can impact on 
patient outcomes. A literature review that comprehensively explores escalation 
of care and patient outcomes in surgery is therefore the first study presented in 
this thesis in chapter 2. Following this, in chapter 3, a qualitative interview study 
builds on the literature review to give us an understanding of the facilitators and 
barriers to escalation of care in surgery. Lastly, in chapter 4 a cross-sectional 
questionnaire study of the factors that affect patients’ willingness to call for help 
on surgical wards (thereby commencing the escalation of care process) will be 
presented.  
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2 A systematic review to investigate the impact of escalation 
of care on patient safety and failure to rescue in surgery 
            
 
2.1 Introduction 
As discussed in Chapter 1, the hypothesis for this study is that delayed or 
inadequately performed escalation of care may result in avoidable patient harm 
and ultimately, increased mortality for deteriorating surgical patients. This 
reflects the important role of variability in the provision of post-operative care 
on patient outcomes. A recent systematic review by Pucher et al. investigated the 
impact of enhanced recovery protocols (ERPs) and other structural, and process 
factors, on failure to rescue rates in surgery54. They found that 21 of 23 studies 
exploring enhanced recovery protocols found reduced length of stay and six 
reported decreased morbidity, none reported decreased mortality. Furthermore 
they found that nursing ratios were strongly associated with failure to rescue 
rates. 
However, whilst this study explored failure to rescue in surgery, many of 
the interventions it investigated were resource-intensive. The hiring of staff and 
maintenance of (ERPs) are resource-heavy alterations to make within a 
healthcare system. The review failed to consider the important role of human 
factors and escalation of care in failure to rescue. Given that the culture of any 
healthcare institution is so important to how it functions and how safe its 
patients are, this paucity within the literature is worthy of additional 
exploration55.  
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2.2 Aims 
The aims of this review are to: 
(1) Determine the incidence of failure to rescue events, 
(2) Identify the factors that contribute to high failure to rescue rates and 
delayed escalation of care, and; 
(3) Summarize outcomes of interventions aiming to reduce failure to rescue 
rates and improve escalation of care. 
 
2.2.1 Rationale for selecting failure to rescue as the primary outcome 
measure 
Failure to rescue is defined as postoperative mortality following a complication. 
It has been reported as an outcome measure in surgery since 1992 and was 
conceived in an attempt to increase the sensitivity of outcome measures and 
quality indicators reported in surgical research. Previous to FTR, mortality rates 
were usually the primary outcome measure reported. However, even when 
performed with case mix adjustment, mortality can be a very crude measure of 
quality. By reporting only patients who die following a complication, FTR is more 
sensitive than mortality as it eliminates those patients who die due to premorbid 
conditions (i.e. death occurs in spite of, not due to the surgery and postoperative 
course). 
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2.3 Methods 
Data sources 
Databases searched included Ovid MEDLINE (1980 to week 2, November 2012), 
EMBASE (1980 to week 2, November 2012), PsycINFO (1987 to week 2, 
November 2012), the Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews (Issue 10, 2012) 
and the Cochrane Central Register of Controlled Trials (Issue 10, 2012). 
Conference abstracts and reference lists of included articles were hand-searched 
to identify additional relevant data. The grey literature (work lacking 
bibliographic control) was searched using the Google website. 
 
2.3.1 Search strategy 
The search strategy employed the following terms (all searched as a keyword 
unless indicated): escalation of care, failure to rescue, rapid response, early 
warning score, critical care outreach, calling for help, patient deteriorat*, medical 
emergency team, postoperative care (title search), failure to escalate, 
postoperative complication (title search), registrar supervision, clinical 
supervision, trainee supervision, requesting help and requesting support. The 
terms ‘patient safety/’ (medical subject heading) and ‘ward’ were combined 
using the Boolean operator “AND”.  
An initial review of this combination revealed a large number of studies 
reporting escalation of drug dosage; therefore to tighten the search specificity, 
the additional limit ‘NOT drug*’ was applied. All of the above terms were then 
combined using the Boolean operator “OR” before limits were applied. Studies 
were restricted to those reporting human subjects in the English language 
published from 1980 onwards. The last search was conducted on the 15th 
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November 2012 (see Figure 2A for a schematic presentation of the search 
strategy)56. All retrieved articles underwent title review by two independent 
researchers to screen for relevance. Letters, commentaries, review articles, 
conference abstracts and articles not fitting in with the aims of the review were 
excluded. 
 
Figure 2A Search strategy for systematic review 
 
 
2.3.2 Inclusion criteria 
Failure to rescue – Articles highlighting the incidence of patient mortality 
following a complication, expressed as a failure to rescue rate 
Escalation of care – Articles investigating the recognition of patient deterioration 
and/or steps taken to escalate care to healthcare colleagues. The efficacy of 
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clinical prediction tools based on physiological parameters were excluded due to 
previous systematic reviews in this area. 
Hospital based – Articles reporting community-based interventions or mental 
health team services were excluded. 
Adult patients – Articles were only selected if the focus was on adult rather than 
paediatric patients. 
Two independent researchers ensured reliability by reviewing a subset of the 
abstracts before independent selection of articles for full text evaluation. Any 
disagreements during selection of articles for full-text review were resolved after 
discussion with a third researcher. The grey literature and reference lists of the 
included articles were also hand-searched to allow identification of additional 
articles warranting inclusion. 
 
2.3.3 Data extraction 
A data extraction form was produced with consensus from all researchers. This 
form was structured to allow consistent evaluation of the selected articles.  Prior 
to extraction of data, two researchers reviewed five selected articles to ensure 
methodological rigour. Data regarding the study setting, subjects, design, 
measures and key findings were extracted and each study was subjected to 
critical appraisal.  
 
2.3.4 Assessment of study quality 
Quality assessment of each of the studies was independently evaluated by two 
researchers using the Standard Quality Assessment Criteria for Evaluating 
Primary Research Papers57. These criteria were chosen as they included a rating 
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scale for both qualitative and quantitative research, thereby allowing a degree of 
direct comparison between articles, as there are some matching items on each 
rating scale. Mixed-methods studies were given quality assessment scores based 
on both the quantitative and qualitative quality criteria. Articles were not 
excluded based on their quality to ensure comprehensive capture of as many 
studies exploring escalation of care and failure to rescue as possible. Had low 
scoring studies been excluded, some valuable qualitative and descriptive data 
may have been lost.  
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2.4 Results 
The search produced 19,887 citations with 9,414 remaining after limits were 
applied and duplicates removed. Of these, 8,566 were excluded during the title 
review leaving 848 abstracts for further scrutiny. Evaluation of these abstracts 
lead to exclusion of a further 781 leaving 67 articles for full-text evaluation, of 
which 38 were considered to meet the inclusion criteria. Agreement between the 
two researchers was high, the inter-rater reliability was found to be high 
(kappa=0.87) for the abstract evaluation stage. A hand search of relevant article 
references and associated literature identified four additional articles fitting the 
inclusion criteria. The flow of articles through the selection process can be seen 
in Figure 2B.  
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Figure 2B Study selection process 
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2.4.1 Study characteristics 
A total of 42 articles were included in this systematic review, 25 studies were 
conducted retrospectively and 12 prospectively. Of these, 24 were cohort 
studies, 10 were observational, four were mixed-methods and four were 
qualitative studies. In addition, three studies were conducted in the simulated 
setting. The studies were conducted in several different continents including 
North America (n=17), Australasia (n=15), Europe (n=9) and Asia (n=1) 
reflecting the global relevance of the research question. The primary focus of 26 
articles was escalation of care. These articles were categorised into groups: those 
reporting factors affecting the decision to escalate care, those reporting 
escalation delay and those reporting interventions in the escalation process. The 
remaining 16 articles reported on mortality, complications and failure to rescue 
rates. Subjects included as units of analysis in the articles varied from whole 
hospitals to individual doctors, nurses and patients.  
 
2.4.2 Quality assessment of included articles 
Inter-rater agreement for the quality assessment of included studies was high: 
quantitative studies (kappa=0.70); qualitative studies (kappa=0.71); mixed-
methods papers (kappa=0.73). Quality scores ranged from 6-22 (mean19.2/22, 
SD 2.74) for the quantitative studies, 15-18 (mean 16.3/20, SD 1.04) for the 
qualitative studies and 35-36 (mean 35.5/42, SD 0.58) for the mixed-methods 
studies. The breakdown of quality scores are offered in Tables 2A and 2B. 
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Table 2A Quality assessment scores for quantitative studies 
Maximum score =22. The original criteria 5, 6 & 7 were not applicable for any of the studies so 
were excluded. The maximum possible score has been reduced from 28 to 22. 
 
 Criterion 
Study author (year) 1 2 3 4 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 Total 
score 
Adelstein58 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 1 2 17 
Almoudaris59 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
ANZICS 
investigators60 
1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 17 
Bapoje61 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 20 
Bobay62 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 19 
Brooke63 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 19 
Cabrini64 0 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 18 
Calzavacca65 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 19 
Chen66 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 0 2 1 2 17 
Cooper67 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 19 
Downey68 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Endacott69 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 20 
Friese70 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 
Ghaferi (2011)71 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Ghaferi (2010)72 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Ghaferi (2009)73 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Glance (2011)74 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 
Glance (2012)75 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Haas76 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 19 
Jones77 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 2 19 
Kansal78 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Kaplan79 0 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 18 
Kendall-Gallagher80 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 19 
Ludikhuize81 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 19 
Mitchell82 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 22 
Moriarty83 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 2 1 2 18 
Pattison84 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 20 
Peebles85 2 2 1 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 1 17 
Quach86 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 21 
Rattray87 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 19 
Robb88 1 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 1 0 6 
Shearer89 2 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 20 
Silber38 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 21 
Trinh90 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 20 
Wright91 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 21 
Wong92 1 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 2 1 2 15 
Wynn93 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 19 
Yasunaga94 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 21 
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Table 2B Quality assessment scores for qualitative and mixed-methods studies 
 
Maximum score =20. * Indicates a mixed-methods study. 
 Criterion 
Study author  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total 
score 
Andrews95 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 2 17 
Donohue96 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 18 
Cioffi97 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 0 2 2 17 
Endacott*69 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 16 
Mackintosh98 0 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 15 
Pattison*84 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 0 2 2 16 
Shearer*89 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 2 2 15 
Jones*77 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 2 2 16 
 
2.4.3 Measures of process and outcome 
Studies reported both process and outcome measures in their results.  Regarding 
process measures, ITU admission acted as a proxy measure for complications in 
eight articles58,64,79,82,84,86,88,89. Other studies used delays in activation of the 
medical emergency team (MET) or rapid response team (RRT) (eight 
articles)58,61,68,84,86,89, cardiac arrest rates (four articles)58,78,88,99 and 
documentation of vital signs (four articles)69,82,88,92 as process measures of 
interest. Additional process measures included adherence to protocols and care 
guidelines99,63,100.  
Nine studies included organisational and structural process measures, namely 
hospital volume 72,90,91,94, procedural volume71,73, staffing level72,75,94, teaching 
status72,76,90 and bed number/ratio 90,94,101. A total of 22 articles reported patient 
outcome measures with 21 using mortality38,61,63-65,68,70-76,80,84,86,90,91,94,100,101, 16 
using incidence of complications (including post-operative and medical)38,63,71-
76,80,83,90,91,94,100,101 and three used 30-day survival or survival to hospital 
discharge68,84,86. Other outcome measures used were hospital-acquired 
infections75, re-operation101 and length of stay78.  
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A total of 16 articles reported an FTR measure63,71-76,83,90,91,94,100,101, 
however, the measure used in each study was not always the same. Of the 16 
FTR studies in this review there appeared to be nine different definitions of FTR 
separated by the complications included in each FTR calculation. The original 
FTR definition is used in four studies38,70,74,94, a modified definition incorporating 
fewer complications is used in three articles71-73 and the AHRQ definition is used 
by another three articles83,91,101. The other FTR articles either specify a unique 
FTR definition or are classified as unique due to the different complications used 
to calculate FTR. Tables 2C and 2D display the frequency with which different 
complications are used in the FTR papers in this review and is evidence of the 
variability of FTR measures used by researchers. Two articles did not specify the 
complications used to calculate FTR rates within their manuscript70,80. 
 
2.4.4 The scale of the problem: failure to rescue rates 
Higher mortality rates were associated with increased FTR rates in several 
studies72-74,76,101. Almoudaris et al.101 found that FTR rates varied from 11.1% in 
low mortality centres to 16.8% in high mortality centres. The reoperation rates 
were similar between these centres (4.6% and 5.0% respectively) indicating that 
it is the mortality rate, not the complication rate that has the greatest effect on 
FTR rates. This finding is consistent with work by Glance et al.74 who found that 
complication rates were similar for low (5.92%) and high (5.49%) mortality 
hospitals (OR1.08, 95% CI 0.97, 1.21) but FTR rates were significantly different 
(13.2% and 27.5%, OR 0.40, 95% CI 0.30, 0.53). Baseline FTR rates varied widely 
between the articles included in this review with the lowest rate of 0.03%100 
compared to the highest of 16.9%74 (see Table 2E). However, for high-risk 
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surgical procedures (such as pancreatectomy or oesophagectomy) the FTR rate 
could be as high as 50%73. Five articles in this review quoted FTR rates between 
5 and 20% but it is difficult to suggest an average figure due to the different 
measures used. Two studies demonstrated that FTR discriminated high and low 
volume hospitals better than morbidity59,74. 
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Table 2C Individual complications included in failure to rescue definitions for each study 
 
Individual Complication 
Study first author (year) 
 
Silber Bobay Almoudaris  
 
 
   
Glance 
(2011) 
Ghaferi 
(2010) 
Wright Ghaferi 
(2009) 
Ghaferi 
(2011) 
Haas Moriarty Yasunaga Brooke 
38 62 59 74 72 91 73 71 76 83 94 63 
Arrhythmia             
Congestive cardiac failure             
Cardiac Arrest             
Pneumonia             
Deep vein thrombosis/pulmonary embolism             
Pneumothorax             
Reoperation             
Cerebrovascular accident             
Renal failure             
Sepsis             
Gastrointestinal bleed/ulcer             
Acute Respiratory Distress Syndrome             
Myocardial Infarction             
Coagulopathy             
Acute Coronary Syndrome             
Respiratory failure             
Post-operative haemorrhage             
Surgical Site Infection             
Shock             
Abscess             
Transfusion             
Peritonitis             
Pressure ulcer             
Line infection             
Malnutrition             
Total 10 5 1 9 8 14 8 8 7 7 10 5 
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Table 2D – Complications categorised by system used to define failure to rescue 
measures 
 
Study first author and 
reference 
Complications by system 
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Trinh 90        7 
Glance (2012) 75        1 
Brooke 63        2 
 
 
Table 2E Incidence of failure to rescue 
 
First author, year Reference Total 
number of 
patients in 
study 
FTR rate for 
lowest 
mortality (m) 
or volume (v) 
cohort 
FTR rate for 
highest 
mortality (m) 
or volume (v) 
cohort 
Overall FTR 
rate 
Almoudaris, 2011 59 144,542 11.1% (m) 16.8% (m) Not stated 
Bobay, 2008 62 16,315 n/a n/a 0.03% 
Friese, 2009 70 24,618 n/a n/a 10.5% 
Ghaferi, 2009 73 269,911 6.8% (m) 16.7% (m) Not stated 
Ghaferi 2010 72 8,862 6.4% (m) 40% (m) Not stated 
Ghaferi 2011 71 37,865 13.1% (v) 30.3% (v) Not stated 
Glance 2011 74 54,713 13.2% (m) 27.5% (m) 16.9% 
Haas, 2011 76 76,048 11.1% (m) 20.3% (m) 16.2% 
Kendall-Gallagher, 
2011 
80 1,283,241 n/a n/a 4%* 
Moriarty, 2010** 83 24,633 n/a n/a 1. 11.60%  
2. 9.93% 
Silber, 1992 38 5,972 n/a n/a 8.2% 
Trinh, 2013 90 16,285 n/a n/a 5% 
Wright, 2012 91 36,624 4.9% (v) 8.0% (v) 6.2% 
Yasunaga, 2012 94 131,394 n/a n/a 11.9% 
* Exact rate not stated, this is the rough figure presented by the authors of the original article.  
** The authors of this study used both the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (1) and National 
Quality Framework (2) definitions of FTR 
 
2.4.5 Factors affecting failure to rescue rates 
The factors affecting FTR rates are presented in Table 2F. 
Patient characteristics: Changes in physiological parameters such as heart and 
respiratory rate, temperature, serum Sodium and urine output were found to be 
significant patient level indicators for FTR in a single study100. Ghaferi et al. 
found that medical complications (e.g. chest infection) were associated with 
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higher FTR rates compared to surgical complications (e.g. anastomotic leak)71. 
Patients aged less than 70 years38, with respiratory or cardiac complications or 
those of non-white ethnicity90 had a decreased rate of FTR. Absence of a 
neoplasm or metastases was associated with lower FTR rates in two studies38,90.  
Organisational characteristics: Greater hospital volume was associated with 
lower FTR rates in four studies71,72,90,91. There were two studies that analysed 
the effect of NQF guidelines compliance on FTR rates; Moriarty et al. found lower 
FTR rates in centres using the National Quality Forum (NQF) database compared 
to the Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) database83 whilst 
Brooke et al. identified that patients with surgical site infections had a lower risk 
of FTR in hospitals with increased NQF guidelines compliance63. National Cancer 
Institute (NCI) centres were associated with better outcomes including FTR rates 
by Friese et al70. An increase in nurse staffing level was associated with lower 
FTR rates in two studies72,94 with no significant effect in another study75 whilst 
Kendall-Gallagher et al. identified no significant difference in FTR rates when 
comparing the level of nursing qualifications80. Ghaferi et al. identified several 
hospital characteristics that have significant effects on FTR rates including 
teaching status, hospital size > 200 beds, hospital daily census >50%, hospitals 
performing transplant/heart surgery and hospitals with increased use of 
technology72. 
 
 60 
Table 2F – Hospital and patient characteristics affecting failure to rescue 
First author, year and 
reference 
Subjects, setting and study 
design 
Main variable(s) Findings 
Almoudaris, 2011 59 144,542 colorectal cancer 
patients, UK. 
Retrospective cohort 
Reoperation 
 
1. FTR higher in high mortality units (16·8 vs. 11·1%; p=0·002) 
2. Adjusted reoperation rates similar in low and high mortality units (4.8%) 
Bobay, 2008 62 16,315 elective surgical 
procedures, USA. 
Retrospective chart 
review 
Physiological parameters 1. FTR rate 0.03% 
2. Deterioration of HR, RR, Temp, serum Na and urine output significant 
predictors of FTR (all p<0.05) 
Brooke, 2012 63 79,462 high-risk surgical 
procedures, USA. 
Cross-sectional 
Compliance with NQF 
guidelines 
1. Hospitals with full compliance had lower FTR vs. partial compliance (OR 
1.13; 95% CI, 1.03–1.25) 
2. FTR secondary to SSI lower in full compliance hospitals (OR, 0.66; 95% CI, 
0.49–0.89) 
Friese, 2009 70 24,618 surgical oncology 
patients, USA. 
Cross-sectional 
Tumour type 
 
1. Unadjusted FTR rate for all units=10.5% 
2. NCI cancer centres had lower FTR (OR 0.68; 95% CI, 0.47-0.97) 
Ghaferi, 2009 73 269,911 Medicare 
patients, USA. 
Retrospective cohort 
Operative procedure 1. Complication rates similar between worst and best mortality quintiles 
(32.7 vs. 36.4%, RR 1.11; 95% CI 1.09-1.13) 
2. FTR rate higher at high vs. low mortality hospitals (6.8 vs. 16.7%, RR 2.43; 
95% CI 2.30-2.58) 
Ghaferi 2010 72 8,862 pancreatectomy 
patients, USA. 
Retrospective cohort 
Teaching status 
Staffing levels 
Use of technology 
1. FTR rates higher in high compared to low mortality centres (40 vs. 6.4%, 
p<0.001) 
2. Lower FTR rates found in centres with teaching status (OR 0.66; 95% CI 
0.53-0.82), increased nurse-patient ratios (OR 0.94; 95% CI 0.89-0.99) and 
high use of technology (OR 0.65, 95% CI, 0.52-0.81) 
Ghaferi, 2011 71 37,865 Medicare patients, 
USA. 
Retrospective cohort 
Procedural volume 1. The low volume quintile had similar complication rates to high volume 
(42.7 vs. 38.0%, OR 1.17; 95% CI 1.03-1.33) 
2. The low volume quintile had much higher FTR rates compared to high 
volume (30.3 vs. 13.1%, OR 2.89; 95% CI 2.40-3.48) 
Glance, 2011 74 54,713 trauma patients, 
USA. 
Retrospective cohort 
Mechanism of injury 1. Complications rates similar for low and high mortality centres (5.9 vs. 
5.5%) 
2. Gunshot wounds more common in high mortality centres (10.3 vs. 3.4%) 
3. FTR lower in low mortality hospitals compared to high (OR 0.28; 95% CI 
0.20-0.39) 
Glance, 2012 75 70,142 trauma patients, 
USA. 
Retrospective cohort 
Nurse staffing levels 
Nosocomial infection 
1. No significant association between RN staffing and overall outcomes 
2. 1% increase in LPN staffing ratios (instead of RN) associated with 
increased mortality (OR 1.04; 95% CI 1.02-1.06) 
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Haas, 2011 76 76,048 trauma patients, 
USA. 
Retrospective cohort 
Injury severity 1. No significant difference in injury severity for different mortality quintiles 
2. FTR higher in high compared to low mortality quintile (20.3 vs. 11.1%, 
p<0.001 
First author, year and 
reference 
Subjects, setting and study 
design 
Main variable(s) Findings 
Kendall-Gallagher, 
2011 
80 1,283,241 surgical 
patients, USA. 
Cross-sectional 
Nursing qualifications 
Teaching status 
1. FTR lower as nursing qualification proportions increase (OR 0.94, 
p<0.001). 
2. FTR also lower as proportion of nurse certification increases (OR 0.98, 
p<0.01) 
Moriarty, 2010 83 24,633 FTR patients, USA. 
Retrospective cohort 
AHRQ FTR definition 
NQF FTR definition 
Pre-existing vs. acquired 
FTR 
1. AHRQ definition: FTR higher than pre-existing (18.5 vs. 8.9%, p<0.001) 
2. Acquired FTR also higher than pre-existing according to NQF definition 
(12.77 vs. 9.42%, p<0.001) 
Silber, 1992 38 2831 cholecystectomy and 
3141 TURP patients, USA. 
Cross-sectional 
Patient comorbidities 
Surgeon certification 
1. Complication rate decreased in centres with higher proportion of board 
certified surgeons (RR 0.86; 95% CI 0.8-0.99, p<0.05) 
2. FTR higher with increased presence of surgical house staff (RR 2.05; 95% 
CI 1.1-3.9, p<0.001) and older age (RR1.34; 95% CI 1.1-1.6, p<0.005) 
Trinh, 2013 90 16,285 cyto-reductive 
nephrectomy patients, 
USA. 
Cross-sectional 
Complication type 
Hospital volume 
Presence of metastases 
1. GI complications had lower FTR rates than other complications (OR 0.15; 
95% CI 0.08-0.30), cardiac (OR 6.43; 95% CI 4.44-9.31, p<0.001) and 
respiratory (OR 8.14; 95% CI 5.70-11.62) complications associated with 
higher FTR 
2. Higher volume centres had lower FTR (OR 0.57; 95% CI 0.37-0.89, 
p=0.014) 
Wright, 2012 91 36, 624 ovarian cancer 
resection patients, USA. 
Cross-sectional 
Patient comorbidities 
Hospital volume 
1. Complication rates higher at high-volume compared to low-volume 
centres (24.6 vs. 20.4%, p<0.001) 
2. FTR rate higher at low vs. high volume centres (8.0 vs. 4.9%, p<0.001) 
Yasunaga, 2012 94 131,394 surgical oncology 
patients, Japan. 
Cross-sectional 
Staff to patient ratios 1. Overall FTR rate 11.9%  
2. Low volume hospitals had lower staff to patient ratios 
3. High compared to low staff to patient ratios (nursing and medical) 
associated with lower FTR (9.2 vs. 14.5%, OR 0.76; 95% CI 0.68-0.86, 
p<0.001) 
 
Abbreviations:, TURP=Transurethral prostatectomy, LPN=Licensed practical nurse, RN=Registered nurse, NQF=National Quality Framework, AHRQ=Agency for Healthcare Research 
and Quality, GI=Gastrointestinal, HR=Heart rate,RR=Respiratory rate, Temp=Temparature, Na=Sodium, NCI=National Cancer Institute, SSI=Surgical site infection 
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2.4.6 Delayed escalation of care and its impact on outcome 
There were eight studies that investigated the frequency of delayed 
escalation58,61,65,68,69,81,84,86 and six studies that reported the duration of 
escalation delays61,65,69,84,86. The highest frequency of delay was 47.1%85 whilst 
the lowest was 20.7%65 (see Table 2G). The maximum duration of delayed 
escalation was 56 hours65 in a study using an escalation protocol involving 
tracking and triggering of physiological parameters; the minimum delay was 
1.15 hours85. 
 
Table 2G – Impact of delays in escalation of care on patient outcomes 
 
First author, year and 
reference 
Location 
subjects 
and 
setting 
Design Measures Delay 
incidence 
Effect of delay on ICU 
admission, mortality and 
survival 
Cabrini, 
2012 
64 Italy, 82 
patients, 
wards 
and ICU 
Obs Mortality 
ICU transfer delay 
n/a Mortality 20% higher in Late 
(60%) v Early (40%) ICU 
transfer  
Calzavacca, 
2008 
65 Aus, 228 
patients, 
wards 
and ICU 
Obs MET delay 
Mortality 
20.7% Increased mortality in those 
with delay (OR 2.53, 95% CI: 
1.2–5.31,p=0.01) 
Downey, 
2008 
68 Aus, 200 
patients, 
wards 
and ICU 
Cohort MET delay 
Mortality 
 
29.5% Increased mortality in those 
with delay (OR 3.1, 95% CI: 
1.4–6.6, p=0.005) 
Pattison, 
2011 
84 UK, 407 
referrals
, wards 
and ICU 
Mixed  Escalation delay 
ICU admission 
Survival to discharge 
23.8% Higher 3 (p=0.004) and 6 
(p=0.026) month mortality, 
lower survival (p=0.004) in 
those with delay 
Quach, 2008 86 Aus, 200 
patients, 
wards 
Cohort MET delay 
Mortality 
Survival to discharge 
44.5% Higher mortality (OR 2.1, 
95% CI: 1.01-4.34, p=0.045) 
and lower survival (p=0.049) 
in those with delay) 
Peebles, 
2012 
85 UK, 17 
patients, 
wards 
Obs MET delay 47.1% n/a 
Abbreviations: Obs=Observational study, Loc=Location, Aus=Australia 
 
Mortality rates were higher in patients with escalation delay compared to no 
delay in three studies68,84 with a mortality rate as high as 40% in one study65. 
Pattison et al. also calculated increased three and six-month mortality and 
decreased survival to discharge in patients experiencing an escalation delay84. 
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Quach et al. found that patients with respiratory failure had increased mortality 
and worse survival compared to hypotensive patients86 whilst Bapoje et al. 
found that swift ICU transfer has an association with lower mortality, which 
highlights the importance of prompt senior involvement61.  
 
2.4.7 Factors affecting escalation of care 
To enable successful escalation of care three process steps must be negotiated. 
Firstly, patient deterioration must be identified. Secondly it must be 
communicated promptly to a senior colleague. Lastly, the senior colleague must 
respond and initiate definitive management (see Table 2H). 
Identifying deterioration: A visual assessment of the patient was used by 
clinical staff to the identify patients requiring escalation in three studies67,69,96 
whilst others advocated the use of early warning scores87. Three studies 
described the use of “worried or concerned” criteria to allow staff to escalate 
care in the absence of objective measures of deterioration77,93,98. Important 
reasons for failure to identify deterioration were clinical inexperience97, 
hierarchical barriers97, high workload69,85,96,97 and overconfidence85.  
Communicating with a senior colleague: Articles in this review tended to 
focus on the communication stage of escalation of care. Fears of hierarchy, 
intimidation or criticism were identified as a common barrier to escalation in 
four studies77,84,89,102. There were three studies that identified hierarchical 
barriers leading to communication failures69,97,98. Other factors that were 
identified included delay in reaching the correct staff member, poor 
communication quality, a desire for independence and frequent 
interruptions89,97.
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Table 2H – Factors affecting escalation of care 
 
First author, year 
and reference 
Location, 
subjects, 
setting 
Design Recognition of deterioration Communication of deterioration Management of deterioration 
+ - + - + - 
Andrews, 
2005 
95 UK, 44 staff, 
wards 
Interview n/a n/a High EWS 
Confidence 
Experience 
Vital signs change 
Criticism 
n/a n/a 
Cioffi, 2006 97 Italy, 18 staff, 
A&E 
Focus 
group 
n/a Inexperience 
Hierarchy 
High workload 
n/a Hierarchy 
Independence 
Delayed contact 
n/a Independence 
Interruptions 
Distractions 
Cooper, 
2009 
67 Aus, 51 nurse 
students, 
Simulated 
Mixed 
methods 
n/a Rapid 
deterioration 
n/a Rapid 
deterioration 
n/a Rapid 
deterioration 
Donohue, 
2010 
96 UK, 14 staff, 
wards 
Interview High EWS 
Handover 
Visual review 
High workload n/a n/a Calling outreach Calling doctors 
Workload 
Endacott, 
2007 
69 Aus, 32 
patients and 
staff, wards 
and ICU 
Mixed 
methods 
LOC 
Vital signs 
Visual review 
High workload n/a Poor protocol 
Hierarchy 
n/a Staffing 
Jones, 2006 77 Aus, 351 
nurses, wards 
Survey n/a n/a MET criteria Criticism 
Worried criteria 
MET teaching n/a 
Mackintosh, 
2011 
98 UK, 35 staff, 
wards 
Mixed 
methods 
Vital signs tool n/a High EWS 
Outreach team 
Worried criteria 
Hierarchy 
n/a n/a 
Rattray, 
2011 
87 UK, 99 nurses, 
wards 
Factorial 
survey 
EWS n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Shearer, 
2012 
89 Aus, patients 
and staff, 
wards 
Mixed 
methods 
Low BP 
Low SPO2 
n/a n/a Independence 
Criticism 
Futility 
n/a n/a 
Wynn, 2009 93 USA, 75 nurses, 
wards 
Cross-
sectional 
Sudden change 
in patient state 
n/a n/a Worried criteria n/a Inadequate 
response 
Pattison, 
2011 
 84 UK, 9 
interviews 
Mixed-
methods 
Teaching Overconfidence n/a Intimidation n/a High workload 
Peebles, 
2012 
85 UK, 17 
patients, wards 
Obs Training Interruptions 
High workload 
n/a Equipment failure n/a n/a 
 
N.B ‘+’ indicates a facilitator of escalation, ‘-‘ indicates a barrier to escalation. Abbreviations: Aus=Australia, EWS=Early Warning Score, LOC=Loss of consciousness, 
Obs=Observational study, BP=Blood pressure, SPO2=Oxygen saturation
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Responding to deterioration: Delayed or non-response to escalation occurred 
when clinicians were not willing to take responsibility for the patient or if senior 
doctors were busy in clinic or the operating theatre96. Doctors use quantifiable 
changes in physiological parameters to aid them in deciding whether a patient is 
deteriorating. Andrews et al.102 explain that “the early warning score in itself is 
meaningless, information on the make-up of the score is needed.” 
 
2.4.8 Escalation of care: Solutions and interventions 
Frequency of MET/RRT calls: The effects of interventions aiming to improve 
escalation of care were evaluated in five studies. Of these, three studies reported 
an increase in the number of MET/RRT calls post intervention78,82,88. Adelstein et 
al. reported a reduction in the number of missed MET/RRT events post 
intervention (16% pre, 7% post); however, the incidence of delayed escalation 
remained the same (50% in both groups)58. Ludikhuize et al. found that 32% of 
non-trained nurses would wait until the next physician ward round to 
communicate concerns about a deteriorating patient81. A further five studies 
evaluated the logistical aspects of MET/RRTs and ICU transfer60,61,66,79,92. Of 
these, two studies found that between 46% and 93% of MET/RRT calls were 
made out of normal working hours79,92 whilst one study found that MET/RRT 
calls were most commonly made between 6am and 12pm66.  
Impact of interventions on patient outcomes: A new vital signs chart was 
introduced in three intervention studies aiming to improve escalation78,82,88.  
Two studies demonstrated significant improvements in the recording and 
documentation of vital signs using these new charts. Other interventions to 
improve vital sign documentation included the implementation of a track and 
 66 
trigger system, simulation-based education and a nurse led RRT coupled with 
ward education and new charts82,88. Four studies reported pre- and post-
intervention outcome measures including unplanned ICU admission, cardiac 
arrest and mortality (details of the interventions and a summary of their impact 
on outcomes can be seen in Table 2I). Both Kansal et al.78 and Robb et al.88 found 
no significant difference in ICU admission when comparing the pre and post 
intervention periods whilst Adelstein et al.58 and Mitchell et al.82 reported 
statistically significant reductions in ICU admission. There were no significant 
differences in the cardiac arrest rate in any of the intervention studies. However, 
Mitchell et al. did report a significant decrease in the rate of unexpected death 
pre and post intervention (1% pre 0.2% post, p=0.03). 
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Table 2I Effect of interventions on the escalation of care process 
 
First author, 
year and 
reference 
Location, 
setting 
Design Intervention Participants No. of escalation calls 
(% of total patients) or 
median per month or 
per 1000 admissions 
Notifying a 
physician of 
deterioration (%) 
Cardiac arrest rates 
(%), median or per 
1000 admissions 
ICU admission 
rates (%) or per 
1000 admissions 
Mortality rates (%) 
NI I NI I p  NI I p  NI I p  NI I p  NI I p 
Adelstein, 
2011 
 
58 Aus, 
wards 
Pre/post 
study 
Escalation 
protocol 
53 129 n/a n/a 9 3 ns 46 23 <0.001 n/a 
 
Ludikhuize
, 2011 
 
81 Holland, 
wards 
Cohort EWS and SBAR 
tools 
48 47 n/a 22 67 0.037 n/a n/a n/a 
Robb, 
2010 
88 NZ, 
wards 
Pre/post 
study 
EWS and new 
vital signs chart 
+ + 27.5 70.5 + n/a 5 5 + No improvement+ n/a 
Kansal, 
2012 
 
78 Aus, 
wards 
Pre/post 
study 
New vital signs 
chart and RRT 
criteria 
375 582 14.3 21.2 <0.001 n/a 1.3 0.95 0.25 2.
7 
2.5 0.61 29.6 30.9 0.87 
Mitchell, 
2010 
82 Aus, 
wards 
Pre/post 
study 
New vital signs 
chart and 
triggering 
system 
1157 985 2.2 3.9 0.03 n/a n/a 1.
8 
0.5 0.005 2.6 0.6 <0.001 
 
N.B. +=Numbers not reported in manuscript. Abbreviations: AUS=Australia, EWS=Early Warning Score, SBAR=Situation, Background, Assessment, 
Recommendation, NI=Non-intervention group, I=Intervention group.
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2.5 Discussion 
The specialty of surgery is complex and, by its nature, places patients at risk. 
Ameliorating risk to the patient through identification of the factors affecting the 
decision to escalate care and the impact of delayed escalation of care on patient 
outcome is an important approach to improving the safety of surgical patients. 
This review aimed to determine the incidence of failure to rescue, identify the 
factors that contribute to high failure to rescue rates and delayed escalation of 
care, and report the impact of interventions aiming to reduce failure to rescue 
rates and improve escalation of care. The findings will be discussed in relation to 
these aims. Following this the implications for the field of surgery will be 
discussed, taking the limitations of this review and area of research in general 
into account. Lastly, some conclusions will be outlined.  
 
2.5.1 Summary of findings 
Incidence of failure to rescue: FTR was found to vary widely between centres 
and this variation can be explained by the complexity of the surgical procedure, 
and the quality of post-operative care provided to the patient71. High-risk 
procedures conducted in low volume centres appear to be a dangerous 
combination for patients. FTR rates were typically between 8.0-16.9%.  
Factors affecting failure to rescue rates: Both patient and hospital factors 
were found to affect FTR. Organisational factors such as increased hospital 
volume, nurse staffing and compliance with national guidelines were found to 
decrease FTR rates, as was an increase in the use of technology. Patient factors 
such as increased age and disease burden were found to increase FTR rates.  
 69 
Factors affecting escalation of care: The most common factors identified as 
barriers to escalation of care were inexperience, hierarchy and poor 
communication. Reflecting their exploratory nature, the studies included in this 
section of the review were typically qualitative or survey-based studies, which 
allowed some valuable analysis to be conducted regarding barriers and 
facilitators of escalation of care. 
Impact of delayed escalation on patient outcomes: Higher mortality rates 
were clearly identified in several studies for patients subjected to escalation 
delays. Similarly, process measures such as cardiac arrest and ICU admission 
rates were higher in those with escalation delay. 
Impact of escalation of care interventions: Several of the five intervention 
studies reported improved process measures such as ICU admission and the 
number of medical emergency calls after introduction of an EWS chart and 
triggering protocol. However, several of the studies also reported mixed results 
without improvement of process or outcome measures. 
 
2.5.2 Implications 
The literature exploring escalation of care and failure to rescue has been 
reported. Surgery is a complex specialty with a high-rate of adverse events so the 
link that has been demonstrated in this review between delayed escalation of 
care and poor patient outcome has wide-reaching implications. Firstly, it has 
highlighted the important role communication and teamwork can play in the 
avoidance of adverse events. Previously, this has only been done in the operating 
theatre or during transfer from theatre to the recovery suite, not on the surgical 
ward40,103. Furthermore, multiple studies showed that mortality rates differ 
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significantly between different hospitals despite the rate of complications 
remaining equivalent73. This indicates that the post-complication management of 
the patient is important to preventing mortality. The presence, vigilance, 
experience and skill of healthcare personnel contribute significantly to good 
outcomes.  
This review has shown that both systems errors and individual failures 
may be the root cause of avoidable patient harm; the contribution of latent 
factors to failed escalation of care should not be overlooked104.  
Indeed, addressing the factors that influence escalation and FTR will be an 
important approach to improving surgical patient safety in the future. While 
structural issues can be optimised, these improvements often require greater 
resources. Considering the financial burden currently affecting healthcare 
organisations, efforts to improve human factors may be an undervalued 
approach to addressing barriers to escalation of care and reducing FTR. The 
importance of teamwork and leadership in this setting cannot be 
underestimated. Specifically, senior surgeons should play a key role in the 
education of junior team members in recognition of complications (or, at the 
very least, deterioration), to improve patient outcome37.  Training by a skilled 
nurse practitioner could also facilitate such learning and contribute towards 
healthy inter-professional relationships. 
 
2.5.3 Limitations 
Limitations of this review: The principal limits of this review are a result of the 
limitations of the primary research included within it. All of the studies reporting 
FTR in this review were retrospective cohort studies and therefore limit the 
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findings. A lack of direct observation, ethnography or any engagement with 
patients and staff through surveys or interviews has led to very high-level 
analysis without any exploration of the antecedents to FTR105. Furthermore, the 
heterogeneity of FTR definitions used in the included studies not only precluded 
meta-analysis but also means that a good impression of a typical or benchmark 
FTR rate was difficult to produce. Silber at al. have encouraged clinicians and 
researchers to use the original FTR definition (which includes all deaths) to 
allow comparison of multiple centres and different geographic areas106. 
All the interventions included in this review targeted doctors or nurses at 
the recognition or communication phase of the escalation of care process.  An 
intervention aiming to improve all three phases across all stakeholders was not 
identified. Multi-faceted interventions have successfully improved care quality in 
elderly and emergency medicine; they may also have a role in escalation of 
care107. This is important because it requires both individual and team skills to 
recognize, communicate and respond to a deteriorating post-operative patient. 
There was also a lack of control groups and poor reporting of data analytical 
techniques in some studies, reflected by a wide range of quality assessment 
scores within each methodological category.  
Limitations of this research area in general: Whilst a small-body of research 
was identified exploring escalation of care, it was very heterogeneous and this 
vital facet of surgical care is under-explored. It is interesting to note that whilst 
some of the articles in this review evaluated the role of human factors in delayed 
escalation of care, none explored their role in FTR. Therefore, it is not currently 
known whether FTR rates are influenced by human factors in addition to the 
patient and hospital characteristics already discussed. Previous studies have 
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explored the role of human factors in the operating theatre but have neglected to 
study their impact on ward-based care35,108. Human factor interventions have 
been successfully utilised in handover and patient safety45,109.  Use of human 
factors interventions in prevention of FTR may be an important approach due to 
the prevalence of errors and adverse events on the surgical ward and should be a 
focus of future research110. In addition to this, consideration of interventions to 
improve the safety culture of institutions prior to attempts to improve outcomes 
may lead to longer-lasting entrenchment of interventions and greater success in 
the future. Safety culture and outcomes have been strongly linked in previous 
research therefore attempts to improve safety culture should be included in any 
safety intervention going forward111. 
The baseline work presented in this review has provided valuable 
information to clinicians and healthcare providers but has not adequately 
tackled the safety concerns that have been identified. To achieve an 
improvement in outcomes researchers need to start looking beyond the numbers 
(i.e. retrospective databases), using both qualitative techniques and front-line 
research methods such as direct observation, to develop targeted interventions 
aimed at improving the quality of surgical patient care. 
 
2.5.4 Conclusions 
Despite widespread heterogeneity in the literature, a link has been established 
between escalation of care and failure to rescue in surgery. Factors that 
contribute to the avoidance of preventable harm include the recognition and 
communication of deterioration to implement definitive treatment. Further 
research utilising targeted observational and interventional techniques is 
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necessary to build on the evidence base and to truly determine what factors can 
improve safety-critical processes such as escalation of care and impact positively 
on outcomes. Before these studies can be conducted, greater knowledge of the 
factors affecting escalation of care according to staff and patients must be 
conducted to inform interventions, this will be gained through the use of 
qualitative techniques as described in the next chapter.  
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3 Understanding the issues with post-operative care: A 
qualitative study exploring escalation of care and failure to 
rescue 
            
 
3.1 Introduction 
Escalation of care can be a troublesome process as the first doctor called by the 
nurses to see a deteriorating patient will usually be the most junior; this is the 
traditional hierarchy. The junior surgeon must assess the patient and decide 
whether they require senior input. They must then contact their senior to 
explain why they need help and the urgency of response required. All of this 
places a premium on the value of communication between team-members. This 
is of concern because studies highlight that failures in communication are 
ubiquitous and frequently occur in the postoperative phase112.  
Studies exploring communication during the postoperative care of patients have 
involved development of handover protocols rather than exploring the 
escalation of care process113,114. Few have investigated the reasons underlying 
failure to escalate. Those few have only examined physicians or nurses115 88or 
else focused upon the Intensive Care Unit 61 and Emergency Department97.  
The review in the previous chapter illustrated how escalation of care 
underpins patient safety on the surgical ward by linking delayed escalation of 
care with poor outcome. It also suggested several factors that may facilitate or 
impede escalation of care. However, exploration of these was far from 
comprehensive and further detail on many of the factors is required. This detail 
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will be gained through qualitative methods and the factors that facilitator or 
impede escalation of care will be presented using Vincent’s taxonomy of factors 
prevalent in adverse events in medicine116. No study to date has conducted a 
comprehensive exploration of communication and escalation of care in surgery. 
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3.2 Aims 
This chapter aims to  
1. Identify and explore facilitators and barriers to escalation of care in 
surgery, 
2. Understand the causes of these facilitators and barriers, and; 
3. Apply the information gained to develop a conceptual framework of 
escalation of care to guide interventions in this area. 
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3.3 Methods 
3.3.1 Study design 
A semi-structured interview study was conducted. This qualitative research 
methodology was selected to allow an in-depth exploration of escalation of care 
in surgery. With the ultimate aim of this thesis being the implementation of 
interventions to improve escalation of care, qualitative work was the 
appropriate initial approach. Had qualitative methods not been utilised it would 
have been difficult to gain a comprehensive understanding of escalation of care, 
meaning any future interventions would be limited in their design and 
potentially ineffective. An intervention has to be developed to solve a specific 
problem, if the underlying causes of the problem and potential solutions to it are 
not explored with those affected by it, the intervention may be fatally flawed.  
The use of semi-structured interviews allows a flexible approach to data 
collection, which would not be possible using survey methodology, which allows 
a greater number of participants but limits the detail possible in their responses 
to questions. The semi-structured nature of the interview gives the researcher a 
framework to structure the interview with, but also allows the freedom 
necessary to explore participants’ perceptions and gain the detail required to 
develop an effective intervention. 
 
3.3.2 Participants and setting 
Consultant and registrar-grade surgeons (seniors) and house officers (juniors) 
from the specialties of General, Vascular and Urological surgery from three 
hospitals across London were approached for recruitment into this study. These 
specialties were chosen as they all involve complex and major abdominal 
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surgery where complications are frequent. Clinicians were given a one-month 
window to confirm participation in this study. In addition to these surgeons, a 
purposive sample of intensive care clinicians (consultant and registrar-grade), 
critical care outreach team members (senior nurses) and surgical ward nurses 
were also included. This ensured a multi-center, pan-stakeholder approach to 
the analysis of escalation of care across the surgical patient pathway from the 
most junior to the most senior members of the interprofessional care team117. 
 
3.3.3 Study procedure 
A semi-structured interview topic guide was developed and piloted prior to use 
with eight clinicians.  This topic guide provided the framework of questioning for 
the interviewer to follow. However, it was not rigid and a degree of flexibility 
was encouraged to ensure that a rich understanding of participant’s perceptions 
of escalation of care could be gained (see Appendix A). Trained patient safety 
researchers with a background in surgery individually interviewed participants 
to allow for a sensitive and detailed understanding of participant’s views on 
supervision and escalation of care. The following topics were examined:  
1. The current escalation landscape. It is not currently known whether UK 
doctors and other healthcare providers consider escalation of care 
important. 
2. When juniors and nurses should escalate care. One of the most difficult 
skills for junior surgeons and nurses to learn is how to prioritise their 
patients and deal with competing demands on their time. 
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3. Information required prior to senior review. The amount of, and quality 
of information transferred to a senior regarding a deteriorating patient is 
an important factor in the prioritisation and management of patients.  
4. Barriers to successful escalation of care. In order to intervene in the 
escalation of care process, the problems that surgeons and nurses face 
when attempting to escalate care must be identified. 
5. Strategies to improve the escalation process. The potential for different 
intervention strategies to improve escalation of care must be explored 
prior to implementation. 
  
Interviews took place between December 2012 and May 2013 in the hospital 
where each participant was working. Interviews lasted 30-40 minutes, were 
audio-recorded with informed consent and then transcribed verbatim. Approval 
for this study as a service evaluation was granted by the institutions prior to any 
data collection, formal ethical approval was not required. Informed consent was 
gained from all participants prior to interviews. 
 
3.3.4 Data analysis 
Each interview transcript was checked for consistency and completeness with 
the original recordings. Three researchers with a background in surgery and 
patient safety then developed a coding framework after a period of reading and 
re-reading of the transcripts to ensure adequate immersion in the data. 
Transcripts were finally subjected to emergent theme analysis based upon 
grounded theory with interviews ceasing when thematic saturation was 
achieved. Emergent theme analysis is a systematic method of extracting common 
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themes, identified by interview participants, which are considered important to 
the research question being asked118. Once themes have been reliably identified, 
the transcripts can be carefully coded to uncover the frequency with which each 
participant discusses each theme.  
 
3.3.5 Assurance of qualitative rigour 
Quality guidelines for qualitative research were strictly adhered to throughout 
this study119. A clear and transparent data collection and analysis protocol was 
used consistently throughout the study. Independent coding of transcripts by 
two researchers that were subsequently triangulated ensured reliability of 
theme extraction. Member checking provided evidence for the validity of our 
findings.   
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3.4 Results 
A total of 41 participants were recruited for this study with 16 consultant or 
registrar grade surgeons, 11 house officer grade surgeons, six surgical nurses, 
four intensive care clinicians and four critical care outreach team members 
(response rate for all participants=82%). The different number of participants in 
each group reflected the number of interviews needed to achieve saturation (i.e. 
no new themes were emerging in that group). The senior clinicians, outreach 
team members and nurses had between 7-25 years of experience and the junior 
surgeons were all in the first year following graduation. Figure 3A and Table 3A 
display the key themes extracted from the interviews and the number of 
participants who identified each theme. Figure 3B displays the key themes 
extracted from the interviews in the form of a conceptual framework for 
escalation.  
The sections below qualitatively summarise the themes that emerged 
during the interviews along with verbatim quotations (S = senior surgeon, J = 
junior surgeon, IC = intensive care clinician, CCOT = critical care outreach team 
and SN = surgical nurse). The term escalation ‘initiators’ refers to those 
participants most likely to contact senior colleagues for clinical support (junior 
surgeons and nurses). The term escalation ‘recipients’ refers to clinicians likely 
to receive regular requests for clinical support (senior surgeons, intensive care 
clinicians and outreach team members). 
 
3.4.1 Current landscape of escalation of care 
Most of the participants believed that escalation of care was a problem in their 
place of work, especially the junior surgeons and outreach team members: “I had 
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an incident where several patients were sick at once and it was only me that was 
available to look after them with all of the seniors scrubbed, I think it’s dangerous” 
(J2). Most recipients believed that the first point of contact for an initiator when 
seeking clinical support should be the surgical registrar, junior surgeons 
responses were slightly varied with some suggesting the FY1 or SHO as more 
appropriate initially. All SNs and CCOT members thought the surgical house 
officer was the appropriate first point of contact but also stated that they would 
escalate higher if they were unable to contact the house officer or decided a 
patient was critically unwell. The exact threshold for being ‘critically unwell’ was 
not clearly articulated, some participants mentioned abnormal vital signs, and 
others simply discussed being concerned about a patient.  
 
3.4.2 Information required prior to reviewing a patient 
Recipients were asked what key information they would require from an 
initiator prior to reviewing a deteriorating patient, initiators were asked what 
information they would provide to a senior colleague when requesting clinical 
support.  The patient’s vital signs were the most common answer followed by the 
history, examination and diagnosis, and the degree of clinical urgency. Other 
participants wanted to confirm that they were responsible for the patient’s care 
prior to hearing clinical information to avoid confusion and time-wasting.  
 
3.4.3 When to call for help 
All groups of participants identified an initial patient assessment as being 
important prior to calling a senior colleague for help.  Recipients considered 
information gathering by initiators necessary before calling to allow them to 
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prioritise their workload. Some initiators did state a preference for commencing 
initial management for the patient prior to calling. “If it’s a simple thing like a 
chest infection I’d probably initiate the management and then check in with the 
registrar later on” (J7). However, participants from all groups were keen to stress 
that in extreme circumstances it would be entirely appropriate to call straight 
away, before seeing the patient: “If they can work out from the nursing call that 
there is a problem with active bleeding or severe respiratory distress they should 
call me and the outreach team directly before going to see the patient” (S14). The 
CCOT members were keen to highlight their escalation skills and availability to 
initiators: “We can fast-track escalation and speak directly to the ICU consultant, 
facilitating movement quite quickly if needed.” (CCOT1). 
The above situations all represent subjective time points. Participants 
also identified several objective time points in answer to the question. The 
presence of abnormal vital signs or an obviously deteriorating patient on visual 
assessment were enough to trigger a call for senior support according to some 
participants: “If their observations are deranged and haven’t improved with small 
things like giving Paracetamol then that’s when I would call for help” (J3). The 
most common subjective time point that should have prompted a junior surgeon 
or nurse to call for help was if they were uncomfortable with the situation or felt 
they couldn’t manage: “The moment they have seen the patient and think it’s 
beyond their level is when they should call” (S6). Nursing staff appreciated the 
availability of the ‘worried’ criterion on the referral form: “On some occasions you 
might know the patient is unwell but not know exactly what is going on, luckily 
there is a part on the referral form which says ‘I am worried, just come and see 
them’” (N1).  
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3.4.4 Factors influencing the decision to escalate care 
Five themes emerged as factors influencing the decision to escalate care and 
formed the basis for the conceptual model; patient, individual, team, 
environmental and organisational factors (see Table 3A). 
Patient: A patient who looked seriously unwell on visual assessment should 
trigger a call for help without further investigation according to the majority of 
participants.  Several of them stated that they would supplement their visual 
assessment with an Early Warning Score and Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS), “If a 
patient is acutely unwell with increasing MEW (modified early warning) scores 
they need something doing rapidly” (J5). 
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Table 3A  – Factors influencing the decision to call for help and the number of 
senior and junior surgeons identifying these factors 
 
Theme Senior Junior Total 
Clinical – Patient factors 
Patient looks unwell on visual assessment 5 8 13 
Abnormal vital signs or GCS 4 7 11 
Individual – Factors relating to individuals  
Clinical experience 12 6 18 
Confidence 9 4 13 
Concerns about senior doctors acumen 4 8 12 
Desire for independence 4 1 5 
Team – Factors affecting the quality of work within the team 
Rapport with senior 9 9 18 
Fear of negative response/criticism 9 9 18 
Environmental – Technological and workforce factors 
Availability of senior 5 6 11 
Time of day 3 2 5 
Phone signal 1 2 3 
Organisational – Protocols and scheduling factors 
Not knowing who or how to contact 3 3 6 
Not familiar with escalation policy 3 2 5 
Multiple demands/high workload 1 2 3 
 
Individual: The most important individual factors influencing a junior 
surgeon/nurse’s decision to call for help were their clinical experience and 
confidence. Interestingly the two did not always correlate in that the house 
officers (who are the least experienced) tended towards overconfidence. For 
example one surgeon described a patient with a severe post-operative chest 
infection that had been reviewed by a junior who had started antibiotics and 
nebulisers. However this junior “didn’t tell anyone because they actually thought 
there was nothing more that could be done. The patient ended up requiring 
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assisted ventilation after further deterioration”. This lack of insight was a 
significant barrier to escalation of care. However another reason that some 
juniors/nurses did not call for help was their concern regarding the clinical 
acumen of their senior colleagues: "I have the experience of feeling that the person 
I'd be asking questions wouldn't know the answer" (J2). Personal accountability 
and legal liability were other factors influencing the decision to escalate “It 
sounds bad but I’m always trying to cover my own back, I don’t want it to come 
back and bite me” (N3). 
Team: A fear of a negative response or criticism from a senior colleague when 
calling for help concerned all groups of participants: “They’re scared. If they have 
not met me before then they would be scared that I might be the most horrible man 
in the world” (S6).  Conversely, the most important team factor in deciding 
whether a nurse/ junior surgeon escalated care was the rapport with their 
senior colleague “I have built rapport with certain consultants and am confident 
enough to phone them“ (J7). In addition, the trend for senior doctors to work on-
call shifts off-site and the frequency with which junior doctors were asked to 
cover multiple specialties when on-call created some difficulties for staff wishing 
to escalate care promptly. 
Environmental: The availability of a senior colleague was crucial in determining 
whether a nurse/junior would call for help. For example, one senior mentioned: 
“I’ve walked past my house officer at 2am and they’ve wanted to run something by 
me but if we hadn’t bumped into each other would they have actually called?” 
(S16).  Other factors included the availability of mobile phone signal and the time 
of day: “If it’s coming to the evening and the patient is quite unwell I’d try to 
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organise a (senior) review faster. They could possibly get very unwell overnight” 
(J9).  
Organisational: Participants identified several organisational factors affecting 
the decision to escalate. The themes identified included familiarity with the 
escalation policy, and not being aware of whom to contact: “On a number of 
occasions I’ve had difficulties contacting a senior because there is no fixed 
framework for doing so” (J7). The current unstable nature of surgical teams due 
to policies such as the EWTD was felt to be a significant hurdle in this respect – 
summarised by one senior surgeon, “Life was a lot simpler when I was a junior, 
and we had a very good team-working environment. Continuity of care, teamwork 
and clear direction are what is missing in this system”(S8).  
 
3.4.5 Communication tools and information transfer 
Clinicians felt that the best communication modality to use when calling for help 
was the mobile phone. However, nurses tended to use bleeps despite the fact 
they were highlighted as suboptimal: “Most of the time our bleeps are not 
answered, if it is answered it’s usually two hours after we have bleeped” (N4). 
Direct conversation was also considered useful, mostly by senior surgeons who 
appreciated juniors coming to the operating theatre to discuss patients. To 
optimise communication and information transfer, participants were asked to 
provide details of the information that they would provide or require when 
making or receiving a request for clinical support. Vital signs were the most 
common answer followed by the history, examination and diagnosis alongside 
the degree of clinical urgency: "If there's a patient that is bleeding massively that 
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needs to be tackled right now. It may be that I need to clear some space in theatres" 
(S1).  
 
3.4.6 Barriers to escalation of care 
Participants were asked what factors might prevent the initiation of the 
escalation of care process, even when clinically indicated. Two themes emerged - 
failure to recognize patient deterioration and failure to communicate concerns to 
a senior colleague. Regarding the former, the most common underlying factors 
were clinical inexperience and diagnostic inaccuracy. Regarding the latter, fear of 
a negative response was identified as a key reason why a junior surgeon/nurse 
would not communicate their concerns to a senior (see Figure 3A). Some 
participants felt that intimidation and humiliation also play a part in this: "I 
couldn't get hold of anyone and decided the patient needed an HDU bed and the on-
call ICU registrar refused to come…" (J1). Technical failures (calls not answered or 
not made due to faulty equipment) were also raised as potential barriers to 
escalation. Other important themes were the culture and cohesion within 
surgical teams, patient ownership and not knowing the escalation policy.  
Failure to recognise or respond to deterioration: Participants identified three 
factors that would contribute to initiators failing to recognise or respond to 
deterioration. The most common of these was clinical inexperience with 
incorrect diagnosis also considered a significant factor. Junior surgeons did not 
raise the issue of overconfidence, however, five senior clinicians felt this was an 
issue.  
Failure to escalate to a senior colleague: Fear of a negative response was 
identified as a key reason why an initiator would not escalate care, in this case 
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even when it was considered clinically indicated. Other important themes were 
the culture & cohesion within surgical teams, not knowing who is in charge of 
patient care and rapport with the senior. Several initiators stated that, despite 
the barriers, they would always escalate care if clinically appropriate as it is in 
the best interests of the patient. 
 
Figure 3A Barriers to escalation of care and potential solutions
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3.4.7 How to improve the escalation process 
Participants made suggestions regarding how to improve escalation of care, 
these have been split into improvements relating to communication and 
feedback, and improvements regarding workforce management. 
Communication, supervision and feedback: Participants felt that 
communication skills teaching and a clearer escalation protocol were the two 
best methods of improving the escalation process: “If I found out that a junior 
had been struggling on their own without calling for somebody I would sit them 
down for a supportive chat to help them realise we don’t want them working 
outside their comfort zone” (S1). Other suggestions were to improve supervision 
by reassuring initiators that they wouldn’t be criticised for incorrect escalation 
and that escalation was actually a part of the job and expected of them: “Make it 
clear to the juniors that we expect them to escalate, even if it’s just to tell us 
something has happened but they have it under control” (S1).  
When asked directly whether a hospital protocol for escalation would 
result in better patient care some participants answered in the affirmative with 
others expressing mixed feelings: “It is clear to me that a protocol would be 
sensible, however, I suspect that half the time it would be ignored” (IC4). When 
asked if they would support the use of new communication technology to 
distribute tasks and control workflow 26 participants expressed enthusiasm: 
“I’m not a big fan of the hospital bleep, it wastes time running up and down the 
stairs to different wards trying to find a phone. An app that sends a detailed 
message would be really useful” (J1). However, some participant’s views were 
mixed: “These things are helpful but there is a learning curve to overcome” (IC2). 
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Workforce management: A return to the old surgical firm system of working 
was felt to be a good way of improving the escalation process by several 
participants in each group. Several participants also felt that increasing the 
number of senior clinicians available for support would be helpful.  
 
3.4.8 How to measure improvements 
Questionnaires regarding morale and satisfaction were thought to be the best 
way of measuring improvement in the escalation process by 17 participants. 
Quantitative measures such as time to senior review or length of stay were also 
felt to be of potential value by five senior and five junior surgeons. The intensive 
care clinicians and outreach team members both felt that monitoring process 
measures such as ICU admission rates and patient outcomes such as mortality 
were the best way of evaluating improvements. 
These results were all collated together to produce a conceptual 
framework for escalation of care in surgery (see Figure 3B). This framework 
shows the factors that may facilitate or impede escalation of care. 
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Figure 3B A conceptual framework of escalation of care 
 
 
(Note:  + represents facilitators and – represents barriers to escalation) 
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3.5 Discussion 
This is the first study to qualitatively explore escalation of care in surgery. The 
escalation of care process can be facilitated or impeded by a variety of 
interprofessional factors. Preventing avoidable patient harm requires a team-
based approach and a good safety culture. This semi-structured interview study 
aimed to identify, explore and understand facilitators and barriers to escalation 
of care in surgery so as to apply the information gained to develop a conceptual 
framework of escalation of care to guide interventions. The findings will be 
discussed in relation to these aims and their context within the wider literature 
will be considered. Following this the implications for the field of surgery will be 
discussed, taking the strengths and limitations of this study into account. Lastly, 
some conclusions will be presented.  
 
3.5.1 Summary of findings and context within the literature 
Facilitators and barriers to escalation of care in surgery: The factors that 
may facilitate or impede escalation of care were presented using the categories 
from Vincent’s taxonomy to analyse risk in medicine.  
Patient factors: Incorrect diagnosis and difficult communication were identified 
as significant barriers to escalation of care whilst abnormal vital signs and a 
visually unwell patient were likely to facilitate escalation of care.  
Individual factors: Good clinical experience can facilitate escalation of care but 
juniors with overconfidence or a desire for independence may impede the 
process. 
Team factors: Good rapport and approachability will facilitate escalation of care 
whilst criticism and hierarchy are significant barriers.  
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Environmental factors: Innovative mobile technology may facilitate escalation 
of care and could replace outdated pager technology. Staffing ratios may also 
impact on escalation of care, when seniors are readily available and 
approachable, escalation of care is facilitated. However, out of hours or at night, 
the process may be impeded by the lack of suitable staff.  
Organisational factors: Seniors who take responsibility for their patients and 
encourage a strong safety culture can facilitate escalation of care. High clinician 
workloads and ambiguous escalation pathways may impede or prevent the 
process.  
How to intervene in the escalation of care process: The two main themes that 
emerged regarding interventions to improve escalation of care were 
communication, supervision and feedback, and workforce management. A 
combined approach of communication skills teaching for juniors, clear escalation 
of care protocols and increased senior surgeon availability was felt to be the 
approach to improve escalation that held the most realistic potential. The 
participants felt that the best ways to measure the impact of an intervention 
would be a combination of survey results measuring satisfaction and safety, and 
the analysis of process and outcome measures.  
One of the principal barriers to escalation of care, highlighted by 
participants, was hierarchy. A paradox was observed where seniors stated that 
they actively encourage escalation whilst juniors and nurses feared criticism, 
intimidation and humiliation. This finding is consistent with experiences of 
internal medicine clinicians requesting clinical support from seniors114,115. It is of 
serious concern given recent reports highlighting the difficulties faced by staff 
when raising the alarm about patient welfare120. Specifically, the recent Mid-
Staffordshire Trust Inquiry into unacceptably high mortality rates highlighted 
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how “some staff did express concern about the standard of care being provided 
to patients. The tragedy was that they were ignored and worse still others were 
discouraged from speaking out”. Previous studies have also highlighted 
significant hierarchical barriers that may contribute to this effect98. In contrast, a 
flattened hierarchy is a key feature of a high-reliability, highly resilient 
organisation where errors are trapped before they occur42. Efforts to improve 
escalation of care will, therefore, need to attempt to flatten hierarchical barriers. 
Towards this end, participants also highlighted the importance of rapport and 
effective team working in enabling escalation of care. Although a return to the 
traditional surgical firm could benefit both senior and junior clinicians, the 
likelihood of this happening is low due to the labour constraints placed upon the 
healthcare industry by the EWTD121.  
 
3.5.2 Implications 
The findings identified two important issues that must be addressed to allow 
improvements in the surgical escalation process. Firstly, juniors and nurses must 
be furnished with a clear escalation protocol and secondly seniors must be made 
available to provide support when required. The former is simple but the latter 
may not be easily resolvable particularly due to training surgeons wanting to 
gain experience in theatre – often at the expense of ward-based care122. 
Educators and curriculum developers must address this in the design of future 
training programmes. Future research should also explore the use of 
technological innovations and human factors in facilitating the escalation of care 
process. The conceptual framework could be used as a model to link failure to 
escalate with a failure to rescue and patient outcomes. This will pave the way for 
real improvements in care quality and patient safety practices to be made. 
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3.5.3 Strengths and limitations 
The strengths of this study include its approach to sampling. All stakeholders in 
the escalation of care process were included meaning that balanced findings 
without bias to any particular grade or specialty of clinician were reported. This 
multi-centre pan-stakeholder approach to exploring escalation across the 
surgical care pathway is the first of its kind; it lends credibility and 
generalisability to the findings. Whilst the study was aimed at the specialty of 
surgery, the interprofessional nature of recruitment means that it can be applied 
to other specialties. Other work exploring escalation of care has limited itself to a 
single specialty and not involved interprofessional staff123. The qualitative nature 
of this study allowed the themes to be explored in great depth with the 
procurement of rich, sensitive data a benefit that would not have been possible 
using quantitative methodology. Care taken to ensure qualitative rigour 
throughout lends further strength to this study.  
Limitations include the subjective nature of participants’ views alongside 
the focus on academic institutions within London. As such the views expressed 
may not reflect those in other geographical regions, non-metropolitan hospitals 
or other specialities, whilst the issues raised may not be prevalent in private 
institutions where the communication pathways are different.  In addition, 
whilst escalation of care is a key component of failure to rescue, other 
organisational issues such as hospital infrastructure, human and, especially, 
financial resources may also play an important role and should be considered in 
further work.  
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3.5.4 Conclusions 
This study confirms escalation of care as an important facet of patient safety. 
Current escalation processes are suboptimal which puts patients at risk of 
avoidable harm. Suggestions to improve escalation of care including 
communication skills training, escalation protocols and increased senior 
supervision are achievable. Future chapters build on the findings of chapters 2 
and 3 to evaluate the effectiveness of interventions and the effect of these on 
safety culture and patient outcomes. However, before this, it is of the utmost 
importance to consider the role of the most central stakeholder in this process – 
the patient. This is explored in the next chapter. 
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4 Factors affecting patients’ willingness to escalate care on 
surgical wards: a questionnaire study 
            
 
4.1 Introduction 
Surgical patients who suffer a post-operative complication experience worse 
overall outcomes than those who avoid a complication37. The speed with which a 
complication is recognised and acted upon has an important role to play in 
patient survival. This places a premium on the quality of communication 
between healthcare professional (HCP) and patients. Chapter 1 found that delays 
in escalation of care lead to poor patient outcomes whilst chapter 2 identified the 
factors that may impact on the ability of healthcare staff to escalate patient care 
safely.   The recognition of a complication involves both HCPs and patients; the 
role of HCPs has been explored previously in literature and in this thesis. 
However, the role of the patient remains unknown117.  
The first indicators of patient deterioration that are acted upon by HCPs 
are commonly changes in the vital signs and early warning score, however, 
deterioration may be apparent to the patient prior to these changes97. Therefore, 
it is vital that the patient is willing and able to report symptoms to an HCP 
promptly, in order to to start the escalation of care process. This is especially 
important on the surgical ward when compared to high-dependency and 
intensive-care units as normal ward areas do not routinely have continuous or 
invasive monitoring systems for patients to aid in the speedy recognition of 
complications124,125. Empowering patients to be involved in all aspects of their 
care is a vital step in improving health care126. Patients are able to play an 
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effective role in healthcare improvement127. This role has also been 
acknowledged as important by physicians128. The importance of the patient 
perspective when conducting research cannot be underestimated and this is an 
important approach to use. The willingness of patients to question healthcare 
staff on issues related to their care has been previously explored with 
researchers finding that patients are less willing to challenge healthcare staff 
than ask factual questions46. The willingness of patients to call for help if they 
feel an error has occurred or have other concerns (e.g. pain or bleeding) is not 
known, improving patient’s willingness to call for help may help to reduce 
complications. 
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4.2 Aims 
1. Investigate the factors affecting patient’s willingness to call for help on 
surgical wards; 
2. Establish how, and from whom, patients are willing to call for help; 
3. Explore how to encourage patients to ask question of ward staff, and; 
4. Identify barriers to patients calling for help. 
 
  
 101 
4.3 Methods 
4.3.1 Study design 
A cross-sectional survey study was conducted. This study design was selected, as 
the perceptions of patients in the position to commence the escalation of care 
process were required. Using survey methodology allows researchers to collect 
data from a large number of participants in different locations. Whilst interview 
methodology may enable more depth to the data collection process; surveys 
allow a wider sample of participants, which was felt to be necessary for this 
study. Another method of collecting data from multiple participants is a focus 
group study but this is time-consuming and logistically difficult to conduct with 
large numbers of participants. It is important when using survey methodology to 
ensure the survey will capture all the desired data. To ensure this, the survey 
must be designed using a team-based approach rather than an individual 
approach129. Furthermore, the opinions of the target audience must be sought in 
advance of data collection. This allows researchers to tweak the survey to ensure 
the language is appropriate and that the questions make sense before it is 
disseminated to a large number of participants.  As this study involved 
questioning patients, ethical approval was sought and received from the 
Berkshire B Research Ethics Committee.  
 
4.3.2 Participants 
Patients who had undergone surgery under general anaesthetic and required at 
least an overnight stay in hospital were invited to participate. Patients from 
three London hospitals (one teaching hospital, one district general hospital and 
one private hospital) were included using purposive sampling. These hospitals 
were invited to participate as they each represented one of the three different 
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types of hospital within the UK. Had hospitals of the same type been included 
instead of different types, this would have limited the collected data. Patients 
were considered eligible if they were over 16 years of age, able to speak English, 
able and willing to give informed consent and either situated on a surgical ward. 
Patient demographics can be seen in the following results section. 
 
4.3.3 Measures 
The ‘Factors affecting hospital patient’s willingness to seek help’ questionnaire 
was developed by generating a list of categories and questions from previous 
studies exploring the role of patients in healthcare, which were debated and 
confirmed by the research team46,127. Subsequently the survey was trialed with 
15 patients to ensure face validity and that the language used was 
comprehensible. Multiple iterations were produced to ensure that the aims 
would be met using the questionnaire. The final questionnaire used in this study 
can be seen in Table 4A.  
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Table 4A Factors affecting hospital patients’ willingness to seek help 
questionnaire  
 
Please indicate your level of agreement with the following statements on a scale of 1-7 
Questions     Strongly  
   disagree 
 Strongly 
 agree 
1. Methods of calling for help 
If I was feeling unwell in my hospital I would be most likely to: 
Call for help by pressing my buzzer 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Call for help by calling over a nurse 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Call for help by calling over a doctor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
2. Prompts to action – Type of problem        
I would press my buzzer if:        
My wound started bleeding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was in pain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I thought another patient was unwell 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My observations had not been done recently 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I knew I had received the wrong medication  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My wound dressing came off  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt sick 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would call over a nurse if:        
My wound started bleeding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was in pain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I thought another patient was unwell 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My observations had not been done recently 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I knew I had received the wrong medication  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My wound dressing came off  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt sick 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would call over a doctor if:        
My wound started bleeding 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I was in pain 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I thought another patient was unwell 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My observations had not been done recently 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I knew I had received the wrong medication  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
My wound dressing came off  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I felt sick 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
3. Prompts to action – Healthcare professional factors        
I would be more likely to seek help if:        
A nurse told me it was ok to ask questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A doctor told me it was ok to ask questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A fellow patient told me it was ok to ask questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
A relative told me it was ok to ask questions 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Staff members wore badges saying it was ok to ask 
questions 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
4. Potential barriers to calling for help – Psychosocial factors        
If I called for help from a healthcare professional I would 
worry: 
       
That I am taking up too much time 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
That I would look stupid 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
That I would be perceived as a difficult patient 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
That my medical care would suffer as a result 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
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The final questionnaire consisted of 33 items divided into six categories. 
Three items aimed to explore the methods used by patients to call for help, 21 
items explored the likelihood of a patient calling for help depending on the cue, 
and these included both visual cues of deterioration (e.g. bleeding or a wound 
dressing falling off) and physical cues of deterioration (e.g. pain or vomiting). 
Five items investigated potential ways of encouraging patients to call for help 
and the final four items aimed to identify potential barriers to patients calling for 
help. Participants answered each item on a seven point Likert scale ranging from 
‘strongly-disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly-agree’ (7).  
 
4.3.4 Patient-demographic questionnaire 
In addition, a socio-demographic questionnaire was also compiled for each 
participant to complete. Data on gender, age, ethnicity, employment status, 
surgical specialty and whether the patient was admitted electively or emergently 
were gathered (see Appendix B). 
 
4.3.5 Statistical analyses 
Data were analysed using IBM SPSS Statistics® (Version 21). The data in the 
main questionnaire were treated as continuous (as per previous studies of 
similar methodology)127,128,130. Means and standard deviations for each item in 
the questionnaire were computed before scale reliability analysis was performed 
using Cronbach’s Alpha to ensure that the items grouped together in categories 
demonstrated internal consistency.  The analysis of variance (ANOVA) for 
repeated measures test was used to compare the means for groups of items; 
post-hoc analysis was performed using the Bonferroni correction. The t-test was 
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used to examine differences and associations between individual items and 
demographic data. Statistical significance was taken when p<0.05. 
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4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Patient demographics 
155 patients between 16 and 100 years of age completed the questionnaire, 84 
were male. A total of 26 patients were approached and elected not to participate 
(83% response rate). Table 4B displays the patient demographics.  
 
Table 4B Patient demographics 
 
Demographic Number of patients 
Gender 
Male 83 
Female 71 
Not disclosed 1 
Job status 
Employed 83 
Unemployed 19 
Retired 39 
Student 10 
Not disclosed 4 
Ethnicity 
White 120 
Asian/Asian British 14 
Black/Black British 10 
Other 3 
Not disclosed 8 
Age 
Mean 50.8 
Standard deviation 19.7 
Surgical specialty 
General 60 
Urology 35 
Orthopaedic 24 
Colorectal 13 
Breast 7 
Ear, Nose and Throat 7 
Plastic 6  
Bariatric 3 
Admission status 
Elective 79 
Emergency 74 
Not disclosed 2 
Hospital type  
Teaching 55 
District General 84 
Private 16 
 
4.4.2 Questionnaire results 
Descriptive statistics for each questionnaire item can be seen in Table 4C.  
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Table 4C Descriptive statistics for each questionnaire item 
 
 Items   Mean    SD 
1. Methods of seeking help   
If I was feeling unwell in my hospital I would be most willing to:   
Seek help by pressing my buzzer 6.50 1.05 
Seek help by calling over a nurse 5.68 1.58 
Seek help by calling over a doctor 4.33 2.22 
2. Cues to action – Type of problem   
I would press my buzzer if:   
My wound started bleeding 6.65 0.78 
I was in pain 6.30 1.09 
I thought another patient was unwell 5.91 1.44 
My observations had not been done recently 4.62 1.99 
I knew I had received the wrong medication 6.26 1.32 
My wound dressing came off 6.04 1.39 
I felt sick 4.18 2.28 
Total  5.72 1.75 
I would call over a nurse if:   
My wound started bleeding 6.42 1.15 
I was in pain 6.11 1.32 
I thought another patient was unwell 5.80 1.61 
My observations had not been done recently 4.80 1.96 
I knew I had received the wrong medication 6.18 1.41 
My wound dressing came off 5.91 1.51 
I felt sick 5.98 1.36 
Total  5.88 1.56 
I would call over a doctor if:   
My wound started bleeding 4.80 2.28 
I was in pain 4.67 2.15 
I thought another patient was unwell 4.60 2.13 
My observations had not been done recently 3.76 2.18 
I knew I had received the wrong medication 4.93 2.17 
My wound dressing came off 4.18 2.29 
I felt sick 4.40 2.18 
Total  4.50 2.22 
3. Cues to action – Healthcare professional factors   
I would be more willing to seek help if:   
A nurse told me it was ok to ask questions 5.67 1.63 
A doctor told me it was ok to ask questions 5.94 1.58 
A fellow patient told me it was ok to ask questions 3.92 1.95 
A relative told me it was ok to ask questions 4.22 2.05 
Staff members wore badges saying it was ok to ask questions 4.64 2.17 
Total  4.89 2.04 
4. Potential barriers to seeking help – Psychosocial factors   
If I sought help from a healthcare professional I would worry:   
That I am taking up too much time 4.41 2.02 
That I would look stupid 3.05 2.10 
That I would be perceived as a difficult patient 3.68 2.18 
That my medical care would suffer as a result 3.01 2.26 
Total  3.54 2.21 
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The internal consistency of each group of items can be seen in Table 4D. 
Table 4D Internal consistency of groups of items 
 
Category Number of items Internal consistency (α) 
Methods of seeking help 3 0.482 
Cues to action - buzzer 7 0.690 
Cues to action – nurse 7 0.858 
Cues to action - doctor 7 0.951 
Cues to action – HCP factors 5 0.860 
Barriers to seeking help 4 0.791 
N.B. HCP=Health-Care Professional 
 
4.4.3 Methods of calling for help 
Patients indicated they would be most willing to seek help by pressing a bedside 
buzzer, followed by alerting a nurse directly and that they would be least willing 
to seek help directly from a doctor (F2,125=66.546, p<0.001). The scale 
consistency for methods of seeking help was moderate (α=0.482).  
Cues to action – using the buzzer: There were significant differences in how 
willing a patient would be to call for help using the buzzer depending on the 
different cues to action (F6, 130=60.792, p<0.001). Post-hoc analysis revealed that 
patients would be most willing to call for help using the buzzer if they were 
bleeding compared to all the other cues to action (all p<0.025). Other cues to 
action likely to result in the patient being willing to call for help using the buzzer 
were pain and if they thought they had received the wrong medication. Patients 
were least willing to call for help using a buzzer if they thought their vital signs 
had not been recently recorded or they felt sick (all p<0.001). The scale 
consistency for cues to action using the buzzer was acceptable (α=0.690). 
Cues to action – calling over a nurse: There were significant differences in how 
willing a patient would be to call over a nurse for help depending on the different 
cues to action (F6, 133=28.292, p<0.001). Patients would be most willing to call 
over a nurse for help if they were bleeding compared to all other cues to action 
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(all p<0.035). Other strong cues to calling over a nurse were if the patient 
thought they had been given the wrong medication, thought another patient was 
unwell, were in pain, felt sick or their dressing fell off. Patients were least willing 
to call for help if they felt their vital signs had not been recently recorded 
(p<0.001). The scale consistency for cues to action - calling over a nurse was 
good (α=0.858). 
Cues to action – calling over a doctor: There were significant differences in 
how willing a patient would be to call over a doctor for help depending on the 
different cues to action (F6, 134=14.507, p<0.001). Post-hoc analysis revealed that 
patients would be significantly less willing to call over a doctor for help if they 
felt their vital signs had not been recorded recently or their dressing fell off. 
There were no significant differences between the other cues to action. The scale 
consistency for cues to action - calling over a doctor was excellent (α=0.951). 
Comparison between all cues to action: Testing of all cues to action combined 
together revealed that there were significant differences between patient’s 
willingness to call for help depending on the cue (F6, 136=47.156, p<0.001). Post-
hoc analysis revealed that patients were most willing to call for help due to 
bleeding, pain or if they thought they had been given the wrong medication. They 
were less willing to call for help if they thought another patient was unwell or 
their dressing fell off. They were least willing to call for help if they felt sick or 
thought their vital signs hadn’t been recorded recently (see Table 4E).  
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Table 4E Patient’s willingness to seek help per the cue to action 
Cue to action Mean SD 
Bleeding 5.96 1.74 
Pain 5.71 1.73 
Thought another patient was unwell 5.42 1.84 
Vital signs had not been recorded recently 4.84 2.01 
Given the wrong medication 5.80 1.78 
Dressing fell off 5.40 2.00 
Felt sick 4.87 2.13 
 
4.4.4 Effects of patient demographics 
Differences in cues to action in relation to patient demographics: 
Male patients were more willing to call for help if they felt sick than their female 
counterparts (mean 4.58 vs. 3.74, t136=2.177, p=0.031); there were no 
differences for other cues to action in relation to gender. Patients in the district 
general hospital were more willing to call for help due to bleeding than those in 
the teaching hospital (mean 6.75 vs. 6.39, F2, 144=4.134, p=0.029). Patients in the 
private hospital and district general hospital were more willing to call for help if 
their dressing fell off than those in the teaching hospital (mean 6.40 vs 5.43 and 
mean 6.27 vs 5.43). There were also differences between how willing patients 
were to call for help when feeling sick between the different types of hospital (F2, 
136=3.237, p=0.042), however, post-hoc analysis results failed to reach statistical 
significance. There were no differences for other cues to action in relation to the 
hospital type. There were no statistically significant differences between all the 
cues to action and the admission status, job status, specialty or ethnicity of 
patients.  
Differences in methods of calling for help in relation to patient 
demographics: There were no significant differences in methods of calling for 
help when patient demographics were taken into account. 
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4.4.5 Encouraging patients to call for help 
There were significant differences between the healthcare professional factors 
that may encourage patients to call for help (F4, 138=66.772, p<0.001). Post-hoc 
analysis revealed that patients were more willing to call for help if encouraged 
by a doctor rather than a nurse (p=0.002). They were also more willing to ask 
questions if encouraged by a healthcare professional, either verbally or by 
wearing a badge, rather than a relative or fellow patient (all p<0.01). The scale 
consistency for encouraging patients to call for help was good (α=0.860). 
 
4.4.6 Potential barriers to patients calling for help 
There were significant differences between the degrees to which patients worry 
about potential barriers to calling for help (F4, 138=25.998, p<0.001). Post-hoc 
analysis revealed that patients are more likely to worry about taking up too 
much time when seeking help than being perceived as a difficult patient (all 
p<0.001). In addition, being perceived as difficult worried patients more than the 
potential for them to be thought of as stupid (p<0.002) or that their medical care 
might suffer as a result (p<0.002). The scale consistency for encouraging patients 
to call for help was good (α=0.791). 
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4.5 Discussion 
Performing any type of surgery places patients at risk. They should therefore, be 
involved in all research to improve patient safety in surgery. This cross-sectional 
survey study is the first to explore the factors affecting patients’ willingness to 
call for help, thereby initiating the escalation of care process, on surgical wards. 
This study aimed to also establish how, and from whom, patients are willing to 
call for help, explore how to encourage patients to call for help and identify 
barriers to them calling for help. The findings will be discussed in relation to 
these aims and in the context of the wider literature. Following this the 
implications for the field of surgery will be discussed, taking the strengths and 
limitations of the methodology used into account. Lastly, some conclusions will 
be updated.  
 
4.5.1 Summary of findings and context within the literature 
Methods of seeking help: Patients indicated that they would be most likely to 
seek help using the bedside buzzer but also indicated a willingness to engage 
directly with nurses and doctors if they were present at the right time. 
Prompts to calling for help: Irrespective of the method used, physical signs of 
illness such as bleeding were most likely to prompt a patient to call for help. Pain 
and the provision of incorrect medication were also likely to prompt a call for 
help. Patients placed less importance on the frequency with which their vital 
signs were recorded. 
Differences in prompts to calling for help in relation to patient 
demographics: Male patients appeared more willing to call for help if they felt 
sick but there were no other differences in relation to gender. This difference is 
not likely to be clinically significant. Patients in private hospitals (and to a 
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degree, in district general hospitals) appeared more willing to call for help than 
those in academic institutions. This may be a reflection of the perceived higher 
workload of HCPs in academic institutions which tend to have higher volumes 
and rates of patient turnover131.  
Encouraging patients to call for help: Patients felt most encouraged to call for 
help when engaged with by healthcare professionals, especially doctors, 
compared to relatives or fellow patients.  
Barriers to patients calling for help: Taking up the time of busy HCPs and 
being perceived as difficult were the most significant barriers to patients calling 
for help in this study. Patients did not worry that their medical care would suffer 
as a result of calling for help, which is encouraging. It is interesting to note that 
patients worry about being perceived as difficult if they adopt a questioning role, 
a finding supported by Frosch et al. who found that being categorised as difficult 
may reduce the patient’s role in their own healthcare132. Previous research 
indicates that patients are willing to question HCPs about errors in their care, 
whilst other research found that the authoritarian role of physicians presents an 
obstacle to shared decision making46, 132. This study revealed that patients were 
less willing to call for help if they didn’t think their vital signs were being 
measured frequently than for other prompts. Fortunately, there are strict 
protocols in place in UK hospitals, dictating the frequency with which vital signs 
are measured so large time gaps should be a rarity28,43. 
 
4.5.2 Implications 
The main implication of this study is the identification of multiple factors that 
affect patients’ willingness to call for help on surgical wards and that these 
factors are of varying importance to different patient groups. It is concerning 
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that patients worry about taking up the time of healthcare staff and a greater 
effort is required from staff to appear visible and available to patients, ensuring 
they will escalate care early and ameliorate further deterioration. This study has 
provided the foundation for the development of interventions to ensure patients 
feel able to call for help and initiate the escalation of care process in a prompt 
fashion. Patient comfort rounds and other such interventions of this nature must 
be explored to quantify their impact on the escalation of care process133. 
 
4.5.3 Strengths and limitations 
This study has certain limitations. The participants were all recruited from 
London hospitals so the results may not be generalisable to other geographic 
regions or non-urban communities. Furthermore, the predominance of 
Caucasian participants means the sample may not be representative of other 
patient ethnicities. The questionnaire was self-reported so the ecological validity 
of the findings needs to be assessed (i.e. how willing patients are to call for help 
in real-life situations).  Lastly, the finding that patients would be more willing to 
call for help from a nurse than a doctor must be interpreted with caution; some 
participants commented that they would call for help from a doctor were one 
present on the ward but this is an infrequent occurrence.  
The mobile nature of doctors compared to nurses means that that nurses 
are more available to patients wishing to call for help. A study exploring the 
actual experiences of patients calling for help would be an interesting 
comparison to the theoretical study outlined in this article. However, there is 
also a key strength of this study. The design of the survey allowed exploration of 
the impact of different methods of calling for help on the various prompts and 
potential barriers to calling for help. A more simple design was considered (that 
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would have used categorical data) but this would not have allowed the depth of 
findings encountered in this study.  
 
4.5.4 Conclusions 
The findings from this study represent novel and valuable insights into the 
factors affecting patient’s willingness to call for help on surgical wards. Taking 
these factors into account may allow HCPs to focus on patient groups who are 
less willing to call for help, and cues to calling for help that are not heeded 
regularly by patients, to avoid delays in treatment.  
Future work will use the findings of the review in chapter 2, the 
qualitative study of healthcare professionals and escalation of care in chapter 3 
and the findings from this study to inform interventions to improve the 
escalation of care process. However, before this occurs, the findings of these 
three chapters must be prioritised for action. This is explored in the next chapter 
of this thesis. 
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4.6 Phase 2 
Understanding problems within the escalation of care process and 
identifying potential improvement strategies  
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 have enabled an understanding of what escalation of care is, 
what impact delayed escalation of care has on patient outcome and the factors 
that may facilitate or impede escalation of care, from both the patient and the 
healthcare professional’s viewpoint. Therefore, the next step is to identify areas 
for intervention within the escalation of care process. In chapter 5, the escalation 
of care process will be mapped out, risk assessed and stakeholders will be asked 
to prioritise areas for intervention. Following this, in chapter 6, a focus group 
study will be reported. This study further explores one of the principal findings 
from chapter 5, the potential for communication technology to improve 
escalation of care. 
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5 A systematic, prospective risk assessment of the escalation 
of care process in surgery to identify strategies for the 
avoidance of patient harm 
            
 
5.1 Introduction 
The escalation of care process is fraught with difficulty; the review in chapter 2 
demonstrated that failures in escalation of care are ubiquitous with at least one 
in five patients experiencing escalation of care delays resulting in a delay of 
urgent treatment86,134.  The effect of these delays can be catastrophic; patients 
experiencing delayed escalation have an increased risk of morbidity65 and 
mortality68,84. Chapters 3 and 4 have reported valuable insights into the 
escalation of care process, from both the patient and healthcare professional 
perspective. However, further investigation of the escalation of care process is 
warranted if the momentum in patient safety and quality research is to be 
extended onto surgical wards.  
Recent reports from the Joint Commission for Patient Safety in the USA 
and the Francis inquiry in the UK have identified a requirement for more 
proactive risk assessments of healthcare processes120,135. Healthcare Failure 
Mode Effects Analysis (HFMEA) is a systematic method of conducting a proactive 
risk assessment136.  It allows for the most hazardous failures in a process to be 
identified and prioritised, so that interventions can be targeted at the most 
appropriate point.  HFMEA incorporates a multi-stage approach which utilises 
the expertise of a multidisciplinary team to develop process flow-charts, hazard 
scores and decision trees, which define areas of potential failure where the 
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patient is most susceptible to avoidable harm. Originally used by the US army, 
this research method has also been employed effectively by the aviation and 
motor industry for decades44,137. Within surgery, risk assessments using this 
approach have identified problems in hand washing and medication delivery110. 
However, no previous studies have conducted a proactive risk assessment of the 
escalation of care process in surgery. Not surprisingly therefore, interventions 
have not been developed with sound knowledge of the process and have had 
limited success in improving either the process of escalation, safety culture or 
patient outcomes78,88. 
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5.2 Aims 
1. To graphically describe the escalation of care process 
2. To risk assess the process and identify hazardous failures within it 
3. To understand the causes of hazardous failures within the process 
4. To prioritise areas within the process amenable to intervention 
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5.3 Methods 
5.3.1 Introduction to FMEA in healthcare 
The HFMEA process enables prospective identification of the severity, 
detectability and frequency of potential risks to patient care19. The standard 
HFMEA process involves the following steps: define the process being explored, 
assemble the research team, graphically describe the process, conduct a risk 
assessment, discuss areas for intervention and feedback recommendations to 
decision-makers. HFMEA differs from root cause analysis (RCA) in the timing of 
data collection. HFMEA aims to prospectively identify failures within a process to 
allow prevention prior to their occurrence. In contrast, RCA involves 
retrospective analysis of events leading to an adverse outcome using casenote 
analysis and interview techniques. The benefit of using HFMEA rather than RCA 
methodology is similar to a comparison of a prospective versus retrospective 
clinical study. As such HFMEA is a powerful tool for patient safety due to its 
proactive nature allowing identification and prevention of failures before they 
occur. 
This study used the validated HFMEA technique modified by the Veterans 
Affairs National Center for Patient Safety138 and was conducted in four phases. 
Phase 1: Ethnographic observation of escalation episodes on surgical wards.  
Phase 2: A risk assessment survey of the escalation of care process. Phase 3: 
Validation of hazard scores by patient safety and clinical risk experts through a 
consensus group meeting. Phase 4: Modified HFMEA to identify root causes of 
potentially hazardous failures and provide recommendations for intervention to 
prevent avoidable harm (see Figure 5A). 
 
 
 121 
5.3.2 Setting 
This study was carried out in four North-West London hospitals and included six 
surgery wards in both academic and district general settings. This region of 
London was chosen as three of these hospitals featured earlier in this thesis and 
wished to continue involvement in research exploring escalation of care. The 
remaining hospital was selected, as it was a different type of hospital to the other 
three (district general rather than academic/teaching). The study aimed to 
explore the escalation of care process in several different surgical specialties, 
therefore, six different surgical wards were selected to participate in the study. 
The rationale behind selecting different types of hospitals and multiple 
surgical wards was to increase the generalisability of the study findings beyond 
academic institutions. The specialty of surgery was chosen due to the fact that 
complication rates are higher in surgical specialties compared to medical. This 
allowed the observational part of this study to yield rich data on the steps of the 
escalation of care processes, where errors may occur and an understanding of 
how to prevent avoidable errors. This study was registered as a quality 
improvement project after consultation with the research compliance office in 
North-West London. 
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Figure 5A Study design and steps of the modified HFMEA methodology 
 
 
Phase 1 
• Purpose: To identify steps in the escalation of care process 
• Method: Ethnographic Observations in real-time (42 hours) 
• Participants: Inter-professional healthcare staff (n=7) 
Phase 2 
• Purpose: To identify potential failures for each step of the EOC process and attribute hazard 
scores (severity x frequency x detectability of failure) 
• Methods: Risk Assessment Survey  
• Participants: Multi-disciplinary healthcare staff (n=30) 
Phase 3 
• Purpose: To validate hazard scores for failure of each step of the EOC process  
• Methods: Focus Group Consensus meeting 
• Participants: Patient Safety & Clinical Risk Experts (n=5) 
Phase 4 
• Purpose: To identify root causes of failures and to provide recommendations for 
preventing/ameliorating/mitigating avoidable harm  
• Methods: Modified HFMEA focus group  
• Participants: Multi-disciplinary healthcare staff and patient (n=12) 
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5.3.3 Phase 1: Ethnographic observations 
Ethnographic observations were conducted to ensure comprehensive capture of 
all of the steps in the escalation of care process. Ethnographic observation allows 
researchers to witness events in-situ and in real-time with minimal interference. 
In this study the observers were external to the organisation where the study 
took place and, as such, were not known to staff members. Ward staff members 
were notified that observers would be conducting an evaluation of clinical 
communication on the wards and had agreed to the presence of observers prior 
to commencement of the study. Observational work also gives the researcher 
insight into how teams and organisations work; this is important for escalation 
of care as it is a collaborative rather than individual process24.  
Two researchers with a background in general surgery and patient safety 
observed and kept detailed ethnographic field notes on episodes of patient 
deterioration and escalation of care on general surgery wards and surgical high-
dependency units for 42 hours. During this time, 28 escalation events were 
observed. Each stakeholder in the process (HCA, nurse, FY1, SHO, registrar and 
consultant surgeon) worked on a postoperative surgical ward and was observed 
for two separate 3.5-hour sessions, one by each observer (a total of 42 hours). As 
per the study protocol, all observations were conducted in 3.5-hour aliquots. If 
an event of interest was occurring at the 3.5-hour mark the observer remained 
until that event had been concluded. Each stakeholder was observed for one 
session during normal working hours (8am-5pm) and one session outside of 
normal working hours (5pm-8am).  
While a single stakeholder was the primary focus of each observation 
session, the inter-professional nature of escalation of care meant that multiple 
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stakeholders were encountered during each session (e.g. nurse contacting 
registrar regarding a deteriorating patient). The observers performed the 
primary 3.5 hour observation session together to ensure consistency of data 
capture in future sessions. These sessions took place between January and March 
2013. No data was collected that could identify staff members and as such, no 
evaluation of individual staff members was conducted. All data was anonymised 
at the point of collection. From these observations a comprehensive flow 
diagram of the escalation of care process was produced with input from all 
investigators and the literature6,25,26 (see Table 5A).  
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Table 5A Validated escalation of care process flow diagram  
 
Hazard scoring system 
Score* Severity** Frequency  Detectability 
4 Death 1 per day Remote 
3 Disability 1 per week Low 
2 Increased stay 1 per month Moderate 
1 None of the above 1 per year High 
* The three scores were multiplied together to give a hazard score, (Maximum score =64). 
** The severity was interpreted as the worst possible potential outcome from each failure mode. 
 
 
Key: 
Single point –This failure may cause total failure of the escalation process 
Control - An effective control measure exists that adequately addresses the failure for this step 
Bold text = hazardous, uncontrolled failures 
Italic text = hazard score not exceeding threshold 
Underlined text = hazardous, controlled failures 
 
 
Start – an acutely deteriorating surgical patient is in a ward or HDU bed 
 
Step 
number 
System step Failure mode S F D Hazard score Single 
point 
Control  
1 Patient feels unwell Patient does not feel 
unwell 
      
2 Patient informs 
HCA 
Patient does not 
inform HCA 
    x  
3 Visitor notices 
patient is unwell 
Visitor does not notice 
that patient is unwell 
      
4 Visitor informs HCA Visitor does not 
inform HCA 
      
5 HCA notices that 
the patient is 
unwell 
HCA does not notice 
that the patient is 
unwell 
      
6 HCA attends 
patients 
HCA does not attend 
patient 
      
7 HCA records vital 
signs correctly 
HCA does not record 
vital signs correctly 
      
8 HCA informs nurse 
that patient is 
unwell 
HCA does not inform 
nurse that patient is 
unwell 
      
9 Nurse notices that 
the patient is 
unwell 
Nurse does not 
notice that the 
patient is unwell 
    x  
10 Nurse attends 
patient 
Nurse does not 
attend patient 
      
11 Nurse assesses 
patient correctly 
Nurse does not 
assess patient 
correctly 
     x 
12 Nurse measures 
vital signs 
correctly 
Nurse does not 
measure vital signs 
correctly 
    x  
13 Nurse documents 
vital signs 
correctly 
Nurse does not 
document vital 
signs correctly 
      
14 
 
Nurse adheres to 
escalation/MEWS 
protocol correctly 
Nurse does not 
adhere to 
escalation/MEWS 
protocol correctly 
    x x 
15 Nurse informs 
senior nurse 
Nurse does not 
inform senior nurse 
      
16 Senior nurse 
contacts doctor 
Senior nurse does 
not contact doctor 
      
17 Doctor attends 
patient 
Doctor does not 
attend patient 
     x 
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18 Doctor takes a 
history correctly 
Doctor does not 
take a history 
correctly 
      
19 Doctor examines 
patient correctly 
Doctor does not 
examine patient 
correctly 
      
20 Doctor checks vital 
signs chart 
correctly 
Doctor does not check 
vital signs chart 
correctly 
      
21 Doctor checks 
drug chart 
correctly 
Doctor does not 
check drug chart 
correctly 
    x  
22 Doctor checks 
fluid chart 
correctly 
Doctor does not 
check fluid balance 
chart correctly 
    x  
23 Doctor checks blood 
sugar chart 
correctly 
Doctor does not check 
blood sugar chart 
correctly 
     x 
24 Doctor checks 
patient records 
correctly 
Doctor does not 
check patient 
records correctly 
    x  
25 Doctor checks blood 
test results 
correctly 
Doctor does not check 
blood test results 
correctly 
      
26 Doctor checks 
imaging results 
correctly 
Doctor does not check 
imaging results 
correctly 
     x 
27 Doctor starts 
correct treatment 
Doctor does not 
start correct 
treatment 
    x  
28 Doctor orders 
correct tests 
Doctor does not order 
correct tests 
      
29 Doctor reviews new 
results correctly 
Doctor does not 
review new results 
correctly 
      
30 Doctor contacts 
senior doctor 
Doctor does not 
contact senior 
doctor 
    x  
21 Senior doctor 
attends the patient 
Senior doctor does 
not attend the patient 
      
32 Senior doctor 
assesses the patient 
correctly 
Senior doctor does 
not assess the patient 
correctly 
      
 REPEAT CYCLE OF 
ASSESSMENTS 
       
33 Senior doctor 
arranges 
definitive transfer 
(e.g. ITU, theatres, 
interventional 
radiology) 
Senior doctor does 
not arrange 
definitive transfer 
    x  
 
5.3.4 Phase 2: Risk assessment survey 
This phase was conducted to provide quantitative data on stakeholders’ views of 
the level of risk associated with each step of the escalation process. Data were 
collected through a detailed risk assessment survey based upon the observations 
from phase 1 in two London hospitals (hospitals 1 and 3 in Table 5B). All 
stakeholder groups in the escalation process completed the survey (n=30). From 
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the 1st hospital there were two consultant surgeons, seven surgical registrars, 
two surgical FY1s, three nurses and two HCAs from the postoperative surgery 
ward. From the 2nd hospital there were two consultant surgeons, four surgical 
registrars, three surgical FY1s and five nurses from the postoperative surgery 
ward. Participants used a four-point scale to rate the potential consequences of 
failure for each step in the escalation process according to the likelihood of 
occurrence, potential harm associated with failure to escalate and the 
detectability of a problem being identified prior to patient harm. These three 
ratings were multiplied together to calculate hazard scores for each process step 
(see top of Table 5A). 
 
Table 5B Details of the hospitals participating in the HFMEA 
 
Hospital Type of 
hospital 
Bed 
volume 
Wards 
observed 
(n) 
Surgical 
specialties 
on ward(s) 
Patients on 
a typical 
ward (n) 
Grades of 
surgeon in 
clinical team 
Surgical 
HDU 
(number 
of beds) 
Hospital 1 Academic 418 2 General 
Vascular 
 
18 1xFY1 
1xSHO 
1x SpR 
General 
(4) 
Vascular 
(6) 
Hospital 2 Academic 
 
500 1 General 
Urology 
26 1xFY1 
1xSHO 
1xSpR 
No 
Hospital 3 Academic 430 1 Emergency 
General 
28 2xFY1 
1xSHO 
1xSpR 
Yes (4) 
Hospital 4 District 
General 
463 2 Vascular 
Urology 
General 
32 1xFY1 
1xSHO 
1xSpR 
Yes (5) 
 
5.3.5 Phase 3: Hazard score validation 
The hazard scores from the risk assessment were then validated by a group of 
patient safety and clinical risk experts. There were two consensus group sessions 
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involving five participants each that occurred two weeks after the initial risk 
assessment to allow the surveys to be analysed in the intervening period. 
Participants were recruited from the Centre for Patient Safety and Service 
Quality at Imperial College. The participants in each group were a patient safety 
manager, clinical risk director, surgeon, physician and critical care nurse. A 
facilitator was also present but did not express any opinions; their role was to 
structure discussions and act as a timekeeper.  
Each process step and hazard score was discussed within the group and 
consensus was reached before moving on to the next step. To allow 
prioritisation, a hazard score threshold of 50% was chosen based upon previous 
guidelines for HFMEA methodology in surgical research20,25.  Process steps 
exceeding this threshold were classified as hazardous (patient at risk of 
avoidable harm) and carried forward to the modified HFMEA. 
 
5.3.6 Phase 4: Modified HFMEA 
Formal modified HFMEA was used to confirm the failures and hazard scores 
associated with each of the hazardous process steps. These failures and hazard 
scores were generated based upon the literature20,21 and observations in phase 
1, the risk assessment in phase 2 and expert opinion in phase 3 so as to provide a 
triangulated approach ensuring detection of all potential failures in the process. 
An inter-professional HFMEA team was assembled consisting of a patient, an 
HCA and two nurses from a post-operative surgery ward, two surgical FY1s, four 
surgical registrars and two consultant surgeons. The patient was recruited from 
the post-operative general surgical outpatient clinic having had major abdominal 
surgery three weeks previously. The team was supplemented by a patient safety 
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researcher experienced in the HFMEA process acting as a facilitator and ensuring 
that participants were given equal opportunity to air their views.  
After explanation of the HFMEA procedure, the team checked the process 
diagram to ensure completeness. Following this, the hazard score for each failure 
mode was reviewed and discussed using decision-tree analysis. Here each failure 
mode was assessed in terms of its potential detectability and whether there were 
pre-existing control measures in place, were it to occur. Hazardous failures, 
which lacked control measures and were not easily detectable, were prioritised 
for further action.  To eliminate the potential for participants with leadership 
qualities to dominate, each participant individually, and privately, scored each 
failure prior to discussion. Final ratings were reached through additional 
consensus agreement; if consensus was not possible the failure was 
automatically included in further analysis. This ensured all potentially hazardous 
failures were reviewed to minimise selection bias.  
The HFMEA team explored each potential cause of a process failure using 
the framework for incident investigation from the London protocol root cause 
analysis method27.  Potential causes were categorised into organisational, 
environmental, patient, staff (individual), team and task related factors. Serial 
causes for each failure were suggested until a definitive or root cause within 
each relevant category of the London protocol could be identified (see Figure 
5B)116. This meant that each failure could have more than one cause if the 
participants assigned causes to multiple categories within the protocol. 
Identification of the underlying causes of a failure allowed synthesis of 
recommendations aimed at preventing the failure in the future. Suggested 
interventions were then fed back to managers and clinical directors through a 
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clinical governance meeting and report. Finally, each participant was asked to fill 
out a questionnaire describing their perceptions of the success of the research 
method and their knowledge of patient safety. 
 
Figure 5B Systems analysis of clinical incidents: The London protocol 
 
Reproduced from: Vincent C, Taylor-Adams S, Stanhope N. Framework for 
analysing risk and safety in clinical medicine. BMJ. 1998;316: 1154-1157. 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Phase 1: Ethnographic observations 
Ethnographic observations of surgical patients and staff led to the identification 
of 33 core steps involved in a successful escalation of care process. Additional 
steps could have been added to this depending on whether a junior surgeon 
(FY1/SHO) escalated directly to a consultant surgeon or via their registrar (see 
Table 5A). As this eventuality would only involve a repeat cycle of assessments 
(registrar review followed by consultant review), these steps were combined 
and considered together. The observation phase of this study revealed escalation 
to be a stepwise process prone to failure until a patient received definitive 
management to enable recovery (see Figure 5C).
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Figure 5C A step-diagram showing the pathway to successful escalation of care 
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5.4.2 Phases 2 and 3: Risk assessment survey and validation of hazard 
scores 
Of the 33 process steps involved in escalation of care, the risk assessment 
participants identified a total of 17 hazardous failures that exceeded the hazard 
score threshold. The patient safety and clinical risk experts identified one 
additional hazardous failure via consensus agreement; this was the patient 
informing the HCA they feel unwell, rather than going straight to the nurse. 
These 18 steps were taken forward to discussion in the modified HFMEA.  
 
5.4.3 Phase 4: Modified HFMEA 
The steps with associated hazardous failures within the process were presented 
to the modified HFMEA team. The HFMEA team then repeated the hazard 
scoring, the lowest possible score was one and the highest possible score was 64. 
Ratings applied by the HFMEA team ranged from 27 to 48. The hazard score 
threshold was >26; therefore, all of the 18 process steps identified as hazardous 
in the risk assessment were confirmed by the HFMEA team. During the 
discussion, participants decided that three of these 18 hazardous steps had 
failures that were already adequately controlled with pre-existing protocols 
(common to all participating hospitals) so a total of 15 (45%) steps were carried 
forward to cause analysis and solution synthesis (see Table 5C). The three 
controlled failures were the nurse failing to assess the patient correctly, the 
nurse failing to adhere to the escalation protocol correctly and the doctor failing 
to attend the patient. The control measures identified by participants were the 
use of vital signs measurement (which participants identified as objective 
physiological evidence of deterioration), the requirement for nurse assistants 
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and junior nurses to check all abnormal vital signs with the senior nurse for the 
ward and the directive which empowered nurses to contact senior registrars or 
consultants if more junior surgeons were not receptive to their request for 
assistance. 
The causes and recommended solutions to uncontrolled, hazardous 
failures are described below. These are described according to the sequence of 
healthcare professional involvement when a patient becomes unwell and 
typically include nursing, junior surgeon and senior doctor stages.  
 
Table 5C Details of steps taken forward to HFMEA 
 
Process 
phase 
Steps with 
hazardous 
failures 
Average 
hazard score* 
Steps included 
in HFMEA 
Controlled 
steps 
Steps analysed 
in HFMEA 
Nursing 16 26.8 9 2 7 
Junior surgeon 14 25.1 8 1 7 
Senior surgeon 3 28 1 0 1 
Total (mean) 33 (26.6) 18 3 15 
* Threshold score for progression to modified HFMEA was > 26. 
 
 
5.4.4 Process steps involving nursing staff 
Causes: There were seven steps with hazardous, uncontrolled failures to 
consider in the nursing stage of the escalation process (see Table 5D). These 
were the patient failing to inform the HCA they feel unwell, failure of the nurse to 
attend the patient, failure to notice the patient is deteriorating, failure to 
measure the vital signs correctly, failure to document the vital signs correctly, 
failure to inform the senior nurse that the patient is deteriorating and failure to 
inform the junior surgeon about the deterioration. Participants felt that clinical 
understaffing was the principal cause of all these failures. They explained that a 
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greater (and therefore more visible) staff presence would allow patients to raise 
concerns about their wellbeing more easily. Interim causes of these failures 
included patient alarm bells not working, inexperience, use of agency staff, 
patients with dementia or communication difficulties and transcription errors 
when recording vital signs. An interim cause means a cause that contributed to a 
failure but was not felt to be the root cause. Regarding communication between 
the nurse and junior surgeon; the participants felt that both human and 
technological factors were contributory. Human factors included the nurses 
fearing criticism by junior surgeons, technological factors principally revolved 
around the limitations of the pager system. 
Recommendations: The recommendations made by participants can be seen in 
full in Table 5D.  The participants felt that more consideration needs to be given 
to the level of nursing cover that is considered safe. An adequate nurse: patient 
ratio should be provided that allows regular comfort rounds and patient checks. 
Furthermore, investment and training in the use of electronic vital sign recording 
and documentation systems could improve the detection of a deteriorating 
patient and should be explored.  To remove hierarchical barriers both within and 
across disciplines, participants recommended development and implementation 
of a clear escalation protocol guided by early warning scores. Increased 
investment in, and use of, technology such as smartphones and tablet computers 
could also facilitate communication. 
 
5.4.5 Process steps involving junior surgeons 
Causes: There were 7 steps with hazardous, uncontrolled failures in the stage 
involving junior surgeons assessing and managing a deteriorating patient (see 
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Table 5D). These were failure to take an adequate history, failure to examine the 
patient thoroughly, failure to check the drug and fluid balance charts or case 
notes, failure to commence the correct initial treatment and failure to inform a 
senior doctor of patient deterioration. The causes of these failures included 
hierarchical and language barriers, senior staff being busy in the operating 
theatre and unable to answer a pager, understaffing, charts being poorly 
designed or unavailable on the ward, junior surgeon inexperience, illegible 
clinical notes and poor availability of equipment. 
Recommendations: The recommendations made by participants can be seen in 
full in Table 5D. The participants felt that recruitment of permanent staff to 
decrease reliance on agency staff could help overcome the issue of unfamiliarity 
with hospital IT systems and clinical pathways. To combat language barriers, 
interpreter services could be made more available. To improve the accessibility 
and legibility of clinical notes, drug and fluid charts; the development and 
implementation of an electronic system with portable and desktop computers on 
wards was advocated. To prevent incomplete assessment and treatment due to 
inadequate equipment, a nurse “champion” for each ward could ensure provision 
and procurement of vital supplies and instruments for clinical use (examples 
given by participants included intravenous fluids, a tendon hammer and a tuning 
fork). A low threshold for non-surgical personnel to review surgical patients 
with a medical complication could help earlier implementation of urgent 
treatments.  
To combat hierarchical barriers both within and across disciplines the 
senior doctors should be encouraged to be more proactive. This would mean that 
the responsibility for initiating contact would not be the sole responsibility of 
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juniors and nurses – the senior could for example make routine calls to ‘check-in’ 
with their junior counterpart. Education of junior surgeons to remind them that 
prompt escalation of care is vital for patient safety coupled with assurance that 
there would not be criticism for doing so were highlighted as key strategies. To 
avoid escalation delays caused by the senior doctor being busy in theatre, the 
development of a software platform with integrated patient demographics, 
pathology, radiology and vital signs to allow prompt escalation in the presence of 
patient deterioration was recommended. It was postulated that a theatre 
assistant could then inform the senior of deterioration if they could not get to the 
phone themself. 
 
5.4.6 Process steps involving senior surgeons 
Causes: There was one step with hazardous, uncontrolled failures in the senior 
doctor phase of the process (see Table 5D) which was the senior doctor failing 
to arrange definitive management. Participants felt this could be due to the 
senior doctor failing to contact an appropriate colleague or failing to arrange 
appropriate patient transfer to the operating theatre or ICU. The root causes of 
these failures were felt to be fear when faced with contacting the consultant 
surgeon or intensivist on duty and the presence of logistical barriers. These 
barriers included a lack of intensive care beds and uncertainty regarding the 
appropriate level of care for each patient. The participants also felt that only 
having a single theatre available for emergent surgeries out of normal working 
hours was a major safety concern. 
Recommendations: The recommendations made by participants can be seen in 
full in Table 5D. The participants felt that the issues regarding intensive care 
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beds and theatre access were particularly challenging and would require 
significant organisational re-structuring; this was outside the participant’s areas 
of expertise.  Regarding levels of care, the recommendation was to produce a 
clinical guideline defining appropriate levels of care according to patient 
diagnosis, physiological parameters and predictive scoring systems (the 
Modified Glasgow Score for pancreatitis was an example given by participants). 
 
5.4.7 Evaluation of the research method 
The participants felt that the modified HFMEA process was easy to interpret 
(75%) and had increased their awareness of patient safety (83%). They 
expressed enthusiasm about participating in further sessions (75%) and would 
also recommend participation to a colleague (83%).  
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Table 5D Causes of failures in escalation of care and recommendations for improvement 
Process phase and step 
with hazardous failures 
Causes of Failure Root cause Recommendations 
 
NURSING STEPS    
Patient fails to inform HCA 
they feel unwell 
Patient decides not to inform HCA 
 
Poor knowledge of patient personality More regular patient rounds 
Patient cannot inform HCA Bell not supplied or out of reach Nominate ward ‘champions’ 
Nurse fails to notice that 
patient is unwell 
Decides patient is not unwell Lack of specialty training Investment and training in detection of 
deterioration for nurses 
 
Use of agency staff Recruit more permanent staff 
Nurse fails to attend to 
patient promptly 
Fails to attend to patient promptly High workload Recruit more permanent staff 
Nurse fails to measure vital 
signs correctly 
Fails to measure vital signs correctly Lack of appropriate technology Invest in bedside electronic vital signs charts 
Nurse fails to document 
vital signs correctly 
Documents vital signs incorrectly on chart Transcribing error Invest in bedside electronic vital signs charts 
Nurse fails to inform senior 
nurse that patient is unwell 
Fails to inform junior surgeon Unclear escalation protocol Develop and publicize a clear escalation protocol 
 
Nurse fails to contact junior 
surgeon successfully 
Decides not to contact junior surgeon Hierarchical barriers Clear escalation protocol 
Lack of confidence Teach handover skills (e.g. SBAR*) to nursing staff 
Previous trouble with pager system Use of mobile telephones 
 
 
 
 
Pages doctor but no response 
Extension engaged when returning page Develop electronic patient platforms allowing 
transfer of patient information 
 
Unable to locate extension Use of mobile telephones 
Busy with a patient Use messaging services to send information 
Doctor receives multiple pages at once Use messaging services to send information 
 
Contacts but junior surgeon will not attend 
 
High workload Recruit more permanent staff 
Poor judgment Teach prioritisation skills 
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JUNIOR SURGEON STEPS    
Junior surgeon fails to take 
accurate history 
Fails to complete history Lack of specialty training Investment and training in detection of 
deterioration for junior surgeons 
 
Junior surgeon fails to 
complete thorough 
examination 
 
Unable to communicate with patient 
High workload Recruit more permanent staff 
Agency staff unfamiliar with hospital Recruit more permanent staff 
 
Language barriers Mobile phones able to call interpreter from bedside 
Fails to complete examination Patient positioning Increase ward staff numbers and manual handling  
 
Junior surgeon fails to 
review drug chart 
 
Completes incorrect examination 
Equipment not available Nominate ward equipment ‘champions’ 
 
High workload Recruit more permanent staff 
 
Fails to review chart 
Lack of specialty training Encourage cross-discipline co-operation 
Chart not on ward Electronic chart available across site 
 
Junior surgeon fails to 
review fluid chart 
Reviews chart incorrectly 
 
Illegible chart Computerized chart 
Reviews incorrect chart Human error Bedside software with electronic chart 
Fails to review chart Chart not on ward Electronic chart available across site 
 
Junior surgeon fails to 
review patient case notes 
 
Unable to fully review case notes 
Not completed accurately Education and training for staff 
Large files for long-term patients Electronic notes system with weekly summaries 
 
Junior surgeon fails to 
initiate correct treatment 
 
Selects incorrect treatment 
Illegible Computerized notes 
Lack of specialty training Support courses/teaching for junior medical staff 
 
 
Junior surgeon fails to 
contact senior doctor 
successfully 
Unable to commence correct treatment Equipment not available Nominate ward equipment ‘champions’ 
Decides not to contact senior doctor 
 
Attempts contact but no response 
Hierarchical barriers Clear escalation protocols 
 Contacts but senior doctor will not attend 
 
 
Contacts senior but delayed response 
Busy with a patient Use messaging services to send information 
Unable to locate extension Use of mobile telephones 
 
Extension engaged when returning 
contact 
 
Develop electronic patient platforms allowing 
transfer of patient information 
 
   
High workload Recruit more permanent staff 
Senior off-site Seniors from busy specialties to remain on-site 
when on-call 
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SENIOR DOCTOR STEPS    
Senior doctor fails to 
arrange definitive 
management 
Unable to transfer patient No ICU beds Set aside surgical ICU beds or a separate unit 
 
No theatre available Increase theatre availability for emergency surgery 
 
Uncertainty regarding appropriate level 
of care for patient 
Physiological parameter thresholds to decide level 
of care 
 
Fails to contact appropriate colleague Fear of consultant surgeon or intensivist Clear escalation protocol 
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5.5 Discussion 
 
This study represents the first systematic risk assessment of the entire 
escalation of care process, which encompasses the recognition, communication 
and response to a deteriorating patient on a surgical ward. The aims of this study 
were to graphically describe, systematically risk assess and analyse the 
escalation of care process so as to identify areas of failure and avoidable patient 
harm, understand their causes and make recommendations to improve patient 
safety on the surgical ward. The findings will be discussed in relation to these 
aims and the wider literature. Following this, the implications for the field of 
surgery will be discussed, taking the strengths and limitations of this research 
methodology into account. Lastly, some conclusions will be presented.  
 
5.5.1 Summary of findings and context within the literature 
Description of the escalation of care process: Using ethnographic 
observational techniques, the escalation of care process was comprehensively 
mapped out using a flow diagram. The process consists of 33 steps, several of 
which may be repeated should multiple junior surgeons assess the patient before 
a senior surgeon does so. 
Risk assessment and identification of failures: Using a stakeholder survey 
and hazard scoring, 18 steps within the process were deemed hazardous by 
participants and progressed forward to the modified HFMEA, three of these were 
felt to be adequately controlled so 15 of 33 hazardous steps were fully analysed. 
Understanding of cause and recommendation synthesis for intervention: 
The London protocol for cause analysis was combined with decision trees to 
determine the causes of failure within each hazardous step of the process. 
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Causes that were common throughout the process included staffing levels, 
resource allocation, inadequate clinical training and experience, limited 
communication technology and hierarchical barriers. Principal 
recommendations for intervention within the escalation of care process included 
the development of education for nurses and junior surgeons, recruitment of 
more permanent staff, increased use of technology and implementation of safe 
escalation of care protocols. 
This study exposes the significant vulnerabilities faced by patients on a 
surgical ward, at a point when high quality care is paramount to safety. It 
demonstrates that failures can occur at any step of the escalation of care 
pathway, highlighting poor resilience and reliability in the overall system. This is 
in contrast to other high-risk, safety critical industries such as aviation and the 
military where redundancy mechanisms are incorporated into the system to 
compensate for a potential failure at any one point, for example, through the use 
of back-up behaviors, dual-tasking and debriefing139.  
The concerns and recommendations described in this study are 
consistent with previous studies evaluating the safety of patient care.  In 
particular, clinical understaffing was highlighted as a significant contributor to 
delays in recognising and responding to a deteriorating patient. This finding is 
supported by worldwide research reporting better patient outcomes in centers 
with higher nurse staffing levels140,141. Staffing levels are also a focus for the 
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality and the Joint Commission142. They 
highlight that recruitment and retention of staff requires determined action from 
healthcare providers.  
 
 144 
The identification of communication failures leading to failed escalation of care is 
consistent with other work highlighting the ubiquitous nature of problems in 
information transfer across the surgical pathway143. Human factors and 
technological failure were identified as the root causes of communication 
failures. Regarding human factors, this study described the importance of 
overcoming hierarchical barriers between junior and senior surgeons as crucial 
for ensuring successful escalation of care. A flattened hierarchy is a key property 
of a safe system98; recommendations were made for a clear escalation protocol 
to facilitate this.  Others have reported that such escalation protocols can reduce 
ICU admission58 and mortality82 making them a cost-effective proposition, which 
could be readily implemented.  However, if measureable improvements in 
patient safety are to be attained, the safety culture of the healthcare institution 
must also be improved55,144.  
Recommendations regarding staff education and training were described 
as integral to this campaign so as to build capacity and capability in promoting 
patient safety. Evidence-based train-the-trainers courses and faculty 
development programs could be used to provide effective training at a large-
scale, institutional level145,146. The technology available to staff was also felt to be 
suboptimal. In particular, the view that the hospital pager is an outdated 
technology with significant flaws was also supported by the literature147.  
Many of the findings in this study are consistent with previous chapters in 
this thesis. The negative impact of hierarchy on escalation of care and the value 
of protocols were also identified in chapter 3. The use of a patient participant 
within this study echoes the method used in chapter 4 where patients were 
placed at the centre of the research. In addition, the link between escalation of 
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care, failure to rescue and patient safety identified in the review in chapter 2 has 
been reinforced by the findings in this study. 
 
5.5.2 Implications for the field of surgery 
This study has wide-reaching implications if further deterioration following 
adverse events in post-operative patients is to be prevented. This study 
highlights the complexity of the escalation of care process and, for the first time, 
describes the antecedents of the escalation of care process, which, if suboptimal, 
can lead to a failure to rescue event. In doing so it draws attention to the 
numerous areas where patients on surgical wards are susceptible to avoidable 
harm. The design and implementation of tailored interventions, based upon the 
recommendations of this study, should serve as a basis for future research. This 
can ensure that the quality of care received by a post-operative patient on a ward 
is at the same level as the exacting standards seen in the operating theatre.  
 
5.5.3 Strengths and limitations  
The modified methodology used in this study enabled the prospective capture of 
all potential failures as opposed to a retrospective analysis following an adverse 
event, which could be limited to the factors surrounding that event in particular. 
The length and depth of the observation period also allowed researchers to form 
a comprehensive map of escalation of care in surgery. The validation of process 
steps and associated failure modes by clinical risk and safety specialists 
strengthened the final analysis. The inclusion of all stakeholders in the surgical 
care pathway meant that robust recommendations were provided to decision 
makers.  
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The limitations to this study are present in all HFMEA processes. The 
subjective nature of participant’s views inevitably introduces a degree of bias; 
attempts were made to reduce this by ensuring group consensus at appropriate 
points throughout the process. In addition, the HFMEA process is built to 
consider process failures in isolation. If failures in the escalation process were to 
occur contemporaneously, the recommendations made in this study may fail to 
control them. This study was conducted in hospitals in the United Kingdom. 
Therefore, the findings may not be generalisable to other regions, countries or 
private health systems. However, the findings regarding a fear of criticism might 
be universally applied and are supported by earlier work in this thesis and in the 
wider literature. 
 
5.5.4 Conclusions 
This study has identified areas within the escalation of process that may be 
amenable to targeted intervention. Future work should concentrate on the 
development of well-designed interventions and analysis of their effect on 
surgical patients and healthcare professionals. 
The two improvement strategies most frequently recommended by 
participants in this study were improvement of communication skills (through 
human factors training and simulation) and improvement of communication 
technology. These key strategies must be explored further and will be the focus 
of the forthcoming chapters of this thesis. 
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6 Requirements of a new communication technology for 
handover and escalation of care: A mixed-methods study 
            
 
6.1 Introduction 
The HFMEA conducted in chapter 5 of this thesis demonstrated the priority 
areas for intervention within the escalation of care process. In addition, previous 
work in this thesis from chapter 2, 3 and 4 has indicated that timely and high-
quality information transfer is critical to the success of the process. Participants 
in the HFMEA in chapter 5 came to a consensus that one of the cornerstones of 
successful escalation of care is the ability to communicate effectively. They also 
demonstrated that the quality of communication is not just dependent on the 
communicators, it may also depend on the quality of the communication 
technology available to healthcare professionals. Poor communication has been 
specifically identified as a key cause of deteriorating patients receiving 
suboptimal care in the UK69. This is of grave concern as the National Reporting 
and Learning System found in 2005 that of 425 potentially preventable deaths in 
acute/general hospitals, 15% were as a result of poorly managed deteriorating 
patients, with 4% dying as a consequence of failings in the communication of 
escalation of care148. 
The majority of clinicians in UK hospitals use a pager device for two-way 
interprofessional communication, including when they need to escalate care. 
However, pagers were invented more than 50 years ago and have failed to evolve 
in the same progressive way that mobile phones and computers have done over 
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the last two decades149. Multiple industries have jettisoned the pager in favour of 
more advanced technology but healthcare has failed to follow suit. Since 1990, 
the mobile phone has progressed from a brick-sized device able to make and 
receive phone calls to palm-sized devices with the ability to send and receive 
phone-calls, text messages, emails, photos, videos and run software applications. 
During this time, the pager device has remained essentially the same and now 
appears to be hindering the safety of hospital patients150,151. Boulos et al. argue 
that the pervasive presence in society of smartphones and mobile app 
technology holds a great deal of potential for their use in healthcare152.  To this 
end, there has been an increase in the number of research articles in the area of 
mobile health (mHealth) and application development for smartphones. 
Unfortunately however, previous attempts to replace the pager device 
with a more modern, capable communication device have, thus far, been 
unsuccessful153. Research has been carried out on the use of smartphones as 
communication devices in hospital154. However these studies have focused on 
the convergence of modalities within one device i.e. the ability to choose 
between direct call, text message or e-mail. These studies highlighted that 
different health professions have different communication requirements. To date 
no study has considered the potential for smartphones, and more specifically, 
apps to improve interprofessional communication during escalation of care. 
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6.2 Aims 
1. Evaluate, through literature review, current methods of communication 
used in hospitals for escalation of care and handover 
2. Explore stakeholders’ perceptions of current communication technology 
and their opinions on the potential for Application Based Communication 
Systems (ABCS) to improve interprofessional communication 
3. Develop a guide for development of ABCS 
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6.3 Methods 
6.3.1 Phase 1: Literature review 
An in-depth picture of communication technologies that have been employed for 
interprofessional communication in hospital was gained through a narrative 
literature review.  This methodology was chosen to enable comprehensive 
capture of the published evidence surrounding current communication 
technologies used in healthcare settings and to enable the research team to gain 
knowledge of important themes for consideration in development of any future 
communication technology. Studies published on this topic prior to April 2013 
were identified from the following databases; Embase, Ovid Medline, Health 
Management Information Consortium, PsycINFO and PubMed. In addition, a 
snowballing technique was used to locate further studies.  
 
6.3.2 Phase 2: Qualitative exploration 
Study design and setting: A qualitative approach was deemed appropriate due 
to the exploratory nature of our research question. The methodology chosen was 
a focus group study. This methodology was chosen to allow collection of 
descriptive data from population subgroups119. An understanding of both the 
issues surrounding current communication during escalation of care and 
handover along with end-user perspectives on ABCS was needed. Focus groups 
were felt to be more appropriate for this purpose as escalation of care and 
handover are interprofessional processes, meaning both individual and 
collaborative opinions were required. The anticipated interplay between 
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different groups of participants was vital to ensure capture of potentially 
complex interactions that take place during interprofessional communication in 
the healthcare setting155. Qualitative interviews were also considered but using 
this method would have omitted the valuable interactions between potential 
end-users of new communication technology. The focus groups were carried out 
at a central London teaching hospital. The Joint Research Compliance Office for 
Imperial College waived formal ethical approval for the project prior to data 
collection. 
Participants: Purposive sampling was used to recruit participants. Eligible 
participants included qualified doctors and nurses with more than one year of 
clinical experience on hospital wards and of using the hospital pager system and 
escalation protocols. Participants were recruited using posters placed in staff 
rooms around the hospital and emailed to ward managers for distribution. 
Researchers also recruited participants in person from their place of work. All 
participants gave written, informed consent in advance. 
Focus groups: A focus group topic guide was developed based on the literature 
review with a focus on Putzer and Park's model for emerging mobile 
technologies (see Figure 6A)156. This model evaluates the impact of seven 
innovation factors on a physician’s behavioral intention to use a smartphone and 
represents an excellent basis for the topic guide that was developed and 
employed in this study. The topic guide was modified and approved in 
collaborative sessions by the research team (see Appendix C). The focus groups 
explored current methods and technologies used for communication in 
escalation of care and handover and the receptiveness towards an ABCS to 
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perform this task in the future. Specific features participants would like to see 
incorporated or avoided were explored in depth with the group to ensure that 
other participants felt the same or to uncover the reasons for disagreement. Two 
researchers moderated each focus group session, two researchers took 
comprehensive notes and one researcher was responsible for administrative 
tasks. The moderators generally allowed each session to be dictated by the 
participants but stepped in if participants with leadership qualities were 
dominating the conversation to ensure the views of everyone were collected. All 
researchers maintained the same roles throughout to ensure consistency 
between sessions. 
 
Figure 6A Putzer and Park’s model for emerging mobile technologies 
 
Data analysis: The focus group sessions were audio recorded and transcribed 
verbatim. Transcripts were then checked for completeness and comprehension 
Intention to 
use 
smartphone 
Compatibility 
Job relevance 
Personal 
experience 
External 
environment 
Observability 
Personal 
demographics 
Internal 
environment 
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with the original recordings before being read and re-read to ensure adequate 
immersion in the data. Triangulation of the data was performed using the 
transcripts, original recordings and the detailed notes taken by the researchers. 
The transcripts were then analysed using systematic thematic analysis. Two 
researchers independently coded all focus group transcripts and points of 
contention were resolved by consultation with a third researcher. 
To ensure methodological rigor, qualitative guidelines were adhered to 
throughout the data collection and analysis119. In addition a collaborative 
approach was used, involving experienced researchers throughout the process. 
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6.4 Results 
6.4.1 Phase 1  
A total of 28 reports were identified from the database searches, which 
evaluated various modes of communication technology used in the hospital 
setting (see Table 6A). Devices evaluated included pagers (numeric and 
alphanumeric); hands free communication devices (HFCDs), personal digital 
assistants (PDAs) and mobile phones (including smartphones). Literature 
describing each device type was collated to assess whether each technology 
facilitated or acted as a barrier to effective interprofessional communication and 
how they affected the communication pathway during escalation of care and 
handover. Findings were then synthesised across all devices to deduce the 
information system needs that must be met to facilitate IPC in the hospital 
setting (see Table 6B). Smartphone technology was found to best meet the 
identified information system needs.  
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Table 6A Characteristics and focus of reviewed studies 
Author, year Method Subjects and 
setting 
Alpha-
numeric 
pager 
HFCD Mobile Numeric 
pager 
PDA Smart
phone 
Ammenwerth157, 
2000 
Mixed 31 Doctors & 
Nurses, Germany − − − −  − 
Aziz150, 2005 Survey 9 Doctors, UK − − − −  − 
Ernst158, 2013 Observation 9 Doctors, USA −  − − − − 
Haroon159, 2010 Survey 60 Doctors, 
Ireland − −   − − 
Ighani160, 2010 Survey 39 Doctors, USA  − − − − − 
Jacques161, 2006 Survey 48 Doctors & 
Nurses, USA   − − − − 
Joseph151, 2013 Survey 50 Doctors & 
Nurses, USA − − − − −  
Katz-Sidlow162, 
2012 
Survey 116 Doctors, USA 
− − − − −  
Lapinsky163, 
2001 
Focus group 26 Doctors, 
Canada − − − −  − 
Lo164, 2012 Interview 31 Doctors & 
Nurses, USA − − − − −  
Mejia165, 2010 Focus group 5 Doctors, 
Mexico − − − −  − 
Mendonca166, 
2004 
Mixed 2607 Doctors & 
Nurses, USA − − − −  −
Menzies167, 2012 Survey 850 Doctors, 
New Zealand − − − − −  
Munoz168, 2003 Mixed 28 Doctors & 
Nurses, Mexico − − − −  − 
Nguyen169, 2006 Survey 48 Doctors & 
Nurses, USA  − −  − − 
O’Connor170, 
2009 
Survey 125 Doctors & 
Nurses, Canada − − − − −  
Patel171, 2006 Observation 14 Doctors, New 
Zealand  − − − − − 
Quan153, 2013 Mixed 74 Doctors & 
Nurses, Canada − − − − −  
Richards172, 
2011 
Survey 53 Doctors & 
Nurses, UK −  − − − − 
Richardson173, 
2008 
Mixed 23 Nurses, USA 
−  − − − − 
Smith174, 2012 Descriptive 34 Doctors, 
Canada − − − − −  
Solvoll143, 2013 Mixed 11 Doctors, 
Norway − −   − − 
Thompson175, 
2005 
Commentary No subjects, USA − − − −  − 
Volpp176, 2003 Commentary No subjects, USA − − −  − − 
Wong177, 2009 Mixed 50 Doctors & 
Nurses, Canada  − − − − − 
Wu178, 2010 Survey 91 Doctors, 
Canada − − − − −  
Wu179, 2011 Mixed 34 Doctors, 
Canada − − − − −  
Wu180, 2013 Mixed 147 Doctors & 
Nurses, Canada  − −  −  
Total 6 4 2 5 7 10 
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Table 6B Information system needs for interprofessional communication in 
hospital 
No. Information System 
Need 
Description No. of papers cited in Reference 
Number 
1 Enable Mobility The sender or receiver are not required 
to be collocated or tied to specific 
locations 
22 143,150,151,153,157-
159,163,165,166,168-
176,179-181  
2 Communicate Context Sufficient levels of detail can be 
communicated when transferring 
information  
20 143,151,153,157,158,163-
166,168-171,173-176,178-
180 
3 Enhance Teamwork Increase in inter-professional 
collaboration/efficiency 
20 143,150,151,153,157,164-
167,169-171,173-176,178-
181 
4 Minimize 
Interruptions 
Fewer interruptive alerts received  18 143,153,158,160,162,164,166
,168-173,176,178-181 
5 Minimize Response 
Time 
Little time passes between sending a 
message and receiving the desired 
response 
17 143,150,151,153,158,159,161
,165,166,170,172-
174,176,178-180 
6 Minimize Disruptions Less disturbance caused by interruptions 17 143,153,158,160,162,164,168
-174,176,178,179,181 
7 Improve Accessibility Easier to contact individuals in times of 
need 
17 143,150,153,157-159,163-
166,170,172-
174,176,178,179 
8 Triage Issues Able to assign levels of urgency to 
communication events 
17 153,157,160,164-166,168-
171,173,174,176,178-181 
9 Identify Users Individuals sending/receiving messages 
can be recognized separately by other 
users 
12 153,158,164,165,168,169,172
-174,176,178 179 
10 User-Friendly Simple to operate 12 143,150,151,157,163,168-
170,172,173 177 180 
11 Minimize Unnecessary 
Communication 
Device discourages transfer of 
redundant information 
11 143,153,170,171,173,174,176
,178-181 
12 Function reliably Device performs desired functions 
robustly, minimal occurrence of 
malfunctions 
11 150,153,157,159-
161,163,170,172,173,175 
13 Allow two-way 
communication 
Device allows user to both send and 
receive information 
11 143,153,157,166,171-
174,178,179,181 
14 Assign Ownership Tasks and patients can be transferred 
with clarity and transparency 
9 153,158,166,167,169,174 
176,177 179 
15 Protect patient data Patient data securely stored/encrypted 9 159,161,165,166,172,173,175
,180,181 
16 Track communication Evidence of all communications stored 7 153,157,164-166,168 174 
17 Incorporate Patient 
Information 
Access to complex patient data e.g. 
health records accessible within system 
7 157,165,166,168,173-175 
 
6.4.2 Phase 2: Focus groups 
Three focus group sessions, lasting one hour each, were conducted during April 
2013. These sessions were semi-structured by the topic guide.  A total of 26 
participants were recruited, including 11 nurses and 15 doctors. Doctors were 
recruited from house officer through to consultant level. Nurses were recruited 
from junior staff nurse through to senior staff nurse and ward manager level. 
Both homogeneous and heterogeneous sessions were conducted with each 
professional group. The homogeneous approach allowed participants to express 
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views openly without hierarchical barriers influencing the discussion. The 
heterogeneous approach encouraged collaborative discussion between 
stakeholders with different requirements, to allow common ground or firm 
disagreements to be identified. 
Six main themes were identified which detail user perceptions of the 
current pager system, attitudes towards smartphone technology and 
requirements of an ABCS for escalation of care and handover. These themes were 
common across all three focus groups and incorporate a full description of the 
data set. The six themes are described in detail below and accompanied by 
informative verbatim quotes from participants (N=nurse, D=doctor). 
 
6.4.3 Theme 1: Clinician perspectives on current methods for 
communication during escalation of care 
Pagers and mobile phones were identified as the main devices used by 
participants for interprofessional communication. Both nurses and doctors used 
the pager system although doctors sometimes used mobile phones as well, 
usually for communicating with other doctors in an ad-hoc fashion. In most cases 
they used their own personal mobile phones because they were dissatisfied with 
the devices provided by hospitals (usually pagers). Just one of the participants 
admitted to contacting their hospital’s information governance department prior 
to using their phone to discuss patients. The majority of participants justified 
their use of mobile phones due to the issues surrounding the pager device. 
Pager System: There was general consensus amongst participants that the pager 
is an outdated technology that is no longer fit for purpose. Doctors perceived the 
greatest weakness of the pager system to be the lack of information transmitted. 
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Doctors found responding to pagers time-consuming and that this could become 
potentially dangerous in urgent situations. They described how receiving 
numerous pages in succession could cause confusion and result in some pages 
being erased from the device to make room for new alerts. Pages were also 
received when doctors were off-duty, outside the hospital, meaning someone is 
waiting for them to call back rather than contacting the correct person. 
Nurses identified the lack of feedback regarding page delivery as particularly 
problematic, leading to uncertainty about the next step to be taken.  
N10: ‘’…you don’t know why they haven’t responded, is it because their bleep’s not 
working? Is it because they’re busy in theatre?” This lack of feedback seemed to be 
a major barrier to good interprofessional communication. 
Participants perceived a limited number of strengths to the pager system, 
with doctors expressing appreciation of the reliable reception pagers receive. 
Mobile phone reception and wireless Internet coverage were considered to be 
unreliable in some hospitals. Nurse participants expressed no positive views of 
the pager system.  
Mobile phone (calling and texting functions only): Doctor participants deemed 
the direct contact made possible by mobile phones helpful when they were with 
patients, particularly for surgeons whilst operating.  
D1 ’You can very quickly say “I’m with somebody, is this urgent or not?’’ 
Nurse participants also found it easier to get a response from doctors 
when calling them on mobile phones rather than pagers.  
N6:”It’s a better way of doing it than with pagers and just getting no response. I’ll 
just pick up the phone and call them.” 
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Text messaging was found to be useful, mainly for non-urgent situations. The 
issues of poor mobile reception in hospitals, data protection requirements and 
patient confidentiality were raised. Some doctors felt uncomfortable with the 
idea of sharing personal mobile numbers indiscriminately with all colleagues. 
The doctors were also concerned that the increased accessibility provided by 
mobile phones could cause regular interruptions during clinical tasks. 
 
6.4.4 Theme 2: Factors affecting choice of communication method used 
Different communication methods were deemed appropriate for different 
situations, with four factors found to influence the choice made:  
1.          Time of day – Nurses found communicating with doctors harder at night 
and stated that this is especially prevalent in surgery when several 
members of the team may be in theatre. The introduction of hospital at 
night teams with fewer members than when each specialty provided their 
own on-call team was also felt to be responsible for difficulties contacting 
clinicians at night.  
2.          Urgency – the participants thought pages and text messages were 
appropriate for less urgent issues whereas phone calls should be used for 
more urgent issues. Tension was observed between doctors and nurses 
when discussing what constitutes an urgent situation as nurses tended to 
adhere to the early warning score system whilst doctors tended to rely on 
both the early warning score and their previous knowledge of particular 
patients if they had been caring for them for some time.  
3.         Types of colleague – when doctor participants escalate within their own 
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team they use mobiles but when escalating to members of a different 
team they tend to use pagers. The doctors mentioned that they would find 
it easier to contact their direct superior if they had already exchanged 
contact details rather than using a pager. 
4.          Location – in general, doctors are more mobile and should use more 
versatile communication methods compared to nurses who work on one 
ward. Accordingly, doctors were keen to use a mobile device and nurses 
requested a stationary device to prevent loss (e.g. a desktop computer). 
 
6.4.5 Theme 3: Attitudes towards smartphone technology in the workplace 
Participants were generally receptive to the use of smartphones for 
interprofessional communication. One nurse pointed out that most people are 
used to using smartphones so the transition would not be difficult. 
N11 “I think most people are used to using smartphones... it wouldn’t be a huge 
leap.’’  
Another nurse described how computerised systems quickly became part 
of daily practice, which was supported by one doctor’s view that if smartphones 
were to become standard practice, clinicians would adapt quickly through 
necessity.  
Some of the doctors expressed doubt regarding the added advantage of 
using a smartphone over a normal phone for communication. They felt the 
benefits of using a smartphone would be reliant on the reliability of wireless 
Internet coverage and integration of patient data and a group conversation 
function.  
 161 
D4 “If it’s only for simple communication and doesn’t have any patient information 
on it, then it’s no more useful than having a bleep’’ 
 
6.4.6 Theme 4: Factors affecting the successful adoption of an ABCS 
Participants were asked to assess the 7 adoption factors identified by Putzer and 
Park’s model. They felt the ABCS would be compatible with, and relevant to, their 
work. All 26 participants owned a smartphone, which may increase the 
likelihood of successful adoption of the ABCS. It was suggested that age could be 
a potential barrier to successful adoption. 
D4: ‘’Age is going to be the only barrier, but anyone under the age of 60 working 
inside a hospital pretty much has a smartphone’’ 
However, both doctors and nurses felt that resistance would be on a more 
individual basis as opposed to being widely pervasive within groups of 
healthcare professionals.   
N3: ‘’I don’t think any groups of staff [would be against using an app]. I think that 
there’d probably be individuals, you know... technophobes.”  
Good technical support and systems training were identified as crucial for 
the successful adoption of an ABCS. 
 
6.4.7 Theme 5: Considerations for software design  
Participants made a number of suggestions about design features they would 
include and avoid in an ABCS. The most commonly stated aspect valued by the 
participants was simplicity. 
N3: “Any complication on it is going to hinder people using it…. You make it difficult 
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and they’ll just bypass it and try and use the [desk] phone anyway.’’ 
Both doctors and nurses believed the ABCS would increase efficiency by 
enabling immediate two-way and group communication. Overall, most doctors 
predicted a reduction in frustration and an increase in job satisfaction. The 
following features were repeatedly identified by participants as desirable 
features of an ABCS for the purpose of communicating during escalation of care 
and handover: 
Ability to acknowledge messages: Almost all doctors and nurses suggested 
that a function informing the sender if a sent message had been received and 
acknowledged should be included. 
 N4: ‘’if you can see that the person has received that message at least you know 
they’ve had it and you’re not going to keep trying to contact them’’  
Pre-set responses were suggested if the doctor was unable to call back 
immediately. Nurses reported that this would reassure them and they would be 
less likely to send repeat messages. The doctors appreciated this potential for 
reduced messages whilst they were busy with other clinical tasks. One 
participant stated that a status could be incorporated into the software where a 
doctor could let others know they are in theatre or at a trauma call so won’t be 
available for a period of time. A job list function was suggested for doctors, which 
could log tasks and indicate whether they had been completed or not.  
Ability to triage messages: Triaging messages based on the clinical urgency of 
the situation was important for the participants. Several doctors suggested the 
ABCS should assign different ringtones/colors to messages of different urgencies.  
D2: “You’d have a basic text mail for a non-urgent call, and then a different color or 
a different bleep saying, “Urgent, please call. Patient deterioration.”“ 
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The potential for system abuse was also raised as messages could be sent 
with a higher level of urgency than appropriate.  
D4: ‘’ …they’ll realize very quickly that they don’t get things done immediately 
unless they’re ‘urgent’, and then everything will become urgent.’’    
The use of objective early warning scores (EWS) to determine urgency 
and collaborative educational sessions were suggested as a means of overcoming 
these issues. 
Data input: The participants were mostly in favor of a system which would 
enable limited data input rather than unlimited free-text to save time at both 
ends of the conversation. 
D2: ‘’There could just be three options … the desired response time, the urgency, 
and the job details, this would take seconds.’’ 
It was suggested this would improve efficiency by only having relevant 
information present. However some nurses were worried that this would limit 
the ability to have a discussion amongst colleagues.  
Integration of patient information: 
The doctors were particularly in favor of being able to access patient information 
through the ABCS including physiological parameters, pathology and radiology 
results.  
D2: ‘’You literally click on the patient, that patient’s reference name comes up, 
you’ve got a summary of them, and if you had a bloods access point on it, great’’ 
Group communication: 
Many of the doctors considered the ability to have group conversations essential, 
possibly in a similar manner to communication apps currently in use in 
platforms such as WhatsApp (Inc., California). 
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D2: ‘’The app could have this background function that any communication 
between the team members and the nursing staff will register on their device.” 
However it was recognized that data protection issues would have to be 
addressed regarding confidential patient information. Several doctors were in 
favor of the ABCS automatically disconnecting once outside the hospital network 
range.  
Monitoring of communication activity: 
Several participants commented that the ABCS could serve as a useful record of 
communication events, and hence would provide an audit trail.  Doctors noted 
that this would be useful for completing logbooks and portfolios. Nurses felt this 
would provide legal protection for them after patient safety events. 
N9: ‘’I think for us, the nurses, it’s going to be like good documentation, if 
something goes wrong then we are protected with a system like this’’ 
 
6.4.8 Theme 6: Considerations for system design and implementation  
The infrastructure of the hospital was raised as an important consideration. The 
participants deemed convenient charging facilities and reliable wireless Internet 
necessary. Some doctors questioned whether the current hospital infrastructure 
would be able to support these features. Several doctors were in favor of 
hospital-supplied devices rather than using their own for ease of data protection 
whilst nurses were happy to share a communal wall-mounted device supplied by 
the hospital. 
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6.5 Discussion 
 
This study represents the first exploration of current communications methods 
in use in hospitals and the features that should be avoided and included in any 
future technology created for interprofessional communication in the healthcare 
setting. The aims of this study were to evaluate current communication 
technologies in use in hospitals, explore stakeholder perceptions of current and 
future communication technology and produce a guide for the development of 
future communication technology for use during escalation of care and 
handover. The findings will be discussed in relation to these aims and the wider 
literature. Following this, the implications for the field of surgery will be 
discussed, taking the strengths and limitations of this research methodology into 
account. Lastly, some conclusions will be presented.  
 
6.5.1 Summary of findings and context within the literature 
Current communication technology used in hospitals: From the 28 articles 
that were explored in the literature review, the opinions and perceptions of 
more than 4,500 doctors and nurses from four different continents were collated 
and reported. From these, 17 information systems requirements for successful 
communication technology in healthcare were generated. Any potential 
developers of new communication technologies for use in the healthcare 
industry should consider these systems requirements. System needs such as the 
allowance of mobility and detailed context, enhancement of teamwork, 
accessibility and triage, and minimisation of interruptions and response times 
(among others) were cited repeatedly in the published literature, providing high-
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level evidence for these system needs.    
Stakeholder perceptions of current and future communication technology: 
Six main themes were generated from the qualitative focus groups. These detail 
user perceptions of current communication technology and why different devices 
may be selected for use, attitudes towards smartphone technology, the factors 
that may affect adoption of smartphone and app-based technology, some 
considerations for future software design and wider considerations for system 
design and implementation. The participants felt that pagers are not fit for 
purpose and should be replaced by devices with greater functionality (such as 
smartphones). They identified the importance of securing end-user buy-in prior 
to implementation of a new communication innovation, especially for people less 
familiar with advanced technology. The inclusion of feedback loops and patient 
information were found to be important software features to include in a new 
communication technology, whilst investment in hospital infrastructure would 
be required to ensure they are receptive to advanced innovation.  
Guide for the development of future communication technology for use 
during escalation of care and handover: Drawing on the findings from the 
literature review and focus groups, nine recommendations to enable successful 
development and adoption of an ABCS for use in hospitals have been developed 
(see Table 6C). In developing the recommendations every effort has been made 
to concurrently address the needs of all potential end-users and existing hospital 
policies regarding confidentiality. In addition, the recommendations were 
reviewed in accordance with the information system needs that emerged from 
the literature search to improve the robust nature of this evidence base.  
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Table 6C Development recommendations 
No. Recommendation  Link to study findings Evidence base 
1 Communication should be triaged 
based on level of urgency 
1. Use of EWS in 
communication 
2. Conflicting opinions of 
urgency between doctors and 
nurses 
1. EWS produces an objective score of patient 
physiology182 
2. Divergent interpretations of urgency164 
 
2 Enable feedback to establish a 
closed communication loop 
1. Nurse frustration with lack 
of delivery confirmation 
2. Lengthy process of 
answering a page 
1. Lack of feedback is a challenge to work 
practice183 
2. Difficulty improving pager response time184 
3 Establish structured data input 1. Produce clearer 
communication 
2. Use of SBAR tool 
1. Avoid interruptions and distraction179 
2. SBAR correlated with reduced unexpected 
deaths185 
4 Establish a team conversation 
function 
1. Allows open style between 
doctors 
2. Multiple participants in a 
conversation 
1. Improved continuity of care186 
2. MDTs can confer improvements in outcomes 
to patients22 
5 Incorporate an electronic audit 
trail 
1. Address nurses’ concerns 
about responsibility 
2. Collection of cases for 
logbooks 
1. Responsibility is a key goal for effective 
handover187 
2. Logbooks are a fundamental part of surgical 
training188 
6 Ensure robust security systems 
are in place 
1. Confidentiality may be a 
barrier to implementation 
1. Raised in several previous pieces of 
research165 
7 Provide individual smartphones 
to doctors and shared devices to 
nurses 
1. Doctors want to use 
hospital mobile devices 
2. Nurses wish to use shared 
ward devices 
1. The choice of device depends on the clinical 
role of staff and degree of mobility required189 
8 Provide staff training 1. Avoid rigidity 
2. Allow judgment of urgency 
1. Rigid adherence to guidelines can lead to 
harm190 
2. Effective triage can improve patient care191 
9 Invest in a flexible operating 
system allowing future 
alterations 
1. Incorporate new features 1. Increased compatibility192 
 
6.5.2 Additional considerations: These additional considerations arise from 
ongoing discussions with colleagues and experts in the areas of healthcare 
innovation and communication. For the success of such a system, individual 
hospitals would need to carefully consider their infrastructure. Adequate 
network coverage, technical support and charging facilities would need to be in 
place. The recommendations that have been provided cannot serve as a final 
step-by-step guide to designing technology; feedback must continually be sought 
from stakeholders throughout the implementation process to ensure the 
technology meets stakeholder requirements and serves its function well.  
The problem of integrating new communication technology into 
healthcare is increased by extra barriers provided by safety and confidentiality 
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concerns. This is a global issue for healthcare with no ‘quick-fix’ available. There 
are a number of companies in the early stages of technology development 
looking to overcome this problem. In the UK, The Learning Clinic has developed a 
system called VitalPac which uses algorithms to calculate patient risk and alert 
staff to unstable patients whilst DocCom has developed an app allowing limited 
team communication and medical alerting43,193. RelayHealth from the USA is also 
developing several communication solutions aiming to improve the efficiency of 
clinical care194. However, these systems do not currently meet the 
recommendations of this study or the level of functionality required to replace 
communication technology in use in hospitals at the present time. 
This research aimed to develop requirements for an ABCS to improve 
escalation of care and handover between healthcare professionals. Participants 
stated a desire for development of this system and this study serves as an 
informative resource to aid practical implementation of such a system into the 
hospital environment. A considerable challenge to the success of this system 
would be ensuring adoption; numerous studies have demonstrated the complex 
challenge presented by introducing new IT to healthcare settings195-197. The 
potential for this system to improve communication and ultimately patient care 
would very much depend on stakeholder ‘buy-in’. Previous research has 
indicated that barriers to adoption of new health information technology (HIT) 
are often more behavioral than technical in nature198. This study has expressly 
addressed this challenge by centralising stakeholders' views. This approach is 
consistent with the approach to software development that the National Health 
Service has endorsed for future projects and has been successful in other 
sectors199.   
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6.5.3 Implications 
The findings from this study have several important implications for the field of 
surgery. Firstly, the current landscape of communication technology in hospitals 
worldwide has been reported and many of the devices in use are suboptimal. 
Considerable efforts from healthcare administrators will be required to bring 
about innovation. Secondly, the potential for smartphones and ABCS to improve 
the efficiency and safety of communication during escalation of care has been 
evidenced through high-level synthesis of published literature and detailed 
interprofessional qualitative methods. Lastly, the importance of patient 
confidentiality and information governance in the healthcare industry has been 
reinforced to clinicians, patients and administrators. Innovation of 
communication technology needs to, and will, happen eventually. However, it is 
critical that security is not compromised to ensure patients are reassured 
regarding the security of their personal details.   
 
6.5.4 Strengths and limitations 
The findings of this study are strengthened by the recruitment of participants of 
varying experience levels from multiple hospitals. The hospitals involved serve 
demographically diverse populations in London whilst the variation in type of 
institution (teaching and district general) also provided generalisability to the 
findings. However, the findings may not generalise to healthcare settings outside 
the UK or in more remote settings200.  
As a qualitative study the subjective opinions of the participants must be 
taken into account, although the use of an interprofessional focus group 
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approach rather than individual interview techniques also has advantages119. 
This study did not consider the views of patients; managerial staff and IT support 
staff. These will need to be taken into account prior to implementation of any 
new technology 201. 
 
6.5.5 Conclusions 
Clinicians find the current methods of communication for escalation of care and 
handover, namely the pager system, to have significant shortcomings. They view 
smartphone and app technology as a potential opportunity to better meet their 
communication needs. In light of previous failed healthcare information 
technology projects (such as the drive to create a paperless NHS), it has been 
deemed advisable to engage end-users in the design process to increase the 
likelihood of successful adoption. Doctors and nurses of different experience 
levels have been found to have varying requirements of communication devices 
in hospital and their different roles in the communication pathway require 
further scrutiny. This study provides a thorough, evidence-based guide for how 
to combine the different requirements of doctors and nurses in an ABCS for 
escalation of care and handover.  
Before such a system can be developed or implemented however, the 
receptiveness of healthcare professionals to, and practicalities of, new 
communication technology must be investigated in the clinical environment. 
This will be the focus of the next chapter in this thesis. 
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6.5.6 Phase 3  
Development and implementation of interventions to address the 
problems with escalation of care 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 detailed the preliminary investigations conducted into the 
escalation of care process and uncovered valuable insights into why the process 
may be delayed or performed poorly, and the implications of this to the surgical 
patient. Chapter 5 then provided a detailed risk assessment of escalation of care 
in surgery and prioritised several important areas as amenable to, and in need 
of, intervention.  The two principal priority areas for intervention in the 
escalation of care process are: 
1. Development and implementation of innovative communication 
technology in the mHealth arena. 
2. Development and implementation of escalation of care protocols based on 
human factors and a flattened hierarchy. 
These priority areas will both be dealt with in the final section of this thesis. 
Chapter 6 will build on the findings from chapter 5 regarding the use of 
suboptimal communication technology and chapter 7 will further explore 
priority one through implementation of a communication technology 
intervention in a surgical team. 
Chapter 8 will then describe the development and validation of a metric 
to measure the quality of information transfer, a vital tool to allow assessment of 
core communication skills during escalation of care. This is important to 
measure the impact of any subsequent interventions. Finally, chapter 9 will 
pursue priority two through the implementation of a human factors intervention 
bundle in a UK surgical department. 
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7 An exploration of the role of instant messaging services in 
surgical teams 
            
 
7.1 Introduction 
Patient care has been revolutionized by the information age; the last two 
decades have seen diagnostics and treatments transformed by widespread 
technological progress202. Chapters 5 and 6 illustrated the pitfalls of current 
communication technology in use in UK hospitals and advocated the use of 
smartphones for interprofessional communication.  
Smartphones are built on mobile operating systems and have more 
advanced connectivity and computing power compared to traditional mobile 
phones. WhatsApp (Inc. California) is an increasingly popular mobile messaging 
application (app) available over all smartphone platforms. With its widespread 
uptake WhatsApp represents a potentially disruptive innovation in healthcare 
communication offering numerous potential benefits to surgeons. 
However, many hospitals still use outdated pager systems as the foundation for 
interprofessional clinical communication between physicians, nurses and other 
healthcare professionals. This is despite the problems identified in chapters 3 
and 5, and discussed in chapter 6, which include long waiting-times for the 
return of a page, lack of feedback loops, frequent interruptions and an inability to 
identify the location or identity of the caller147,169,179.  From a patient safety 
perspective, this is of significant concern given the fact that poor communication 
often lies at the heart of an adverse event203.  
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Although previous studies have evaluated communication in acute 
settings35,204, the focus has been on direct or face-to-face communication. 
Communication using electronic devices has been explored in general internal 
medicine 205 and the use of social media has been explored in psychiatry 206 with 
investigators finding that the proliferation of new electronic devices and use of 
social media can lead to difficulties with boundaries and information 
governance. No study available to date has evaluated the use of mobile electronic 
communication in surgical teams; despite the fact that many physicians are now 
jettisoning their hospital pagers and using their personal mobile phones to 
facilitate professional communication207.  
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7.2 Aims 
1. Identify the interprofessional communication pathways used through 
WhatsApp 
2. Evaluate the response times to communication for different communication 
types, domains and clinician grades. 
3. Explore participant’s perceptions of how increased supervision of junior team 
members provided by WhatsApp affects team culture and the escalation of 
care pathway 
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7.3 Methods 
7.3.1 Study design 
This study used a mixed-methods approach to investigation. A combination of 
quantitative script analysis was combined with qualitative semi-structured 
interviews. The quantitative analysis of communication was deemed necessary 
to ensure that valid data reporting the frequency and direction of 
communication with the team could be collected. The qualitative interviews 
were included to ensure that the quantitative results were expanded upon using 
in depth analysis of the perceptions of the study participants. The combination of 
quantitative and qualitative research methods is used to supplement objective 
quantitative data with descriptive detail provided by qualitative methods. This 
approach has been used successfully to gain knowledge of the perceptions of 
potential end users of an innovation or intervention and was therefore chosen as 
the study design for this chapter208,209. 
 
7.3.2 Participants and setting 
An acute surgical team responsible for all emergency admissions in a London 
teaching hospital was invited to participate in the study. All team members 
agreed to participate so no sampling was required. The nature of the team's 
emergency workload involves rapid assessment, management and discharge of 
all acute surgical patients. The team consisted of one consultant, one registrar 
rotating on a six monthly basis and two FY1 doctors, rotating on a weekly basis 
between surgical teams. The total number of core participants therefore totalled 
forty people over the course of the study. Additionally medical students and 
SHOs of varying experience joined the team sporadically when patient loads 
 176 
were high or to seek educational and training opportunities.  The setting was 
selected as it has wide-ranging wireless Internet coverage (a key theme in 
chapter 6), enabling excellent reception for WhatsApp messaging at all times.  
 
7.3.3 Details of app 
WhatsApp is an app, used by over 500 million people worldwide, that allows 
smartphone users to send text messages and other types of media (such as 
videos, voice messages and photographs) to their contacts. It also facilitates the 
creation of groups, this allows multiple users to participate in and monitor the 
conversation. WhatsApp avoids charging for each message by utilising cellular 
data plans and wireless Internet networks; a subscription is currently £0.69. For 
the purposes of this study, participants used the secure wireless network rather 
than their mobile data plan when using WhatsApp to ensure security and 
confidentiality were maintained. 
 
7.3.4 Study procedure WhatsApp was downloaded onto all team members’ 
smartphones for the last week of September 2012 to allow participants to 
familiarise themselves with the workings of the software, clinical communication 
during this week took place using both the hospital pager system and WhatsApp 
messaging service. By the end of the pilot week all participants chose to use 
WhatsApp for their clinical communication rather than the pager system despite 
being given the option of opting out at any time. To prevent disruption to the 
medical emergency calling system all doctors who previously carried pagers 
continued to do so allowing medical emergency team calls to continue without 
any change. Capture of data commenced during the first week of October and ran 
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through to the first week of March. Data was captured for 19 consecutive weeks 
excluding occasions when the consultant was on annual leave. The data captured 
includes all clinical communication events on WhatsApp between the hours of 
8am-8pm during the normal working week (Monday-Friday). Clinical 
communication taking place at night or over the weekend is not included in this 
study. Therefore each script contains the team communication that took place 
over five consecutive working days.  
Clinicians continued to be notified of cardio-respiratory arrest and peri-
arrest scenarios via the pager device, all other matters were communicated on 
WhatsApp. At the end of the data capture period scripts were produced for each 
eligible week between October 2012 and March 2013. The consultant participant 
carefully anonymised each script prior to passing them to the research team. 
 
7.3.5 Project approval 
This project was confirmed as a service evaluation; formal ethical approval was 
not required. Participants used their own smartphones over the hospital secure 
wireless network and gave informed consent prior to participation. Approval 
was secured from the hospital Information Governance department on the basis 
of three conditions being met: 
1. No storage of WhatsApp data on participant devices beyond the end of the 
working week was allowed. The team consultant downloaded and kept a 
hard copy in a secure location for record keeping purposes.  
2. Patient identifiable data was omitted from team communication on 
WhatsApp, the patient’s initials, location and a brief clinical description 
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allowed team members to identify the subject of communication without 
breaking confidentiality.  
3. Professional behaviour had to be exercised in all communication on 
WhatsApp. To facilitate this all participants were offered a weekly 
induction briefing from the consultant detailing the above conditions 
along with practice guidelines. These guidelines reminded participants of 
the importance of contemporaneous documentation of clinical decisions 
communicated via WhatsApp in the clinical notes. 
 
7.3.6 Data analysis 
Each of the nineteen scripts was carefully checked for consistency and 
completeness including the date and time of messages to make sure data had not 
been omitted. Scripts were read and reread by the research team to ensure 
adequate immersion in the data. Four researchers with a background in surgery 
and patient safety developed a coding framework for script analysis prior to 
detailed scrutiny. The scripts were finally subjected to analysis by one 
researcher to extract data regarding the identity of the initiator and receiver of 
each communication event. Communication events were analysed using the chi-
squared test for frequency data. The data was then separated further into 
communication episodes, which involve a series of events that all deal with the 
same initial event.  
Data analysed for communication episodes included the response time for 
each participant grade, the type of communication and the clinical domain 
involved (e.g. operating theatre, ward etc.). Analysis of continuous data was 
performed using the Kruksal-Wallis test and the Mann-Whitney test on SPSS 
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Statistics (Version 20), statistical significance was taken when p<0.05. In 
addition, standardised qualitative methodology was used to identify emergent 
themes regarding the nature of these communication events. Two coders used a 
coding framework to categorise these communications, noting in particular 
where potential patient safety events had occurred. Such episodes are reported 
with supporting quotes. Participant’s reflections of using WhatsApp were 
captured using semi-structured interviews, conducted at the study centre, which 
were analysed using standard qualitative techniques. 
 
7.3.7 Assurance of methodological rigour 
Quality guidelines for qualitative research were strictly adhered to throughout 
this study 119. Data analysis protocols were formulated via a collaborative 
approach between all researchers and were used consistently for all data 
synthesis. Independent coding of two scripts by separate researchers (10% of 
the total number) was performed prior to triangulation to assess the reliability 
of data analysis. 
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7.4 Results 
 A total of 1140 hours of clinical communication pertaining to 636 patients over 
95 days was recorded.  This yielded 1,495 communication events (a median of 
65.5 communication events per week, see Figure 7A). Of the communication 
events 359 came from the consultant (mean 17 per week), 318 from the 
registrar (mean 16 per week), 784 from the FY1 (mean 39 per week) and 34 
from other team members. Messages from FY1s were longer, on average, than 
those from the registrar or consultant (18 words compared to 11 & 9 
respectively). 
Communication events were then grouped into communication episodes 
where events consisting of discussion regarding the same issue or patient that 
followed each other chronologically were combined to form one episode. A total 
of 658 communication episodes were produced from 1,495 events (a mean of 35 
episodes per week). The initial communication event in each episode then had 
two codes assigned to it, one to designate the communication type and one to 
designate the clinical domain. There were four possible communication types: 
administrative question, clinical question, informative comment or instructive 
comment. There were seven possible clinical domains: administration, discharge, 
education, investigations, prescribing, theatre or ward care. 
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Figure 7A Frequency of communications per week  
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7.4.1 Initiators and recipients of communication 
 The FY1s initiated the most communication episodes (413, 64.9%) followed by 
the consultant (151, 23.7%), then the registrar (72, 11.3%) with the remaining 
episodes initiated by other team members. For episodes where the intended 
receiver was not specified or was not a core team member the receiver was 
classified as ‘team’. There were also episodes where the initiator specified the 
team and a designated receiver; hence the reason for a greater number of 
received episodes than initiated. The team received the most communication 
episodes (269, 38.7%) followed by the consultant (196, 28.2%), the registrar 
(132, 19.0%) and the FY1s (98, 14.0%) received the least (see Figure 7B). 
 
Figure 7B Frequency and direction of communication events 
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7.4.2 Initiators and recipients by communication type 
 Administrative questions were most frequently initiated by FY1s and received by 
the consultant (n=60, p=0.02). The FY1s were most likely to initiate a clinical 
question than the consultant or registrar whom received a large number of this 
type of communication (n=417, p<0.001). Informative comments were most 
commonly initiated by the FY1s and most commonly received by the consultant 
(n=387, p<0.001). Accordingly the consultant initiated more instructive 
comments than other participants with the FY1s receiving the majority (n=207, 
p<0.001). It was not possible to directly compare the amount of initiated and 
received communications by the ‘team’. The ‘team’ received more informative 
comments than any other communication type (n=269, p<0.001). The above 
results are summarised in Table 7A and Figure 7C. 
 
Table 7A Initiators and receivers by communication type 
  Grade Frequency 
initiated 
Frequency 
received 
Total X2 p-value 
Admin question Cons 13 11 
60 7.75 0.02 SpR 3 8 
FY1 19 6 
Clinical question Cons 20 88 
417 248 <0.001 SpR 7 76 
FY1 205 21 
Informative Cons 21 96 
378 192 <0.001 SpR 28 43 
FY1 179 11 
Instructive Cons 97 1 
207 143 <0.001 SpR 34 5 
FY1 10 60 
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Figure 7C Initiators (top) and recipients (bottom) by communication type (N.B 
recipients graph contains ‘team’) 
 
 
 
An example of instructive communication can be seen in Figure 7D. 
Often, several different types of communication were combined in a single 
communication episode (see Figure 7E).  
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Figure 7D A WhatsApp screenshot showing instructive communication 
(attending=consultant) 
 
Figure 7E A WhatsApp screenshot from the FY1 handset showing different types 
of communication and a potential patient safety event (resident=registrar) 
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7.4.3 Initiators and recipients by clinical domain 
 Administrative comments were initiated more frequently by consultants than 
other participants and received more frequently by FY1s but there was no 
significant difference (n=58, p=0.11). The FY1s and consultant initiated 
communications about patient discharge with greater frequency than the 
registrar (n=188, p=0.003). Communication episodes regarding patient 
investigations were initiated by the FY1s in large numbers and most commonly 
received by the consultant (n=310, p<0.001). There were small numbers of 
communications regarding education so these were compared using Fisher’s 
exact test rather than chi-squared, there were no significant differences (n=27, 
p=0.49). There were also no significant differences between the number of 
initiated and received communications regarding the operating theatre (n=66, 
p=0.27). FY1s initiated communications regarding ward care significantly more 
often than other participants (n=357, p<0.001). It was not possible to compare 
the number of initiated and received communications regarding prescribing. 
These results are summarised in Table 7B and Figure 7F. 
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Table 7B Comparison of communication by clinical domain 
N.B Cons=Consultant, SpR=Specialty Registrar, X2 is the Chi-Squared value. 
  Grade Frequency 
initiated 
Frequency 
received 
Total X2 p 
Admin Cons 20 6 58 4.42 0.11 
SpR 6 6 
FY1 10 10 
Discharge Cons 45 25 188 11.33 0.003 
SpR 12 17 
FY1 67 22 
Investigations Cons 23 56 310 118 <0.001 
SpR 12 48 
FY1 147 24 
Education Cons 9 8 27 Fisher's 
test 
0.49 
SpR 1 1 
FY1 6 2 
Theatre Cons 15 6 66 2.6 0.27 
SpR 12 13 
FY1 12 8 
Ward care Cons 39 50 357 69 <0.001 
SpR 29 47 
FY1 160 32 
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Figure 7F Initiators (top) and recipients (bottom) of communication by clinical domain 
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7.4.4 Response times to communication 
 The response time (in minutes) to each communication event was recorded 
along with the grade of participant, the communication type and clinical domain. 
In instances where the response was to multiple queries the data was excluded 
from analysis. Data was also excluded where the response time was greater than 
90 minutes as participants felt these instances were very likely to be due to 
technical difficulties including phones being turned off in teaching or long 
difficult operations where communication could not be responded to.  
Response time to communication by grade: The consultant responded to 193 
communication events in a median time of 7 minutes, the registrar responded to 
174 communication events in a median time of 2 minutes and the FY1s 
responded to 177 communication events in a median time of 3 minutes. A 
Kruskal-Wallis test revealed a significant difference between these response 
times (H(2)=41.3, p<0.001) with Mann-Whitney tests revealing significant 
differences between the overall response times of consultant compared to 
registrar (p<0.001), consultant compared to FY1 (p<0.001) and registrar 
compared to FY1 (p=0.007). These results are summarised in Table 7C. 
Response time by communication types: There were 43 administrative 
questions responded to in a median time of one minute. Clinical questions were 
responded to 193 times with a median response time of five minutes. 
Informative comments represented 181 responses with a median response time 
of three minutes. Lastly, 110 instructive comments were responded to in a 
median time of 2.5 minutes. There was a significant difference between these 
response times (H(3)=13.05, p=0.005, administrative questions v clinical 
questions, p=0.006, clinical questions v instructive comments, p=0.003 and 
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informative comments v instructive comments, p=0.019. All other comparisons 
revealed no statistically significant differences between communication types. 
These results are summarised in Table 7C. 
Response time by clinical domain: There were 64 communications discussing 
administration answered in a median time of two minutes. Responses to 
communications regarding patient investigations (149), the operating theatre 
(32) and ward care (171) were answered in a median time of three minutes. The 
75 responses regarding patient discharge and 12 responses regarding education 
were answered in a median time of four minutes. Responses to 24 prescribing 
questions took a median time of six minutes. A Kruskal-Wallis test for response 
time by clinical domain revealed no significant difference (H(6)=3.5, p=0.739). 
These results are summarised in Table 7C. 
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Table 7C Response times to communication by grade, communication type and 
clinical domain 
  
Events (n) Median Min Max Range 
Grade of 
responder 
Consultant 193 7 1 88 87 
SpR 174 2 1 73 72 
FY1 177 3 1 84 83 
Communication 
type 
Admin question 43 1 1 64 63 
Clinical question 193 5 1 75 74 
Informative 181 3 1 88 87 
Instructive 110 2.5 1 46 45 
Clinical area 
Admin 64 2 1 64 63 
Discharge 75 4 1 70 69 
Education 12 4 1 35 34 
Investigations 149 3 1 84 83 
Prescribing 24 6 1 43 42 
Theatre 32 3 1 88 87 
Ward care 171 3 1 75 74 
 
Comparing response times by grade and communication type: There was no 
significant difference between the response times for administrative questions 
(H(2)=1.5, p=0.468) or instructive comments (H(2)=0.075, p=0.963) when each 
grade of participant was compared. When response times for clinical questions 
were compared by each grade there was a significant difference (H(2)=28.9, 
p=<0.001, consultant v registrar, p<0.001, consultant v FY1, p=0.024 and 
registrar v FY1, p=0.006). There was also a significant difference between 
response times by each grade for informative comments (H(2)=14.4, p <0.001, 
consultant v registrar, p<0.001).  
 
 
 
 
 192 
Comparing response times by grade and clinical domain: There were no 
significant differences between the response times by each grade for 
communications regarding education (consultant v FY1 only as there were no 
registrar responses, p=0.142), investigations (H(2)=4.2, p=0.123) and 
prescribing (H(2)=0.629, p=0.730). There were significant differences when the 
response times by each grade of participant were compared for communications 
regarding administration (H(2)=8.8, p=0.012, consultant v registrar, p=0.005 
and registrar v FY1 p=0.03), patient discharge (H(2)=11.3, p=0.003, consultant v 
registrar, p=0.003 and consultant v FY1, p=0.008), prescribing (H(2)=8.9, 
p=0.012, consultant v FY1, p<0.001) and ward care (H(2)=29.2, p<0.001, 
consultant v registrar, p<0.001 and consultant v FY1, p<0.001).  
 
7.4.5 Participant’s perceptions of how use of WhatsApp affected the culture 
within the team and the escalation of care pathway 
 WhatsApp was used to facilitate communication between members of the 
emergency general surgery team as well as improving the speed with which care 
could be escalated and urgent decisions could be made and communicated: 
"EH in HDU, I'm worried she's got pulmonary oedema so I've stopped fluids, put her 
on Oxygen, doing a chest x-ray and giving 20mg intravenous Furosemide" (FY1) 
"Good. Let's get urgent medical registrar review as well please" (consultant). This 
example illustrates how the FY1 can escalate care rapidly to a senior clinician. In 
this instance the consultant felt they had implemented the correct initial 
management and recommended liaison with a specialty team who are 
experienced in dealing with cardiorespiratory failure. 
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Another example shows how the whole team could have input into an 
escalation of care episode. In this situation, the registrar initially felt they could 
deal with the clinical problem, however, the consultant saw the need to 
intervene: “Patient MD (reversal jejunostomy) has Hb 7.4, WCC 26.1, CRP 68, obs 
stable, will go see soon” (FY1) “Hb will be chronic so don’t worry” (registrar) 
“What was pre-op Hb?” (consultant) “11.3” (FY1) “Maybe not then” (registrar) 
“Lets get urgent USS abdo and transfuse a couple of units, she may be bleeding 
intraluminally” (consultant). 
 There were also instances where potential patient safety events were 
avoided through use of WhatsApp: Shall I restart Aspirin and Clopidogrel for 
subarachnoid haemorrhage patient?” (FY1) “No, don’t restart. Please check with 
Cardiology” (consultant).  
 
7.4.6 Examples of participant’s reflections on WhatsApp for 
communication: Participants were asked to reflect on how the use of WhatsApp 
has affected their work during the course of the study. Both junior and senior 
participants felt that the ability to send a quick message rather than make a 
phone call was helpful and efficient: “I like being able to send a message about 
basic questions that require a simple answer” (FY1). Junior participants also 
appreciated the increased level of support they felt WhatsApp gave them “The 
fact I can just send a quick update about patient care to the registrar or consultant 
is very reassuring” (FY1). The consultant was grateful for the increased level of 
supervision WhatsApp gave him: “The fact that I can constantly monitor what my 
team is doing for my patients allows me to step in when needed but leave them to it 
at other times. This reassures me and my juniors whilst giving them a sense of 
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independence as non-response to an informative comment provides feedback to the 
sender that I am in support of what they are doing.”  
The registrar felt that WhatsApp helped to remove communication 
barriers between junior and senior colleagues by flattening the traditional 
hierarchy: ”I feel that this system has encouraged the juniors to keep us updated, 
even about things they think are minor. They may not take the trouble to bleep us 
with informative updates to avoid disturbing us in theatre but are very happy to 
send a WhatsApp message.” The registrar also felt that WhatsApp made 
coordination of the team easier: “Being able to update several people at once 
about where a ward round is starting or when a theatre case is being sent for is a 
real time-saver.” All of the participants felt positive about using WhatsApp for 
clinical communication during the study period and as a result the acute general 
surgery team decided to continue using this method of communication in the 
future. 
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7.5 Discussion 
This study investigated the use of WhatsApp in surgical teams, through a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methodology. This is the first study 
of its kind that investigates how such a communication system operates within a 
clinical team and quantifies both the direction and type of communication 
between doctors. Facilitating supervision, communication and escalation of care 
using improved communication methodology can be achieved through simple 
innovations. The prevention of avoidable patient harm may also be augmented 
by innovative communication technology but core clinical skills and human 
factors also require improvement and this will require a team-based approach 
and a good safety culture.  
This mixed-methods study aimed to identify the interprofessional 
communication pathways used through WhatsApp; evaluate the response times 
to communication for different communication types, domains and clinician 
grades; and explore participant’s perceptions of how increased supervision of 
junior team members provided by WhatsApp affected the team culture and 
escalation of care pathway. The findings will be discussed in relation to these 
aims and their context within the wider literature will be considered. Following 
this the implications for the field of surgery will be discussed, taking the 
strengths and limitations of this study into account. Lastly, some conclusions will 
be presented.  
 
7.5.1 Summary of findings and context within the literature 
Identification of interprofessional communication pathways using 
WhatsApp: The main protagonists of communication within the team were the 
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FY1s. They initiated the most communication episodes, and, though they 
received fewer communications from other team members they were still the 
most heavily involved members of the team. The reasons for this are two-fold. 
Firstly, there were two FY1s within the team and only one registrar and 
consultant so it is not surprising that the volume of communication arising from 
the FY1s is greater than that of other participants. Secondly, the FY1s initiated a 
large volume of clinical questions, which gives a good insight into their role 
within the team. It is also worth noting that the team was the most frequent 
recipient of communication episodes. When the team received communication 
this means that the episode was initiated with communication that was not 
specifically addressed to any particular team member or began with a generic 
greeting such as “hi” or “guys”. The large volume of communication received by 
the team reflects the participant’s confidence in the communication system and 
the fact that all participants could see all communication events, unlike when a 
pager is used and the communication is limited to a two-way conversation by 
default.  
Regarding the type of communication events, clinical questions were the 
most frequent, followed by informative, instructive and administrative 
comments. The FY1s were most likely to initiate communication with clinical 
questions and informative or administrative comments.  The team received the 
most informative comments. However, reflecting the interprofessional nature of 
communication analysed within this study, frequently, there were several types 
of communication utilised in each episode.  
Regarding the clinical domain of communication, the heaviest frequency 
of episodes concerned ward care and patient investigations.  
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Response times to communication: For all communication types, the 
consultant tended to be slower to respond than both the registrar and FY1s. This 
may be a reflection of higher workload. This is important from the patient 
perspective as the consultant is responsible for the team and must be contacted 
when definitive decisions about patient care need to be made210. Regarding 
communication type, clinical questions were responded to more slowly than 
other types of communication and this may be due to their relative complexity 
compared to other communication types. A simple administrative question or 
instructive comment may only require a short, quick response but a clinical 
question often requires a doctor to review a patient or at least check a test result, 
therefore the reply takes longer. Regarding the clinical domain of 
communication, there were no significant differences. 
Supervision and escalation of care: The greatest potential benefit from using 
systems such as WhatsApp is the increased involvement and supervision from 
the consultant surgeon. The consultant is in a position to constantly oversee 
what is happening within the team. This allows them to step in whenever an 
escalation of care episode occurs, especially if the patient deterioration is not 
recognised by more junior team members of if the patient is about to be treated 
inappropriately. Previous chapters in this thesis have discussed the harm 
patients are susceptible to when escalation of care is not initiated promptly, 
especially if the incorrect diagnosis has been made or the initial treatment is not 
correct.  
This study provides a unique insight into the importance of supervision of 
junior clinicians. It is interesting to consider the role of the registrar within the 
team. There were instances in the study where they gave advice, which was 
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quickly corrected by the consultant. Whilst the maintenance of high-quality 
patient care underpins the role of any medical professional, a degree of 
autonomy and independence is also required, to allow clinicians to develop their 
skills.  
As this work is taken forward care must be taken to ensure that the 
autonomy of developing decision-makers in the team (such as the registrar) is 
preserved to avoid prolonging their learning experience. It is also noteworthy 
that this study also discovered several instances where drug errors were 
prevented through use of WhatsApp. Whilst drug errors are not strictly a part of 
the escalation of care process, they are an important cause of medical error, and 
if left undetected, may lead to deterioration and the requirement for escalation 
of care for a patient further down the line. A good example of this is seen in the 
results where a swift reply from the consultant advising the FY1 to seek 
specialist advice prevented a potentially lethal error. Whilst this thesis 
principally focuses on escalation of care, some of the interventions and teachings 
within it will spill over into other areas of medicine.  
There is a paucity of literature that examines healthcare worker’s 
response times to communication, this is an important subject and deserves 
greater focus. Research on medical emergency teams has revealed that 
ineffective communication methods can lead to treatment delays and failed 
escalation of care85,97. Worse still, studies have highlighted that patients are 
subject to significant harm due to poor communication211,212. Human factors 
such as hierarchical barriers and inadequate information transfer techniques 
contribute to these failures213. In this study the threat to patient safety presented 
by these factors was successfully overcome through the use of WhatsApp and 
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determination of the participants to improve team communication. A flattened 
hierarchy is a key component of safe surgical care and this mantra was 
reinforced by the findings in this study. 
The fact that almost all health professionals in the USA and UK now carry 
mobile phones (and increasingly smartphone devices) has disrupted the way 
many clinical teams are communicating214. WhatsApp represents a successful 
technological innovation that effectively replaced the pager over a short time 
period and continues to be used well after the period of this trial ended. The 
findings of this study are in agreement with research showing that handheld 
computers improve efficiency, clinical decision-making and documentation 
practice215. These positive aspects may have an effect on the quality and safety of 
healthcare delivery.  
 
7.5.2 Implications 
This study has shown how increased supervision of junior team members may 
facilitate escalation of care and improve safety for patients. However, human 
factors and non-technical skills must also be taken into account. Future research 
could seek to determine how well communication tools such as SBAR and 
innovations such as WhatsApp work together. Successful interventions in this 
area should aim to include strategies for improvements in both the content (e.g. 
SBAR) and mode (WhatsApp) of communication.  
 
7.5.3 Strengths and limitations 
Efforts to make changes in healthcare are often ambitious and employ a whole-
system goal216; the use of a more modest initial target in this study may have 
 200 
contributed to its success. Computer-based innovations supporting decision-
making have been successful in improving the safety of medication prescribing. 
The barriers overcome by these systems, of which WhatsApp is an example, may 
be a platform for further successful innovation in the healthcare communication 
sector217. Further development of healthcare communication technology will 
need to include the integration of direct access to patient information218.  
This study involved an entire population rather than a sample, eliminating the 
potential for participant bias. Consecutive weeks of data collection mean that 
selection bias was also not an issue. There was no observer bias or measurement 
bias as the ability to record; date and time stamp clinical communications 
removed any interpretation error. Detailed qualitative analysis of team 
perceptions allowed in-depth exploration of participant’s receptiveness to 
WhatsApp. The statistical analysis presented in this study allows the crucial role 
of hierarchy within the team to be explored in detail, something that has not 
previously been researched in surgical teams outside of the operating theatre. 
The use of a single-centre and exploration of communication in 
emergency surgery only may limit the application of the findings to other 
hospitals and specialties. There was an absence of out of hours communication in 
this study and further work is required to evaluate the use of WhatsApp and 
other communication tools between different healthcare staff (e.g. nurses). 
There was no comparison of any communication outside the WhatsApp platform, 
nor an assessment of the quality of communication; these areas were outside the 
scope of this study. Furthermore, the communication pathways may be different 
in private healthcare institutions, limiting the generalisability of the findings to 
academic centres. Consideration of wireless network coverage and hospital 
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dead-zones (areas without wireless service) will be needed as this system is 
expanded into other clinical domains and institutions. 
 
7.5.4 Conclusions 
The findings of this study provide a novel and detailed examination of the 
communication pathways between members of a surgical team involved in 
escalation of care. It meets the current need for evaluation of communication 
methods in healthcare219. The WhatsApp platform was deemed to be user-
friendly and was extensively used to facilitate communication, and escalation of 
care within a team where junior physicians rotate on a weekly basis. In addition, 
significant benefits were realised through a system in which senior physicians 
had a constant overview of activities undertaken within their team without 
active interference, allowing their juniors to develop a degree of clinical 
independence at minimal risk to patient safety.  
WhatsApp was perceived to be a simple and efficient innovation for 
communicating within a surgical team. It helped flatten the traditional hierarchy 
between team members thereby overcoming the human factor barriers to 
effective escalation of care. This study illustrates the potential for simple 
technological innovation to improve patient safety. In doing so it lays the 
groundwork for both technology development and implementation.  
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8 Measuring information transfer during escalation of care: 
Development and validation of the QUality of Information 
Transfer tool 
            
 
8.1 Introduction 
The escalation of care process has been shown to be amenable to intervention in 
the areas of communication technology and escalation protocols based on 
human factors and flattened hierarchies. The former was dealt with in chapter 7 
whilst the latter will be discussed and investigated in the remaining chapters. 
Chapter 7 demonstrated how innovation of technology could facilitate 
interprofessional communication and improve the safety of clinical supervision 
and escalation of care. However, there was no quantitative evidence showing 
that escalation of care had improved, just the perceptions of participants. 
With the ultimate aim of this thesis, and future work in this area, being 
the implementation of interventions to improve escalation of care, it is critical to 
ensure that any improvement can be objectively measured. This is the 
penultimate step in this thesis. The beginning chapters dealt with exploring 
escalation of care, the middle chapters involved the development of ideas for 
successful intervention in the escalation of care process. This chapter links the 
development of interventions to their implementation and analysis. Before any 
improvement in escalation of care secondary to an intervention can be 
demonstrated, validated metrics to measure the core skills required to conduct 
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the process successfully must be available. As a metric for this purpose is not 
currently available, one must be developed.  
 
The two core skills required by the initiator of escalation of care are: 
1. Recognition of patient deterioration through patient assessment, and; 
2. Effective transfer of critical information to a senior colleague. 
Regarding recognition of deterioration, metrics have already been developed 
that can objectively measure the quality of a patient assessment. The Surgical 
Ward care Assessment Tool (SWAT) was developed on a high-fidelity simulated 
ward in London and includes scales for both patient assessment and 
management33. In addition the Global Assessment Toolkit developed, content-
validated and reliability-assessed by Hull et al. is a psychometric toolkit which 
includes a tool to measure the quality of patient assessment skills in surgery and 
is appropriate for use in deteriorating patients220. In addition, metrics have been 
developed to measure the quality of postoperative handover (transfer of a 
patient from the theatre complex to the ward or intensive care unit). However, 
these assess face-to-face communication rather than telephone referrals, which 
are more commonly used to refer patients to senior colleagues during escalation 
of care40.  
Although there has been an exponential rise in the number of metrics to 
assess non-technical skills (e.g. Observational Teamwork Assessment for 
Surgery103, Anaesthetists’ Non-Technical Skills221 and NOn-TECHnical Skills222) 
in the past decade, these have largely concentrated on the operative 
environment, often neglecting the high risk and inherently stressful nature of the 
surgical ward.  In contrast, communication guides, such as the Situation-
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Background-Assessment-Recommendation (SBAR) tool have been developed. 
However, the SBAR tool was produced to help nurses and junior surgeons 
structure their communication rather than to measure the quality of information 
transfer. Therefore, perhaps unsurprisingly, reports suggest that SBAR has not 
improved critical information transfer during the referral process223.  
It is noteworthy that, whilst tools exist to measure patient assessment skills in 
the setting of patient deterioration, there are no available metrics to measure the 
quality of information transfer during escalation of care for surgical patients. If 
the information transfer is not of high-enough quality, a senior clinician may not 
actually come to the ward to assess the patient. This crystallises the crucial role 
that information transfer may play in escalation of care and failure to rescue. An 
evidence-based, validated, reliable and feasible metric for objectively measuring 
the quality of information transfer needs to be developed before information 
transfer during escalation of care referrals can be improved. 
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8.2 Aims 
1. To develop the QUality of Information Transfer (QUIT) tool; 
2. To generate evidence for the reliability and validity of the QUIT tool in the 
simulated environment, and; 
3. To assess the feasibility of using the QUIT tool in the clinical environment. 
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8.3 Methods 
This study comprised three phases. Phase 1 involved development of the QUIT 
tool through a literature review and semi-structured interviews with 
stakeholders to identify best evidence for core skills required for effective 
information transfer. Phase 2 aimed to assess the face, content, construct and 
concurrent validity and the reliability of the QUIT tool using psychometric 
methodology. Phase 3 used direct observation to provide evidence for the 
feasibility of the tool in the clinical environment (see Figure 8A). 
 
8.3.1 Phase 1 
Literature review: A comprehensive review of the literature was conducted to 
identify the necessary components of successful information transfer for 
escalation of care. The Ovid Medline database was searched using the following 
keywords and their combinations (medical subject headings are indicated in 
parentheses): ‘escalation of care’, ‘referral’ (MeSH), ‘communication’ (MeSH), 
‘quality assessment’, ‘patient handover’ (MeSH) and ‘surgery’ (MeSH). These 
terms were then combined with the term ‘information transfer’ using the 
Boolean conjunction ‘AND’. The reference lists of selected articles were hand-
searched to identify additional relevant studies. The components of effective 
information transfer were synthesised from selected articles by two independent 
researchers. Any conflicts were resolved through consultation with a third 
researcher and then the research team. Reports were not excluded based on 
specialty or methodology to allow comprehensive capture of evidence for the 
QUIT tool. 
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Figure 8A Study procedure 
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Semi-structured interviews: Senior surgeons (consultant and year-5 registrars 
and above) and junior surgeons (FY1 or FY2 level) from general surgical 
specialties were recruited purposively for interview in three London hospitals. 
The rationale behind this was that data could be collected both from a top-down 
and bottom-up perspective, allowing a holistic picture of escalation of care 
information transfer practices in UK hospitals. Surgical ward nurses were also 
interviewed to ensure a multiprofessional approach to development of the tool. 
Participants were interviewed individually in order to gain a detailed 
understanding of their experiences of the communication phase of the escalation 
of care process. Interviews were semi-structured by a topic guide developed by 
the research team117. The following key questions were asked of each 
participant: 
1. In which clinical situations should junior surgeons and nurses escalate care? 
2. What information should be transferred to a senior surgeon to allow them to 
make an informed decision about a deteriorating patient? 
Each interview was conducted with informed consent, audio-recorded and 
transcribed verbatim. To ensure methodological rigour each transcript was 
member-checked and re-read by researchers to ensure immersion in the data. 
Grounded theory methodology was then used to identify emergent themes by 
two independent researchers before triangulation of the dataset to ensure 
complete data capture117,224. 
Drafting of the QUIT tool: Finally, the research team evaluated the results of the 
literature review and interviews to construct the tool. The research team had 
backgrounds in surgery (n=2), patient safety (n=2), and validation 
methodology/psychometrics (n=2). All potential components of information 
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transfer during escalation of care that were derived from the literature review 
and semi-structured interviews were reviewed by the team and key components 
to be included in the draft of the tool were selected through group consensus.  
A five-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree, 5=strongly agree) was 
employed for each of the items included in the tool, which were placed into one 
of seven core categories for information transfer during escalation of care. The 
alternative to using a Likert scale would have been to use simple yes/no ratings. 
However, the tool needed to be as sensitive to variations in individual 
performance as possible so the Likert scale was selected. The initial draft was 
then piloted with clinicians, nurses and researchers to ensure that the language 
used was understandable. Based on this small pilot, several iterations were 
produced within a plan-do-study-act cycle, to ensure it was ready for 
validation225.  
 
8.3.2 Phase 2 
Face and content validity: A group of 22 clinicians and nurses was asked to 
complete a questionnaire to assess face and content validity. A five-point Likert 
scale was used to assess the level of agreement and the content validity index 
(CVI) was calculated by computing the proportion of ratings of four or higher. 
The CVI value gives an indication of the relevance of an item to the overall 
research question being pursued. If a category or item achieved a CVI value of > 
0.8, it was considered to be highly relevant226. Items with a CVI of >0.6 but <0.8 
were considered to be acceptable with the caveat that they be discussed by the 
research team prior to a decision being made on inclusion or exclusion from the 
tool227. 
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Construct validity: Construct validity denotes the ability of the QUIT tool to 
measure differences in the quality of information transfer during escalation of 
care. To assess the construct validity of the QUIT tool 15 senior (consultants and 
year-5 registrars and above) and 15 junior surgeons (FY1 or FY2) were recruited 
from four London hospitals using purposive sampling techniques and their 
performance in terms of information transfer was compared.  
Participants followed the study protocol shown in Figure 8B. Each participant 
was asked to assess a deteriorating actor-patient in a previously validated high-
fidelity ward simulator33, once they had completed an assessment of the patient 
they made a referral to a senior colleague over the telephone. Each scenario 
ended with a debriefing for the participants to further their own training and 
skills. 
The scenario used in this study was developed using the American College 
of Surgeons (ACS) surgical skills curriculum for residents developed at Tufts 
University (module 6: postoperative pulmonary embolism). The reason for using 
this material was that it had already been validated for use in a curriculum for 
surgical trainees and, as such, did not require validation itself within this study. 
Furthermore, the material provided by the ACS is comprehensive and allows the 
researcher to ensure that the simulation is set up in exactly the same way each 
time it is conducted. An actor playing the role of a ward nurse, patient casenotes, 
vital signs charts and investigation results were made available for each 
participant. The participant stem described a deteriorating post-operative 
patient with respiratory distress (see Figure 8C). Each referral was audio and 
video-recorded with informed consent to allow for independent rating by 
trained researchers (see Figure 8D). Construct validity was demonstrated for 
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each item if a Mann-Whitney test comparing senior and junior scores was found 
to show a significant difference. Inter-rater reliability was calculated using the 
intra-class correlation co-efficient (values > 0.7 indicate good reliability) and 
internal consistency of the tool items and categories was assessed using 
Cronbach’s alpha.   
 
Figure 8B Simulated scenario protocol 
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Figure 8C Simulated patient scenario flow diagram 
 
 
Concurrent validity: Concurrent validity was demonstrated by comparing the 
scoring by two independent researchers for all participants using the QUIT tool 
and the SBAR communication tool adapted by Cunningham et al.223 to assess the 
telephone referral skills of surgical interns (FY1s) in Australia. The point biserial 
correlation228 was used to compare the dichotomous scores from the SBAR tool 
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with the ordinal data from the QUIT tool. A correlation value (r) of > 0.5 is 
considered a moderate positive relationship and a value of > 0.7 is considered a 
strong positive correlation.  
Reliability: Two independent researchers conducted scoring of all participants’ 
referrals twice each, at least one month apart. These original scores (‘test’) and 
subsequent (‘re-test’) scores were compared using the Wilcoxon test to assess 
for the reliability of the QUIT tool. To be considered reliable the test and re-test 
scores would have a strongly positive correlation and not be significantly 
different. For all analyses in this study significance was taken at a level of p<0.05. 
 
Figure 8D Simulation ward set-up 
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8.3.3 Phase 3 
Clinical testing: In order to provide feasibility evidence for the QUIT tool in the 
clinical environment, real-time escalation scenarios were observed directly. It is 
very important to conduct feasibility analysis of a tool that is tailored for use in 
the clinical environment. The generation of evidence for validity does not allow 
the researcher to establish that the tool is practically useable (and useful) in the 
clinical environment. In-situ testing of the tool was deemed necessary to ensure 
that it could be used to measure the quality of information transfer during 
escalation of care contemporaneously, on the surgical ward.  
Two independent researchers conducted observation sessions on surgical 
wards in two London hospitals with appropriate approvals secured beforehand. 
The researchers observed and scored 15 referrals each using the QUIT tool, 
aiming to score the information transfer during escalation of care in real-time, 
rather than retrospectively. Both nurses and junior surgeons were observed 
escalating care to ensure data collection was interprofessional. Data were 
analysed using SPSS Statistics (version 21) to compare scores for the nurses and 
doctors. The median, range and p-value (calculated using the Mann-Whitney 
test) were reported.  
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8.4 Results 
8.4.1 Phase 1: Tool development 
Literature review: A total of 43 articles reported components of effective 
information transfer in healthcare and were selected for inclusion from a total of 
456 citations. Forty-one original research articles and two literature reviews 
were included. Of these there were three that employed qualitative methodology 
and 23 articles from the field of surgery. Other clinical specialties included 
paediatrics, internal medicine, general practice and emergency medicine. Full 
results of the literature review are displayed in Table 8A. 
Semi-structured interviews: A total of 33 interprofessional healthcare staff 
including 16 senior surgeons, 11 junior surgeons and six surgical ward nurses 
were recruited for interview. The interviewees provided rich qualitative data 
regarding their perceptions of important components of information transfer, 
specific to surgery.  
The different components of information transfer from the literature 
review and interviews were recorded on a database and through identification of 
frequent themes; seven key categories for information transfer were developed, 
which contained a total of 24 different items. These themes form the structure 
for the QUIT tool. Details of the data used to formulate the QUIT tool can be 
found below along with verbatim quotations from the interviews. 
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Table 8A Literature review articles and identified categories  
 
 
 
Category 
First Author (ref) Methodology Subjects and Setting Communicator 
Identities 
Patient 
Identity 
Clinical 
Details 
Problem Plan Information 
Presentation 
Overall 
Quality 
Adhiyaman et al.229 Observation study 200 discharged patients, UK   √     
Agarwal et al.230 Prospective observation 
study 
Paediatric clinical team, USA   √  √    
Anwari.231 Survey study 276 patients, PACU, Saudi 
Arabia 
     √ √ 
Archbold et al.232 Survey study GP surgeries, UK      √  
Bertrand et al.233  Retrospective case series 30 patient notes, France  √ √ √    
Catchpole et al.234 Interview study F1 teams and 10 clinical staff, 
UK 
   √  √  
Clark et al.235 Prospective intervention 
study 
General surgery registrars and 
Faculty, USA 
  √ √    
Craig et al.236 Prospective intervention 
study 
Paediatric clinical team, UK     √ √ √  
Fair.237 Retrospective case series Discharged patients, UK  √ √ √    
Foster et al.238 Audit 244 patient discharge notes, 4 
GP surgeries, Scotland 
 √      
Greenberg et al.239 Retrospective case series 60 surgical malpractice claims, 
USA 
 √  √ √ √  
Horwitz et al.240 Prospective intervention 
study 
Emergency department staff, 
USA 
      √ 
Joy et al.241 Prospective intervention 
study 
79 paediatric patients, cardiac 
ICU, USA 
   √    
Karakaya et al.242 Prospective intervention 
study 
48 paediatric patients, cardiac 
centre, Belgium 
  √  √   
Kendrick et al.243 Prospective observation 
study 
110 discharged patients, UK     √    
Kripalani et al.244 Literature review No subjects, USA    √ √  √ 
Lissauer et al.245 Retrospective case series 133 neonates, UK      √  
Mageean.246 Retrospective case series Patient notes, General 
Practice surgery, UK 
  √ √    
Manser et al.247 Literature review No subjects, Switzerland √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Manser et al.248 Prospective intervention 
study 
126 patients, UK hospital √   √ √ √ √ 
Marks et al.249 Randomized controlled 
trial 
60 paediatric patients, 
Australia 
     √ √ 
Nagpal et al.250  Prospective intervention 
study 
50 staff, 100 patients, UK and 
Switzerland 
 √ √ √    
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N.B PACU=Post-Anesthesia Care Unit, GP=General Practitioner, F1=Formula 1, ICU=Intensive Care Unit, CSICU=Cardiac Surgical ICU
Nagpal et al.203  Interview study 18 staff, UK  √ √ √  √  
Nagpal et al.251  Prospective observation 
study 
20 patients, UK  √ √ √    
Nagpal et al.212  Survey study 50 surgical staff, UK  √ √ √ √ √  
Pantilat et al.252 Survey study 1,030 Primary Care 
Physicians, USA 
 √      
Penney253 Prospective observation 
study 
104 discharged patients, UK   √     
Petrovic et al.254 Prospective intervention 
study 
238 staff, 60 patients, CSICU, 
USA  
√       
Pickering et al.255 Prospective intervention 
study 
Senior and junior ICU staff, 
Ireland 
√   √ √  √ 
Rao et al.256 Prospective intervention 
study 
150 patients, USA       √ 
Rudiger-Sturchler 
et al.257 
Prospective intervention 
study 
Emergency department staff, 
Switzerland 
     √  
Salerno et al.258 Prospective intervention 
study 
34 FY1s, Medical ward, USA      √  
Sandler et al.259 Randomized controlled 
study 
289 discharged patients, UK √       
Scott et al.260 Prospective intervention 
study 
Paramedics and Trauma 
physicians, USA 
 √ √     
Sevdalis et al.35 Observation study Theatre staff, UK √       
Smith et al.261 Observation study 17 anaesthetists 15 nurses, 
UK  
√    √  √ 
Symons et al.262 Observation study Medical handover team, UK  √ √ √ √ √ √ √ 
Telem et al.263 Prospective intervention 
study 
45 surgical registars, USA √       
Tulloch  et al.264 Retrospective case series 546 discharge reports, UK  √ √ √    
van Walraven et 
al.265 
Randomized controlled 
study 
293 patients, Canada      √ √ 
Wayne et al.266 Prospective intervention 
study 
Surgical registrars, USA  √  √ √ √  
Webster et al.267 Randomized controlled 
study 
36 participants, USA      √  
Zavalkoff  et al.268 Prospective intervention 
study 
33 staff, Paediatric ICU, USA  √ √ √    
 218 
Category 1: Communicator identities – The importance of establishing the 
identities of those participating in the information transfer was emphasised by 
nine articles, which stated that the clinical specialty and grade should also be 
included. Disclosing identity early was found to create rapport and reduce 
tension between colleagues35,248,269.  
Category 2: Patient identity – The name of the patient, including a unique 
identifier such as their date of birth, was identified by 16 articles. Other 
important details were the location of the patient, their hospital number and the 
name of their responsible consultant239,264,270. 
Category 3: Clinical details – The patient’s relevant past history (including 
recent surgical procedures), current treatments and working diagnosis were 
identified by 16 articles. The surgical history was frequently identified as 
crucial40,212. The current treatment was particularly important for the interview 
participants with a junior surgeon stating: “I make sure I initiate the first steps of 
the emergency management pathway prior to calling.” 
Category 4: Problem – The current problem with the patient was identified by 
22 articles. The patient’s vital signs and recent investigation reports were 
frequently mentioned40,236,271. The inclusion of salient points only236 whilst 
including sufficient detail234,272 was identified as a difficult balancing act for 
junior surgeons.  
Category 5: Plan – 11 articles identified the importance of concluding the 
information transfer with a clear plan for the patient’s management. Questions 
or ambiguities over patient care were to be avoided212,244,273. One of the senior 
surgeons exclaimed, “they [junior surgeons or nurses] must have all the 
information that is required [for me] to make a considered decision”. 
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Category 6: Information presentation – There were 17 articles that identified 
the necessity for good communicators to have strong non-technical skills. The 
clarity232,258 and structure265,274 of communication and avoidance of 
interruptions275 were frequently mentioned. One of the nurses explained that the 
way information is packaged can impact on the success of the referral: “On some 
occasions you might think the patient looks really unwell, the way you 
communicate can determine whether someone comes to see them quickly.” 
Category 7: Overall quality – The importance of providing a score that rated 
the overall quality of the information transfer was raised by 11 articles. Receiver 
satisfaction249,256 and areas for improvement231 were highlighted as effective 
methods of packaging a global rating score. Table 8B shows the components of 
information transfer during escalation of care that were common themes 
identified from the interview transcripts.  
 
8.4.2 Drafting of the QUIT tool 
The research team combined the findings extracted from the literature review 
and interviews into a version of the QUIT tool that was ready for simulation 
testing. 
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Table 8B Components identified from interview transcripts 
Item Quote supporting component (S=senior surgeon, 
J=junior surgeon, N=surgical ward nurse) 
Reason for the call “If the patient looks acutely unwell and I don’t really know 
what’s going on then I would call for help urgently” (J) 
Vital signs "I'd want to know what the vital signs are...I'm busy in 
theatre and I've really got to know that this is a dire 
emergency" (S) 
Initial diagnosis and 
management 
"I would want to be sure that they have initiated first steps of 
the diagnostic or management pathway" (S) 
Examination and 
investigation findings 
"They must see the patient. They must have all of the 
information that is required to make a considered decision" 
(S) 
Clinical problem and 
history 
"A quick history with important background information and 
a summary of the current problem is very useful" (S) 
Degree of urgency "On some occasions you might think ‘this patient looks really 
unwell, but I don’t know the diagnosis. Please come to see 
them quickly” (N) 
 
8.4.3 Phase 2: Psychometric testing 
Face and content validity: Face and content validity were demonstrated to be 
high for the QUIT tool with all 24 items achieving a median score of > 4 for both 
questions in the questionnaire. Furthermore, 21 of 24 items achieved a CVI of > 
0.8. Items that did not achieve a CVI > 0.8 were ‘clearly communicates 
responsible consultant (attending)’, ‘used available documentation to structure 
handover’ and ‘establishes rapport and mutual respect’. These items all had a CVI  
value between 0.6 and 0.8. These results indicate good evidence for the face and 
content validity for the QUIT tool (see Table 8C). 
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Table 8C Content validity of the QUIT tool 
Categories and items 
 
This item is relevant to 
information transfer for 
surgical patients. 
Communication of this item 
will enhance escalation of care 
and/or patient safety. 
 Median (range) CVI Median (range) CVI 
Communicator Identities     
Clearly communicates initiator identity (include 
grade and specialty) 
5.0 (3-5) 0.95 5.0 (3-5) 0.91 
Clearly confirms receiver identity (include grade 
and specialty) 
5.0 (4-5) 1.00 5.0 (1-5) 0.91 
Establishes rapport and mutual respect 4.0 (2-5) 0.64 4.0 (2-5) 0.73 
Patient Identity     
Clearly communicates patient name 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 
Clearly communicates patient location 5.0 (3-5) 0.95 5.0 (3-5) 0.91 
Clearly communicates responsible consultant 4.5 (2-5) 0.77 5.0 (1-5) 0.77 
Clearly communicates age/DOB 5.0 (3-5) 0.95 5.0 (3-5) 0.95 
Clinical Details     
Clearly articulates working diagnosis 5.0 (3-5) 0.95 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 
Clearly communicates relevant history 
(including recent operations) 
5.0 (4-5) 1.00 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 
Outlines current treatment to date 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 
Problem     
Clearly describes current problem with patient 5.0 (5-5) 1.00 5.0 (5-5) 1.00 
Communicates relevant vital signs and fluid 
balance 
5.0 (4-5) 1.00 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 
Describes patient assessment and examination 
findings 
5.0 (4-5) 1.00 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 
Outlines relevant investigation results to date 5.0 (3-5) 0.95 5.0 (3-5) 0.95 
Effectively prioritises clinical issues 5.0 (3-5) 0.95 5.0 (3-5) 0.95 
Clearly communicates degree of urgency 5.4 (4-5) 1.00 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 
Plan     
Clearly defines the reason for the call (e.g. 
advice, patient review, transfer) 
5.0 (3-5) 0.95 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 
Questions/ ambiguities about patient care 
definitively resolved 
4.0 (3-5) 0.82 4.0 (2-5) 0.82 
Agrees plan for on-going care for patient 5.0 (3-5) 0.91 5.0 (3-5) 0.95 
Information Presentation     
Clear, understandable language used 
throughout 
5.0 (4-5) 1.00 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 
Information presented in a structured and logical 
order 
5.0 (4-5) 1.00 5.0 (4-5) 1.00 
Used available documentation to structure 
handover 
4.0 (1-5) 0.73 4.0 (1-5) 0.68 
All relevant information selected and 
communicated 
4.0 (3-5) 0.86 5.0 (3-5) 0.95 
Completes information transfer without 
digressing 
4.-0 (3-5) 0.91 4.0 (3-5) 0.86 
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Construct validity: The QUIT tool was demonstrated to be construct-valid. For 
all of the seven categories, senior surgeons were found to perform significantly 
better than their junior counterparts (p<0.05). In addition senior surgeons were 
scored significantly higher than junior surgeons for 18 out of the 24 items in the 
tool (p<0.05). These findings were supported by the significantly higher median 
overall scores achieved by senior compared to junior surgeons (senior 98 vs. 
junior 78, p<0.001). These results can be seen in Table 8D. The reliability of the 
scores given by the independent raters was excellent. Both the inter-rater 
reliability and inter-rater agreement were shown to be high. All seven categories 
were rated with an intra-class correlation coefficient of > 0.7 and achieved high 
levels of internal consistency as demonstrated by the Cronbach’s alpha statistic 
in Table 8E.  
Concurrent validity: The scenario for each participant was scored using both 
the QUIT and the SBAR tools. The total score for all 30 participants was 
compared using each tool and the point biserial correlation between the two 
assessment tool scores was found to be moderately, almost strongly, positive 
(r=0.694, p<0.001) indicating good concurrent validity. 
Reliability: The QUIT tool was found to be reliable when the scores from 
independent raters were compared at the time of the study and when they were 
scored again more than one month later. All seven categories and the overall 
score showed similar median values and were not found to be statistically 
significantly different (p>0.05). The overall scores achieved in the test compared 
to re-test comparison had a strongly positive correlation indicating a high degree 
of reliability (ICC=0.965, 95% CI 0.927-0.983, p<0.001). 
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Table 8D Construct validity of the QUIT tool 
Component 
 
Novices Experts Mann-Whitney 
U test 
Median (range) Median (range) p value 
Communicator Identities 12 (11-15) 14 (12-15) 0.003 
Clearly communicates initiator identity (include 
grade and specialty) 
3 (3-5) 5 (3-5) 0.264 
Clearly confirms receiver identity (include grade and 
specialty) 
5 (5-5) 5 (5-5) 1.000 
Establishes rapport and mutual respect 4 (2-5) 5 (4-5) <0.001 
Patient Identity 10 (4-15) 12 (4-16) 0.030 
Clearly communicates patient name 3 (1-5) 4 (1-5) 0.740 
Clearly communicates patient location 1 (1-5) 5 (1-5) 0.012 
Clearly communicates responsible consultant 1 (1-5) 1 (1-5) 0.150 
Clearly communicates age/DOB 3 (1-5) 5 (1-5) 0.150 
Clinical Details 11 (8-12) 13 (11-14) <0.001 
Clearly articulates working diagnosis 4 (3-5) 5 (4-5) <0.001 
Clearly communicates relevant history (including 
recent operation and date) 
3 (2-4) 4 (3-5) 0.001 
Outlines current treatment to date 3 (2-4) 4 (3-5) 0.002 
Problem 19 (15-23) 24 (18-28) <0.001 
Clearly describes current problem with patient 4 (2-4) 4 (3-5) 0.007 
Communicates relevant vital signs and fluid balance 3 (1-4) 4 (2-4) 0.002 
Describes patient assessment and examination 
findings 
3 (2-4) 4 (3-5) 0.004 
Outlines relevant investigation results to date 3 (2-4) 4 (3-5) 0.010 
Effectively prioritises clinical issues 4 (2-5) 4 (4-5) 0.003 
Clearly communicates degree of urgency 3 (2-4) 4 (2-4) 0.008 
Plan 11 (8-13) 14 (12-15) <0.001 
Clearly defines the reason for the call (e.g. advice, 
patient review, transfer) 
4 (2-5) 4 (3-5) 0.009 
Questions/ ambiguities about patient care 
definitively resolved 
3 (2-4) 5 (3-5) 0.001 
Agrees plan for on-going care for patient 4 (3-5) 4 (4-5) 0.026 
Information Presentation 17 (11-21) 20 (16-23) 0.001 
Clear, understandable language used throughout 4 (2-5) 5 (4-5) 0.005 
Information presented in a structured and logical 
order 
2 (1-4) 4 (3-5) <0.001 
Used available documentation to structure 
handover 
3 (2-4) 4 (3-4) 0.002 
All relevant information selected and communicated 3 (2-4) 4 (3-4) 0.056 
Completes information transfer without digressing 4 (2-5) 5 (4-5) <0.001 
Overall quality of information transfer 3 (1-4) 4 (2-5) <0.001 
Total score 78 (68-89) 98 (82-110) <0.001 
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Table 8E Inter-rater reliability for the QUIT tool 
Category Intra-class 
correlation 
95% CI p-value Cronbach’s Alpha 
Communicator identity ICC = 0.925 0.728-0.931 <0.001 0.923 
Patient identity ICC = 0.998 0.997-0.999 <0.001 0.998 
Clinical details ICC = 0.792 0.564-0.901 <0.001 0.790 
Problem ICC = 0.790 0.662-0.870 <0.001 0.791 
Plan ICC = 0.902 0.793-0.953 <0.001 0.899 
Information presentation ICC = 0.891 0.809-0.938 <0.001 0.890 
Global rating ICC = 0.902 0.605-0.976 =0.001 n/a 
Overall score ICC = 0.932 0.745-0.983 <0.001 n/a 
 
8.4.4 Phase 3: Testing in the clinical environment 
Observation of 30 escalation scenarios was conducted. For 15 of these, two 
independent researchers observed a nurse escalating care to a junior surgeon 
(FY1 or FY2); the other 15 scenarios involved a FY1 or FY2 surgeon escalating 
care to their registrar. The researchers were able to score each telephone 
referral contemporaneously and completely. They felt that the QUIT tool was 
feasible to use in the clinical environment in real-time.  
Data analysis revealed that the surgeons had statistically significantly greater 
information transfer skills compared to their nursing colleagues for five of the 
seven categories (including the total score). Nurses outperformed junior 
surgeons in the communicator identities category, there was no difference in the 
information presentation category (see Table 8F).  
 
Table 8F Scores for clinical referrals 
 
Category Median (range) for nurse 
initiator 
Median (range) for doctor 
initiator 
p-value 
Communicator identities 13 (9-15) 12 (10-14) 0.023 
Patient identity 12 (4-16) 17 (10-20) <0.001 
Clinical details 10 (3-13) 12 (8-15) 0.002 
Problem 16 (12-22) 21 (16-29) 0.001 
Plan 10 (6-12) 12 (6-15) 0.037 
Information presentation 16 (10-22) 18 (11-24) 0.305 
Global score 3 (2-4) 4 (2-5) 0.061 
Total score 78 (57-87) 91 (68-110) 0.002 
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8.5 Discussion 
This study has led to the development, validation and feasibility analysis of a 
metric to measure the quality of information transfer during escalation of care. 
In doing so it has provided valuable evidence for the importance of high-quality 
information transfer in the setting of patient deterioration and has important 
implications for junior surgeon and nurse training. 
The aims of this study were to develop and generate evidence for the 
reliability and validity of the QUIT tool in the simulated environment and to 
assess the feasibility of using the QUIT tool, real-time, in the clinical 
environment. The findings will be discussed in relation to these aims and in the 
context of the wider literature. Following this, the implications for the field of 
surgery and beyond will be discussed, taking the strengths and limitations of this 
research methodology into account. Lastly, some conclusions will be presented.  
 
8.5.1 Summary of findings and context within the literature 
Development of the QUIT tool: This study utilised a comprehensive literature 
review and qualitative, semi-structure interviews to generate best evidence for 
the categories and items contained within the QUIT tool. A collaborative 
approach was used which involved regular consultation with an expert research 
team to ensure that all the critical components of information transfer during 
escalation of care were included, whilst also ensuring the tool was as short as 
possible to enable real-time use. These two methodologies allowed capture of 
evidence from the widest number of potential stakeholders.  
The literature review was very broad and did not limit articles to those in 
the surgical field, as communication and information transfer are core skills of all 
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healthcare professionals. Limiting the search may have omitted some important 
articles from other specialties, which provided valuable evidence for the QUIT 
tool. The inclusion of interviews has also allowed the opinion of 
multiprofessional clinicians whom participate daily in escalation of care to be 
included in the development phase of the tool. The final draft of the QUIT tool 
included seven categories and 24 items. 
Validation and reliability testing of the QUIT tool: Multiple types of validation 
were evidenced for the QUIT tool. Face validity, content validity and construct 
validity were all demonstrated in a robust fashion. Whilst a few individual items 
did not reach the desired CVI level or significance value, all categories and more 
than 75% of the items did. Furthermore, none of the items were demonstrated to 
be irrelevant to information transfer during escalation of care or to have 
displayed no construct validity whatsoever so all items will be retained in the 
tool going forward to further research.  
Three of the items in the QUIT tool failed to reach the threshold for 
acceptable content validity. One of these items (uses available documentation to 
structure handover) was identified multiple times in the literature review and 
interviews and did achieve reasonable content validity (>0.7 overall) and 
construct validity (p<0.001) so was retained in the tool. Communicating the 
responsible consultant (attending) was also identified multiple times in phase 1 
of this study and does seem important. This item achieved reasonable content 
validity (>0.7 overall) but was not found to be construct-valid. It may also, not be 
relevant to an on-call registrar who simply needs to know if the patient is under 
their specialty or not initially. The identification of the responsible senior 
clinician may come later, when resuscitation has been started. However, for the 
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purposes of this study it was retained in the tool. The establishment of rapport 
and mutual respect item did not achieve high content validity (overall <0.7) but 
was construct-valid (p<0.001) and is important to ensure a flattened hierarchy 
so this item was retained.  
The concurrent validity of the tool was assessed using a comparison to 
the SBAR tool. The correlation was found to be moderately, almost strongly, 
positive (r=0.694) and highly significant (p<0.001) and was just on the border 
between moderate (0.5-0.7) and high (>0.7). This result provided good evidence 
for concurrent validity between the SBAR and QUIT tools, but also shows us that 
there are differences between the two assessment tools. The reliability testing of 
the tool when scores more than 1-month apart were compared was also high, 
indicating that the tool can perform on a consistent basis in the simulated 
environment. Further analysis of the results in the simulated environment 
revealed that junior surgeons routinely failed to mention where the patient was 
located or describe their vital signs, examination and investigation findings as 
well as the senior surgeons did. The implication is that the senior cannot gain an 
accurate picture of the patient’s clinical condition from their junior colleague and 
may fail to realize the seriousness of the patient’s deterioration and not 
prioritise that patient appropriately. This may result in treatment delay and 
preventable harm68,71,73.  
Feasibility evidence for the QUIT tool: Clinical escalation scenarios were 
observed to provide feasibility evidence for the QUIT tool. Two independent 
researchers found they were able to contemporaneously rate telephone 
referrals, both by nurses and junior surgeons. It was demonstrated that junior 
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surgeons perform better than nurses in the majority of tool categories but 
further analysis will be required to confirm this.  
Context of these findings in the wider literature: Several standardized 
handover tools have been developed but the principal focus of these has been the 
transfer of a patient from the operating theatre to the ICU and they have not 
been thoroughly validated230,242,255,276. Additionally, these tools do not aim to 
measure or improve communication for a deteriorating patient where time is 
critical if failure to rescue is to be prevented. The QUIT tool incorporates both 
the key information that needs to be transferred by a junior surgeon to a senior 
surgeon during escalation of care and the way in which this information should 
be presented to ensure the senior surgeon can effectively prioritise. This sets the 
QUIT tool apart from other communication tools such as the SBAR tool, which 
simply acts to structure communication during escalation of care, rather than 
objectively measure its quality.  
Previous studies have demonstrated the ubiquitous nature of threats to 
patient safety that are present on surgical wards110 and the contribution of 
communication failures in these adverse events113,272. Clinical inexperience and 
hierarchical barriers have been shown to affect the confidence of junior staff and 
impede escalation of care84,89,117. Potential solutions to these issues have 
included the development of escalation of care protocols277. The development of 
these protocols can be augmented through the development of training regimes 
for surgeons to teach them valuable escalation and information transfer skills. 
The QUIT tool provides a valuable method of measuring the quality of 
information transfer during escalation of care, which will allow the efficacy of 
training programmes and protocols in this area to be accurately assessed. 
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8.5.2 Implications 
The primary function of the QUIT tool is to serve as a metric to evaluate the 
quality of information transfer during escalation of care. As such, the QUIT tool is 
an important part of any clinical educator’s toolkit. The pervasiveness of 
simulation training in surgical curricula means that trainees are spending 
increased time working on their non-technical skills, one of the most critical of 
which is communication skills (i.e. information transfer)210. The importance of 
communication skills in facilitation of both the interprofessional and the doctor-
patient relationship is reinforced by the addition of communication skills 
modules to surgical and medical training programmes278,279. The QUIT tool can 
be used to assess the efficacy of communication skills training, which is 
important as training surgeons and nurses are using time away from the wards 
and direct patient care to participate in training. Although the QUIT tool is not 
intended to be a rigid protocol, the categories and items within it can also be 
used to teach training surgeons and nurses to standardise and structure 
information transfer during escalation of care, thus acting as a training tool as 
well as a tool for evaluation. The QUIT tool may improve training for surgeons 
and quality and safety for patients on the surgical ward and can also be adapted 
to specialties other than surgery, increasing its applicability to healthcare in 
general. 
 
 
8.5.3 Strengths and limitations 
To our knowledge, the QUIT tool is the first to accurately assess information 
transfer during escalation of care in surgery. The inclusion of data to support the 
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use of the QUIT tool in the clinical environment adds strength to the findings of 
this study. Demonstrating the validity of any assessment tool is necessary, 
however, showing that the tool can be translated from the simulated to the 
clinical environment is also important if the aim is to improve the skills of 
healthcare professions in their own working environment. Phase 1 of this study 
involved the use of literature review and semi-structured interviews to establish 
best evidence in the topic area, adding strength to the development phase of the 
QUIT tool. Researchers seeking to develop and validate assessment tools in 
surgery have used this mixed-methods approach previously220,280,281. The data 
collected in phase 2 demonstrated that the QUIT tool has both high validity and 
reliability when utilised by junior and senior surgeons. Multiple facets of validity 
assessment were used in this study and the most current validity framework was 
utilised, adding to the robust nature of the results obtained282.   
This study has certain limitations, which future research should seek to 
address. Firstly, the QUIT tool should be tested across other sites in different 
geographic areas and outside of the UK to determine if the excellent results 
obtained in this study can be replicated. Furthermore, it should be realised that, 
despite this tool being ready for use, it remains a work in progress, the results in 
this study have provided good evidence for the validity, reliability and feasibility 
for the tool but further refinement may be required to adapt the tool for 
alternative settings and specialties. In addition, it should be recognised that the 
results presented in phase 3 aimed to provide evidence for the feasibility of the 
tool in the clinical environment, not its validity. The results should be 
interpreted with caution as differences in the culture and customs of the nursing 
and medical professions may have contributed to the differences observed in the 
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results. Lastly, future research should aim to include analysis of whether the 
QUIT tool has an impact on error rates and avoidable adverse events; as per the 
study by Starmer et al. exploring the I-PASS handover program283.  
 
8.5.4 Conclusions 
In conclusion, this study has described a reliable, valid and feasible tool to assess 
information transfer during escalation of care on surgical wards. It can be used 
to assess key non-technical skills of training surgeons and nurses and also serve 
as a training aide to increase the structure of information transfer during 
escalation of care. As one of the vital components of safe surgical care, improving 
the escalation of care process is a priority. The QUIT tool may lead to fewer 
delays in treatment and improved patient outcomes if widely adopted and 
implemented correctly.  
The next chapter in this thesis will describe a human factors intervention 
bundle aiming to improve escalation of care and safety culture in a UK surgical 
department. Unfortunately, due to logistical considerations the intervention 
study presented in chapter 9 of this thesis had to be started prior to the 
development and validation of the QUIT tool to allow sufficient time for adequate 
pre and post-intervention periods. Therefore, the QUIT tool does not appear in 
the next chapter. However, the clear implications of the QUIT tool that have been 
outlined mean it will certainly be utilised in future research based on the 
findings in this thesis. 
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9 A prospective study exploring the impact of a human 
factors intervention bundle on supervision, escalation of care 
and safety culture in a UK surgical department 
            
 
9.1 Introduction 
Previous chapters in this thesis and articles from the published literature have 
shown that multiple factors can impact on the quality of escalation of care and 
safety culture in surgery. The most important strategies to improve escalation of 
care in surgery were identified in chapters 2-5 as improvement of 
communication skills through human factors training and escalation protocols, 
and the improvement of communication technology. Chapters 6 and 7 explored 
the potential of improved communication technology in escalation of care. 
However, the sheer abundance of barriers to implementation of new 
communication technology allied with the complexity of development of these 
innovations mean that an intervention would take several years to develop. A 
more timely approach to improving escalation of care may be to use human 
factors to prevent the previously identified human errors frequently present 
within the process.  
A key strategy to improve escalation of care is to target the level of 
supervision provided to junior surgeons. The quality of supervision is dependent 
on many factors, one of which is the EWTD. The EWTD reduces the continuity of 
patient care and can also introduce unfamiliarity in clinical teams, which 
highlights the importance of supervision and escalation of care. Chapter 3 
demonstrated that senior surgeons must provide adequate supervision to their 
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juniors, ensuring escalation of care is not delayed and that avoidable patient 
harm can be prevented. Chapter 5 recommended implementation of escalation of 
care protocols, which include strategies to improve the speed with which patient 
deterioration is recognised and acted upon. These protocols can aim to facilitate 
the escalation of care process and ensure senior clinicians and experienced 
resuscitation staff arrive to a deteriorating patient promptly66. When used for 
this purpose, junior surgeons and nurses are empowered to act decisively as the 
hierarchy within and external to the team is flattened. However, these protocols 
must rely on human activation, and as such, are prone to human error41. 
Therefore, prior to the introduction of a new protocol or pathway for patient 
care, the staff that will be using it must be appropriately educated and trained.  
The combination of an intervention to improve patient care and human 
factors education to ensure it is implemented appropriately has been proven 
effective in previous research exploring surgery and ward-based care39,45. The 
role of supervision on the surgical ward and its association with care processes 
and outcomes have not yet been explored. The above approach to development 
and implementation of an intervention may be the best way to bring about an 
improvement in safety culture in surgical care. 
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9.2 Aims 
1. Develop and implement a human factors intervention bundle in a UK 
surgical department. 
2. Describe the impact of the intervention on supervision, escalation of care 
and safety culture within the department. 
3. Explore the impact of the intervention on process and outcome measures. 
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9.3 Methods 
9.3.1 Setting 
This study took place in a 500-bed academic hospital in London; the hospital is 
part of an NHS trust serving a population of approximately 500,000 people. The 
hospital is a tertiary referral center for general and gastrointestinal surgery and 
has four surgical wards with 18 beds each and a four-bed high dependency unit 
for general surgery patients in need of more intensive monitoring than normal 
ward patients.  
 
9.3.2 Pre-intervention landscape 
The junior surgeons working within the department had previously raised 
concerns about the level of supervision they were given and a lack of support 
they experienced when attempting to escalate care for deteriorating ward 
patients to their senior colleagues. These concerns are described in detail in 
chapter 3117. The concerns raised by junior surgeons were taken seriously and a 
team of researchers was requested by the institution to study the inner workings 
of the department, improve the supervision of junior surgeons and escalation of 
care in surgery and, ultimately, improve the safety culture. 
 
9.3.3 Development of the intervention bundle 
In order to effectively develop the intervention, several focus group sessions 
were held. Any clinical staff member involved in the care of surgical patients was 
invited to contribute. A total of 24 staff members attended two focus group 
sessions, staff included ward and theatre recovery nurses, FY1s, SHOs, registrars 
and consultant surgeons, anaesthetists and administrators.  After the first 
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session the research team developed a draft version of the intervention bundle. 
This draft was presented to staff on the wards for informal discussion and 
feedback. It underwent multiple iterations before a final draft was taken to the 
second focus group. By the end of the second session, consensus had been 
achieved with all attendees and the intervention bundle was finalised (see 
Figure 9A).  
 
9.3.4 The intervention bundle 
This consisted of four separate components, which were originally conceived in 
previous chapters of this thesis. The first of these was the introduction of twice-
daily consultant on-call ward rounds. Previously, there had only been one 
consultant on-call ward per day. This took place in the morning and involved a 
review of each surgical patient admitted to the hospital in the preceding 24 
hours. This round was kept in place but a further evening round was added to 
ensure that patients admitted after the morning round were seen by a senior 
surgeon and had a formal management plan in place overnight. Increasing the 
presence of senior clinicians and promoting clear ownership of patients were 
identified as important strategies to improving escalation of care in chapters 3, 4 
and 5 of this thesis.  
The second component was the designation of a ‘ward registrar of the 
week’ (WRW). Prior to the intervention the FY1s and SHOs were responsible for 
the majority of ward-based surgical patient care, if they encountered a patient 
requiring more senior input the juniors had to go to the outpatient clinic or 
operating theatre and request help, which was not always forthcoming. The 
introduction of the WRW gave ward-based junior surgeons direct access to an 
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experienced clinician during normal working hours. The WRW was removed 
from any clinic or theatre commitments to ensure they were available to help 
care for ward-based patients at short notice. The introduction of the WRW was 
in response to findings from chapter 3 of this thesis stating that senior clinicians 
must be available and approachable to juniors wishing to escalate care. In 
addition, chapter 4 identified that patients may be more willing to escalate their 
own care if doctors were more frequently present and visible on the surgical 
ward.  
The third component of the intervention was a new escalation of care 
protocol for deteriorating ward patients. Previously, the FY1s and SHOs had not 
known who to call for help and this had led to unacceptable delays for at-risk 
patients. The new escalation protocol decreed that the WRW was responsible for 
urgently reviewing any ward-patient the juniors had concerns about during 
normal hours (8am-5pm), if they were not available then the consultant on-call 
was the next person to contact. Similarly, out of hours and at night (5pm-8am), 
the registrar on-call was made responsible for urgently reviewing deteriorating 
patients. If they were unavailable (in the theatre or with another patient) and 
could not attend within 30 minutes the juniors were instructed to contact the 
consultant on-call to review the patient, thus ensuring a rapid, senior surgical 
opinion. This component was based on the findings of chapter 5 which identified 
the importance of formal escalation of care protocols to patient safety.  
The final component of the intervention bundle was a credit-card sized 
team contact card, which listed the preferred contact number of each doctor 
working in the surgical department, along with an alternative contact number if 
needed. Previously, the pager system was being used when doctors were in the 
 238 
hospital whilst mobile phones were used for doctors out of hospital, this 
component was supposed to streamline the communication process and prevent 
any delays in contact of senior surgeons when required. This component was 
formulated based upon the findings from chapter 2 which identified that failure 
to rescue was lower in hospitals with increased uptake of technology. 
Furthermore, chapter 3 found that junior surgeons were not aware of who or 
how to call the correct person when they wished to escalate care so the 
knowledge of which communication paradigm to use (e.g. bleep, mobile or 
landline) should ensure that delays are kept to a minimum.  
The hypotheses underlying the intervention bundle was that an 
improvement of supervision of junior surgeons would facilitate escalation of care 
for deteriorating surgical ward patients and improve safety culture and 
outcomes within a UK surgical department.  
 
9.3.5 Study design 
This was a pre-post intervention study. This study design was chosen because 
the aim was to establish the impact of the intervention on junior surgeon 
supervision, escalation of care and safety culture in a UK surgical department. 
The pre-post intervention design is a very useful research methodology when an 
intervention is being introduced in a wide and diverse arena. The pre-
intervention period provides baseline data, which the post-intervention data can 
subsequently be compared with to yield the selected study outcomes. The 
randomised controlled trial (RCT) is a more rigorous methodology that is less 
prone to confounders than a pre-post intervention study. However, it is not 
logistically feasible or appropriate to conduct an RCT for a wide-ranging 
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intervention such as the bundle used in this study284. It would not have been 
ethical to randomise patients to be treated without the use of the intervention 
bundle. Furthermore it would not have been possible to blind participants and 
patients as to whether they were in the control or intervention arm of the study. 
RCTs are more commonly used to evaluate medication or treatment 
interventions rather than multi-faceted interventions bundles such as the one 
employed in this study285. 
One further possibility would have been to perform a cluster-RCT with 
another institution acting as the control arm286. However, this was not feasible 
for this study due to the large number of potential confounders that could not be 
adjusted or controlled for. The study protocol that was followed can be seen in 
Figure 9A. 
 
9.3.6 Study periods 
The pre-intervention period was from 1st August – 30th November 2012 (four 
months), the post-intervention period was from 1st December 2012 – 31st March 
2013 (four months). The intervention bundle was introduced across the whole 
department at the same time. An additional data collection window opened six 
months after closure of the post-intervention period for two months to allow 
investigators to assess whether any impact of the intervention bundle identified 
in the post-intervention period was retained. Four months was chosen as an 
appropriate pre-post period length as any shorter and the intervention bundle 
may not have had time to bed-down into the institution and become standard 
practice. If a longer period was selected, the length of the study (which included 
the six-month retention study) would have been so prolonged the results would 
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not be available in this thesis. For instance, if the periods had been doubled to 8 
months each, and the retention window and development time for the 
intervention included, the study would have taken almost 3 years to complete. 
 
9.3.7 Participants 
All surgical staff members working for the department of general surgery at the 
study hospital were eligible for recruitment into the study; both junior and 
senior surgeons were recruited. A senior surgeon was defined as a year-5 or 
above registrar, or a consultant, a junior surgeon was defined as an FY1 or FY2 
surgeon. The year-5 cut-off to define a senior surgeon was decided in accordance 
with previous research exploring the surgical ward and is consistent with the 
experience level at which a surgical registrar ay be expected to act with a 
reasonable degree of autonomy33.  
To allow collection of clinical data, all patients admitted under the 
surgical service during the four-month and pre-and-post intervention periods 
were entered onto a prospective database. Data collected for patients included 
their admission date and whether it was on an emergent or elective basis. All 
study patients were followed up to either discharge from hospital or death.  
 
9.3.8 Measures 
All senior and junior surgeons were asked to complete a questionnaire that was 
developed by the research team to establish the supervision and escalation of 
care landscape in the pre-and-post intervention periods. The questionnaire was 
based on Sexton’s safety attitudes questionnaire and underwent several 
iterations prior to its use287. Responses were indicated for both normal hours 
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and out of hours using seven-point Likert-type scales ranging from disagree 
strongly (1) to agree strongly (7). Data from the questionnaires were reported 
using the median and range. Analysis for differences between the junior and 
senior surgeons, pre and post intervention periods and normal hours and out of 
hours working periods was performed using the Mann-Whitney test for 
between-subjects comparison and the Wilcoxon test for within-subjects 
comparison. 
Additionally, participants were submitted to semi-structured interview 
during the post-intervention period using the same methods of data collection 
and analysis as described previously117. The aim was to gather rich data to help 
explain the results of the questionnaires and the impact of the intervention on 
patient safety and culture within the surgical department. Clinical outcome 
measures were derived from the prospective database and the pre-and-post 
intervention periods were compared. The outcome measures that were explored 
were inpatient mortality, cardiac arrests, re-admission within 30 days of 
discharge and reoperation during the index admission. These outcomes were 
selected in accordance with other interventional studies in surgery from the 
published literature. In addition, they are consistent with some of the outcome 
measures reported in the literature review in chapter 2 (other than failure to 
rescue which could not be calculated in this study due to practical reasons). The 
chi-squared or Fisher’s exact tests were used for statistical analysis. Statistical 
significance was taken when p<0.05. As this intervention was part of a hospital 
approved quality improvement initiative, ethical approval was waived for this 
study. 
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Figure 9A Study procedure
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9.4 Results 
The results of the questionnaires are reported first, followed by the qualitative 
interviews. Lastly, the clinical data is reported. 
 
9.4.1 Questionnaire results 
A total of 16 senior surgeons answered the questionnaire pre and post-
intervention (response rate 80%). There were 13 consultants and three 
registrars. The registrars answering the questionnaire were the same for the pre 
and post-intervention periods but had rotated to a different hospital for the six-
month retention questionnaire so the new registrars were queried instead; the 
consultants remained the same for all three time-points. There were 11 junior 
surgeons who answered the questionnaires (response rate 69%). Similarly, the 
junior surgeons were the same for the pre and post-intervention questionnaires 
but new junior surgeons were in rotation at the time of conducting the 6-month 
retention questionnaire.  
Comparing the pre and post-intervention and 6-month retention 
questionnaires for junior and senior surgeons: Overall, for senior surgeons 
during normal hours 11 of 18 items demonstrated improvement post-
intervention, of which two were significantly improved (see Table 9Ai and 
9Aii). For the retention period a further seven items had significantly improved. 
For senior surgeons out of hours 10 of 18 items demonstrated post-intervention 
improvement, of these three were significant, for the retention period a further 
six had improved significantly. For junior surgeons during normal hours, 11 of 
19 items were improved post-intervention; of these five were significant 
improvements, a further four improved significantly by the retention period. For 
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junior surgeons during out of hours care, 15 of 19 items improved, of which five 
were significant improvements, by the retention period a further three had 
demonstrated significant improvement, whilst a single item had declined to the 
baseline established during the pre-intervention period. 
Regarding clinical exposure, junior surgeons felt that they were asked to 
perform tasks outside their competence level more frequently at during the pre-
intervention period compared to post-intervention, during normal hours and out 
of hours. This effect was temporary however; the results by the retention period 
had declined to baseline levels. The juniors also felt they were less likely to be 
asked to work outside the limits of their competence post-intervention 
compared to pre-intervention for both out of hours care and during normal 
hours.  However, this effect had disappeared by the retention period. 
Regarding supervision, both the junior and senior surgeons felt that 
supervision of the junior surgeons by their senior colleagues had improved post-
intervention during normal hours. The senior surgeons also felt supervision had 
improved post-intervention during out of hours care but no improvement was 
seen with the junior surgeons results. This effect was retained for the retention 
period for senior surgeons during out of hours only. The junior surgeons also felt 
that their senior colleagues were more approachable during normal hours post-
intervention compared to pre-intervention and that they were more likely to 
know whom they were supposed to call for help if they needed it out of hours 
post-intervention compared to pre-intervention. These effects were both 
retained by the retention period. 
Regarding the interactions between junior and senior surgeons, the junior 
surgeons felt significantly more able to speak-up about problems with patient 
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care during normal hours after the introduction of the intervention bundle, this 
effect was retained during the retention period. 
Regarding the organisational structure of the surgical department, the 
junior surgeons felt that they were better able to prioritise patient care over 
administrative tasks during normal hours and that the balance of training and 
service provision out of hours had improved after the intervention. Both of these 
effects were retained by the retention period.  
Regarding feedback between junior and senior surgeons, both groups felt 
that there had been no improvements after the intervention for both feedback 
delivery and receipt. However, the amount of feedback that both groups felt they 
could provide back to their employers had increased between the post-
intervention and retention periods.  
Regarding the safety culture within the department, both the junior and 
senior surgeons would have felt safer being treated as a patient after the 
intervention outside of normal hours. This effect was retained for the retention 
period for both groups, as neither returned to baseline levels, and results for the 
junior surgeons continued to improve between the post-intervention and 
retention periods. There was no initial improvement, between the pre and post-
intervention periods, regarding the degree to which junior and senior surgeons 
felt encouraged to report safety concerns. However, results by the retention 
period were better than the pre and post-intervention periods, indicating 
ongoing improvement with regard to reporting of concerns by surgeons within 
the department. 
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Table 9Ai Senior surgeon questionnaire responses with comparison of each time point 
 
Item Normal hours Out of hours 
 T1 
median 
(range) 
T2 
median 
(range) 
T3 
median 
(range) 
T1 vs. T2 
p-value 
T1 vs. T3 
p-value 
T2 vs. T3 
p-value 
T1 
median 
(range) 
T2 
median 
(range) 
T3 
median 
(range) 
T1 vs. T2 
p-value 
T1 vs. T3 
p-value 
T2 vs. T3 
p-value 
Exposure             
I have a satisfactory balance of elective 
vs. emergency work 
5(2-7) 6(2-7) 6(2-7) 0.959 0.308 0.344 5(1-7) 5.5(4-7) 6 (2-7) 0.081 0.050 0.797 
Supervision              
My juniors know who to call for help if 
they need it 
6(1-7) 7(2-7) 6(2-7) 0.012 0.107 0.796 6(1-7) 7(5-7) 6(2-7) 0.031 0.060 0.943 
My juniors are adequately supervised 
by senior surgeons 
5(3-7) 7(3-7) 7(3-7) 0.002 0.365 0.856 5(2-6) 6(5-7) 7(6-7) 0.003 0.020 0.070 
Senior surgeons are accessible to 
juniors for advice and support 
6(3-7) 7(2-7) 7(6-7) 0.339 0.010 0.739 6(3-7) 6.5(4-7) 7(6-7) 0.359 0.058 0.739 
Senior surgeons are approachable to 
juniors wishing to escalate care 
7(5-7) 7(3-7) 7(6-7) 0.914 0.020 0.020 7(6-7) 6.5(5-7) 7(6-7) 0.480 0.025 0.020 
Trainee-trainer interactions             
Junior surgeons speak up about 
concerns with patient care 
6.5(4-7) 7(4-7) 7(6-7) 0.340 0.034 0.034 7(5-7) 6(5-7) 7(6-7) 0.564 0.206 0.014 
I criticize my juniors for not calling for 
help when necessary 
5(1-6) 2(1-6) 2(1-7) 0.117 0.164 0.888 5(1-7) 2.5(1-6) 2(1-7) 0.123 0.413 0.734 
I criticize my juniors for calling for help 
unnecessarily 
1.5(1-6) 1(1-5) 1(1-6) 0.317 0.838 0.758 1(1-5) 1(1-6) 1(1-7) 0.458 0.442 0.592 
Organisational structure             
Handover meetings are well organised 5(1-6) 5.5(1-6) 6(2-7) 0.149 0.302 0.895 5(1-7) 6(5-6) 6(2-7) 0.073 0.142 0.850 
There is a good balance between 
training and service provision 
4(2-7) 4.5(2-7) 5(3-7) 0.943 0.114 0.270 5(1-7) 4.5(2-6) 5(3-7) 0.163 0.094 0.533 
I can prioritise patient care over 
administrative tasks 
5(2-7) 5(2-7) 6(5-7) 0.942 0.004 0.006 6(3-7) 6(3-7) 6.5(6-7) 0.180 0.107 0.029 
I know my educational supervisee’s 
name 
5(2-7) 5(4-7) 7(5-7) 0.170 0.007 0.004 3(2-7) 5(2-6) 7(4-7) 0.156 0.007 0.006 
I know my junior’s name 6(1-7) 6(1-7) 7(4-7) 0.170 0.005 0.016 6(1-7) 6(3-7) 7(4-7) 0.399 0.007 0.053 
Feedback             
I am able to provide feedback and 6(3-7) 6(4-7) 6(5-7) 0.524 0.071 0.070 6(2-7) 5.5(3-6) 6.5(2-7) 0.194 0.036 0.015 
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raise concerns about my job 
I regularly give my junior feedback on 
their clinical skills 
5(2-7) 6(3-7) 6(3-7) 0.103 0.155 0.719 5(2-7) 6(3-7) 6(4-7) 0.731 0.802 0.904 
Patient safety             
Patient safety is a priority in my 
department 
5(2-7) 5(2-7) 6(2-7) 0.596 0.095 0.073 5(2-7) 5.5(3-7) 6.5(2-7) 0.116 0.086 0.210 
I would feel safe being treated as 
patient in this department 
4(1-7) 5(1-7) 5(1-7) 0.187 0.169 0.436 3(1-6) 4.5(3-7) 4(1-7) 0.021 0.136 0.837 
I am encouraged to report safety 
concerns by colleagues 
6(2-7) 6(2-7) 7(5-7) 0.276 0.026 0.061 6(4-7) 6(4-7) 7(6-7) 1.000 0.020 0.033 
N.B. T1=pre-intervention period, T2=post-intervention period and T3=retention period.  
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Table 9Aii Junior surgeon questionnaire responses with comparison of each time point  
 
Item Normal hours Out of hours 
 T1 
median 
(range) 
T2 
median 
(range) 
T3 
median 
(range) 
T1 vs. T2 
p-value 
T1 vs. T3 
p-value 
T2 vs. T3 
p-value 
T1 
median 
(range) 
T2 
median 
(range) 
T3 
median 
(range) 
T1 vs. T2 
p-value 
T1 vs. T3 
p-value 
T2 vs. T3 
p-value 
Exposure             
I only undertake tasks I feel competent 
to perform 
5(2-6) 6(3-7) 7(5-7) 0.026 0.003 0.029 5(1-6) 6(2-6) 5(3-7) 0.015 0.017 0.166 
I am asked to work beyond the limits 
of my competence 
5(2-6) 3(1-6) 6(5-7) 0.059 0.021 0.012 5(2-7) 4(2-7) 6(3-7) 0.023 0.352 0.081 
Supervision              
I know who to call for help if I need it 6(1-7) 6(2-7) 6(3-7) 0.176 0.079 0.458 4(2-7) 6(2-7) 5(3-7) 0.040 0.226 0.796 
I am adequately supervised by senior 
surgeons 
4(2-7) 6(2-7) 6(3-7) 0.039 0.012 0.096 4(2-7) 5(2-7) 5(3-7) 0.129 0.105 0.185 
Senior surgeons are accessible to me 
for advice and support 
5(2-7) 6(2-7) 6(3-7) 0.129 0.024 0.458 5(2-6) 6(2-7) 5(3-7) 0.063 0.083 0.470 
Senior surgeons are approachable to 
me when I wish to escalate care 
5(2-7) 6(2-7) 6(3-7) 0.047 0.103 1.000 5(2-7) 6(2-7) 5(4-7) 0.288 0.629 0.713 
Trainee-trainer interactions             
I speak up about concerns with patient 
care 
5(2-7) 6(2-7) 6(2-7) 0.039 0.047 1.000 5(3-6) 6(3-7) 4(2-7) 0.202 0.885 0.250 
I have been criticized for not calling for 
help when necessary 
2(1-7) 2(1-6) 1(1-5) 0.414 0.201 0.248 3(1-7) 3(1-6) 2(1-5) 0.129 0.063 0.190 
I have been criticized for calling for 
help unnecessarily 
2(1-6) 2(1-5) 2(1-5) 0.157 0.301 0.465 3(1-6) 3(1-6) 2(1-6) 0.317 0.157 0.480 
Organisational structure             
Handover meetings are well organised 3(1-6) 5(1-7) 5(2-6) 0.068 0.011 0.121 4(2-7) 5(2-7) 5(2-6) 1.000 0.952 0.856 
There is a good balance between 
training and service provision 
1(1-6) 5(1-6) 3(1-6) 0.059 0.215 0.929 3(1-5) 4(1-5) 2(1-6) 0.024 0.615 0.133 
I can prioritise patient care over 
administrative tasks 
2(1-6) 4(1-6) 4(2-7) 0.016 0.017 0.234 3(1-7) 4(1-6) 4(2-6) 0.123 0.011 0.396 
I know my educational supervisor’s 
name 
7(1-7) 7(3-7) 7(3-7) 0.317 0.581 0.785 7(1-7) 7(3-7) 7(4-7) 0.317 0.285 0.655 
I know my senior’s name 7(1-7) 7(1-7) 7(2-7) 0.180 0.216 0.715 7(1-7) 7(1-7) 7(4-7) 0.180 0.414 1.000 
Feedback             
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I am able to provide feedback and 
raise concerns about my job 
6(1-7) 6(1-7) 6(1-7) 0.068 0.135 0.473 4(1-6) 6(1-6) 5(2-7) 0.072 0.272 0.541 
I regularly receive feedback on my 
clinical skills 
2(1-5) 4(1-6) 5(2-7) 0.066 0.053 0.201 3(1-5) 4(1-6) 4(1-7) 0.109 0.046 0.258 
Patient safety             
Patient safety is a priority in my 
department 
4(1-7) 6(1-7) 6(4-7) 0.068 0.064 0.719 4(2-7) 5(2-7) 5(2-7) 0.084 0.388 0.569 
I would feel safe being treated as 
patient in this department 
4(1-7) 4(1-7) 5(2-7) 0.197 0.011 0.042 3(1-5) 4(1-6) 4(1-7) 0.034 0.098 0.680 
I am encouraged to report safety 
concerns by colleagues 
4(1-6) 4(1-7) 6(3-7) 0236 0.007 0.025 2(1-5) 4(1-7) 4(2-7) 0.121 0.013 0.541 
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Comparing junior vs. senior surgeons questionnaire responses: During the 
pre-intervention period (T1) it is clear that the senior surgeons did not perceive 
that issues with the surgical department were as bad as the junior surgeons did, 
both during normal hours and out of hours (see Table 9B). The junior surgeons 
were significantly less likely to feel that their senior colleagues were 
approachable and accessible than the senior colleagues themselves perceived. 
Additionally, the junior surgeons did not feel as able to speak up regarding 
problems with patient care as their senior colleagues thought they did. 
Furthermore, the juniors thought the organisational structure of the department 
was poorer; opportunities to give and receive feedback were sparser and that 
they were encouraged to report patient safety concerns less frequently than 
their senior colleagues. Similar results were also obtained at T2 and T3, 
indicating that the perceptions of junior and senior surgeons were consistently 
different.  The potential reasons for this disparity are highlighted in the 
discussion.  
 
9.4.2 Interview results 
The first question the participants were asked during the interviews was “how 
have things in the department changed since the introduction of the intervention 
bundle?” In response senior surgeons reported increased medical cover, greater 
senior staff presence on the ward, increased junior supervision and improved 
cover arrangements at the weekend for ward-based patients. However, the new 
system of working did lead to a significantly increased workload on-call for 
several of the senior surgeons, “I am much more tired after doing an on-call shift 
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using the new system, especially when I have to do 3 straight days over the 
weekend.” 
Junior surgeons felt the intervention bundle had a positive impact, reporting 
greater supervision and support on the ward from senior surgeons and that it 
was much easier to escalate care after the intervention bundle. One of the junior 
surgeons said, “the presence of a registrar on the ward at all times is very 
reassuring, escalation of care is now quicker and safer.”  
Participants were also asked “if the WRW wasn’t available would you 
contact the consultant on-call” (as per the new escalation protocol). This 
question was met with mixed responses. A third of the senior surgeons and half 
the junior surgeons said that the consultant would be contacted but it did not 
appear to be universal. One of the senior surgeons stated, “the less confident 
juniors still hold back a bit and may delay contacting the consultant in the hope 
that the situation resolves itself.” However, there did appear to be some 
improvements in this area for the juniors, “If the registrar is unavailable, which 
isn’t often, I have contacted the Consultant which is something I didn’t do before 
and would now continue to do when required.” 
All surgeons felt that the juniors knew who to call for help if they wanted 
to escalate care and found the team-contact cards helpful. The final question 
participants were asked was “how has the intervention bundle affected you 
personally?” Several senior surgeons stated that they were more tired and were 
spending increased time in the hospital. However, others stated they were 
receiving less calls out of hours, “I am having to take calls about deteriorating 
patients in the middle of the night far less frequently, the fact we see all the 
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emergency patients at least twice every 24 hours means that problems can be 
anticipated and the emergency operating schedule can be planned better.” 
Several of the junior surgeons felt less work-related stress and believed the 
working relationships between members of the surgical team had improved. 
When questioned about how the intervention bundle had affected their 
training the chief registrar explained that it had a negative impact as they were 
regularly tied to the ward, however, all three registrars felt that patient safety 
had significantly improved. One registrar explained that “my elective work is now 
easier but those days when you are the ward registrar are difficult as that now 
takes precedence over attending the emergency theatre. I think the system overall 
is safer but some tweaks are needed.” 
 
9.4.3 Clinical data 
During the pre-intervention period 1409 patients were admitted under the 
general surgical service, of these 273 were elective admissions and 1136 were 
emergency admissions. During the post-intervention period, 1305 patients were 
admitted under the surgical service, 202 electively and 1103 as an emergency 
(no significant difference between groups, p=0.07). None of the outcomes 
measured demonstrated any significant differences between the pre and post-
intervention periods. Inpatient mortality decreased from 1.92% pre-intervention 
to 1.38% post-intervention but this was not statistically significant (p=0.40). 
Similarly, cardiac arrests decreased from 0.34% to 0.23% but this was also not 
significantly different. Readmission increased post-intervention, from 2.13% to 
3.30% (p=0.06) and reoperations increased from 1.63% to 1.84% (p=0.69). 
These findings are further explored in the discussion section.
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Table 9B Comparing senior and junior surgeon questionnaire responses at time point 1 (T1) 
 
 Normal Out of hours 
  Senior Junior   Senior Junior   
Items Median (Range) Median (Range) p-value Median (Range) Median (Range) p-value 
Supervision             
Juniors know who to call for help 6 (1-7) 6 (1-7) 0.574 6 (1-7) 4 (2-7) 0.107 
Juniors are adequately supervised by senior surgeons 5 (3-7) 4 (2-7) 0.577 5 (2-6) 4 (2-6) 0.721 
Senior surgeons are accessible to give juniors advice 6 (3-7) 5 (2-7) 0.047 6 (3-7) 5 (2-6) 0.011 
Senior surgeons are approachable to juniors 7 (5-7) 5 (2-7) 0.020 7 (6-7) 5 (2-7) 0.002 
Trainee-trainer interactions             
Juniors are able to speak up regarding problems with patient care 6.5 (4-7) 5 (2-7) 0.006 7 (5-7) 5 (3-6) <0.001 
Juniors are criticised for not calling for help when necessary 5 (1-6) 2 (1-7) 0.149 5 (1-7) 3 (1-7) 0.494 
Juniors are criticised for calling for help unnecessarily 1.5 (1-6) 2 (1-6) 0.212 1 (1-5) 3 (1-6) 0.087 
Organisational Structure             
The handover meeting is well organised 5 (1-6) 3 (1-6) 0.036 5 (1-7) 4 (2-7) 0.413 
There is a good balance between training and service provision 4 (2-7) 1 (1-6) 0.039 5 (1-7) 3 (1-5) 0.077 
I can prioritise patient care over administrative tasks 5 (2-7) 2 (1-6) 0.001 6 (3-7) 3 (1-7) <0.001 
I know the name of my educational supervisor/ee? 5 (2-7) 7 (1-7) 0.035 3 (2-7) 7 (1-7) 0.010 
I know my senior/junior’s name? 6 (1-7) 7 (1-7) 0.294 6 (1-7) 7 (1-7) 0.134 
Feedback             
I can provide feedback or raise concerns regarding my post 6 (3-7) 6 (1-7) 0.212 6 (2-7) 4 (1-6) 0.121 
I receive/deliver feedback regularly on clinical skills 5 (2-7) 2 (1-5) 0.005 6 (3-7) 3 (1-5) <0.001 
Patient safety             
Patient safety is a priority in my workplace 5 (2-7) 4 (1-7) 0.716 5 (2-7) 4 (2-7) 0.838 
I Would feel safe being treated as a patient here 4 (1-7) 4 (1-7) 0.231 3 (1-6) 3 (1-5) 0.259 
I am encouraged by colleagues to report patient safety concerns 6 (2-7) 4 (1-6) 0.009 6 (4-7) 3 (1-5) <0.001 
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9.5 Discussion 
This pre-post intervention study aimed to establish the impact a human factors 
intervention bundle could have on the safety culture, levels of supervision, 
escalation of care practices and patient outcomes in a struggling UK surgical 
department. Significant barriers to high quality of care had insidiously crept into 
standard practice within this department and it is known that the culture of a 
workplace must change before its results can improve288,289. The complexity of 
the escalation of care process and its relationship with supervision and safety 
culture have been described in previous chapters and the novelty of this study is 
the multi-faceted nature of the intervention bundle which encompassed changes 
to the workings of the surgical department from top-to-bottom.  
The aims of this study were to develop and implement a human factors 
intervention bundle in a UK surgical department, to describe the impact of the 
intervention on supervision, escalation of care and safety culture within the 
department and explore the impact of the intervention on process and outcome 
measures. The findings of this study will be discussed in relation to these aims 
and the wider literature. Following this, the implications for the field of surgery 
will be discussed, taking the strengths and limitations of this research 
methodology into account before some conclusions from this chapter are drawn. 
Following this, a wider discussion of the findings, context, implications and 
limitations of the research described in this thesis will be presented in chapter 
10 and the plan for future work in this area will be described.  
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9.5.1 Summary of findings and context within the literature 
Development and implementation of the intervention bundle: As far back as 
the systematic literature review in chapter 2 and the interviews in chapter 3, it 
was suggested that human factors would have an important role to play in 
improvement of the escalation of care process. The development and 
implementation of a human factors intervention bundle required extensive 
literature review and a great deal of consideration. This was accomplished using 
the data from previous chapters to develop the initial iteration of the 
intervention bundle. However, chapters 6 and 7 demonstrated how crucial it is 
to scope the opinion of potential end-users prior to introducing disruption into a 
clinical environment. This is of the greatest importance when the changes 
suggested will significantly impact on the working life of busy professionals. This 
process was facilitated in this particular study as the junior surgeons in the study 
hospital had already voiced concerns regarding their supervision and the ease 
with which they could escalate the care of a deteriorating patient to a senior 
colleague. Furthermore, the development phase of this study involved extensive 
consultation with multiprofessional staff that helped to produce and iterate the 
intervention to suit their working environment. The final intervention bundle 
included a twice-daily consultant ward round, a WRW, a new escalation protocol 
and team contact cards. 
Impact of the intervention bundle on supervision, escalation of care and 
safety culture: The data from the questionnaires showed that team working, 
supervision, escalation of care and safety practices in the department improved 
after the introduction of the intervention. Furthermore, for some of the items 
that did not demonstrate significant improvement during the post-intervention 
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period, the intervention bundle continued to work within the department and 
several of these items had improved significantly when the questionnaires were 
repeated six-months later.  
The improvement in whether juniors felt they were asked to work outside 
their competence levels is important as it implies improved supervision; 
unfortunately this improvement was only transient. However, when asked 
directly about supervision, both junior and senior surgeons felt it had improved 
significantly after the intervention was introduced and this positive effect was 
retained after six-months. Similarly, the approachability of senior surgeons and 
knowledge of who to call for help with a patient significantly improved and this 
effect was also retained after six-months. This demonstrates that crucial aspects 
of the escalation of care process improved after introduction of the intervention. 
The readiness of juniors to assess deteriorating patients (recognition), 
knowledge of who to call (communication) and senior approachability 
(response) represent the three phases of the escalation of care process and 
sustained change in these practices is very positive. 
It was also encouraging that both junior and senior surgeons felt 
significantly more able to report safety concerns after the intervention. The 
reporting of safety concerns, adverse events and near-misses is the cornerstone 
of high-performance, safe healthcare systems and indicated a shift in culture 
within the department290.  
The interview data within this study allowed a deep and rich 
understanding of how and why clinical practice had changed within the 
department post-intervention. Both junior and senior surgeons felt that the 
intervention had a positive impact, citing better supervision and escalation of 
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care. Senior surgeons did, however, report an increased workload. Despite this, 
only a third of senior and half of the junior surgeons reported that juniors were 
following the new escalation protocol and contacting the consultant if the 
registrar was unavailable. This indicates that there is further room for 
improvement and that some hierarchical barriers may still be in place.  
It was noticeable from the questionnaires that the senior surgeons felt 
that improvements were greater and ongoing problems were less significant, 
than the junior surgeons. The senior surgeons agreed with positive statements 
and disagreed with negative statements more than the juniors, both pre and 
post-intervention. This tendency was also seen in the results of the interviews 
meaning that the results need to be considered with this discrepancy between 
junior and senior surgeons taken into account. There are several potential 
reasons underlying this discrepancy. Firstly, the senior surgeons have an 
inherent stake in the safety culture in their workplace and the happiness of their 
juniors so may reflect the situation in a more positive light. Secondly, the junior 
surgeons begin their career under a great deal of pressure and stress, some of 
which they may place onto themselves. They are inexperienced in taking care of 
deteriorating patients but also may not be used to a working life and will 
certainly not be used to working night shifts and weekends. The potential for 
stress and fatigue to produce a more negative mindset in these junior surgeons 
compared to their experienced seniors must be considered.  
Lastly, the senior surgeons (especially the consultants) are usually more 
permanent members of staff then junior surgeons who rotate between different 
hospitals and specialties. This means that if changes in the safety culture were to 
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occur insidiously, the senior surgeons may not notice them whilst junior 
surgeons may become aware of the issues more readily.  
Impact of the intervention on process and outcome measures: There were 
fewer deaths in the post-intervention period compared to pre-intervention but 
this was not significant. Similarly, there were no significant differences or 
improvements in the cardiac arrest, readmission and reoperation rates between 
the two periods. There are three potential reasons for this lack of a difference. 
Firstly, as is common with any large-scale pre-post intervention study, there are 
a large number of confounders that could not be controlled for. We were unable 
to adjust for patient comorbidities, age, and other important factors such as 
changes in staffing and bed occupancy. The sample size, whilst considerable, may 
not have been large enough to reliably detect any difference in outcomes. Lastly, 
there is likely to be a considerable time lag between when an improvement in 
supervision and safety culture can be demonstrated, and when any improvement 
in patient outcomes begins to occur. It is possible that a longer degree of follow-
up was required for this study to identify any difference in outcomes. 
Unfortunately, this was not possible due to the time constraints mentioned 
previously.  
The findings in this pre-post intervention study echo those of several 
other interventional studies that have aimed to improve escalation of care and 
patient outcomes. Adelstein et al., Robb et al. and Kansal et al. all introduced new 
escalation protocols or triggering systems on hospital wards in Australia, they 
reported an improvement in escalation practices but were unable to 
demonstrate an improvement in cardiac arrest rates and/or mortality58,78,88. 
Conversely, several intervention studies exploring human factors and escalation 
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of care have demonstrated improvement in patient outcome measures. Mitchell 
et al. introduced a multi-faceted intervention to encourage early recognition of 
hospital patient deterioration and reported reduced ICU admission and 
mortality82. Catchpole et al. used human factors engineering to overcome 
communication failures in trauma care and showed reduced length of stay for 
patients45. 
Importantly, this study explored the retention of the intervention after it 
had been allowed to gain traction within the department. If the impact of an 
intervention is only analysed immediately after its introduction, there may have 
not been enough time for the intervention to exert it greatest effects. Haynes et 
al. allude to this argument in a response to an article exploring the impact of 
surgical safety checklists in Canada by Urbach et al291,292. Furthermore, Lucian 
Leape argued, in his editorial, that the mandating of safety checklists may have 
led to lower compliance than that reported and a watering-down of the impact of 
the checklist on patient outcomes over time293. These factors may also be 
relevant in this study because the institution being studied needed to introduce a 
change in practice in response to multiple complaints from staff. 
 
9.5.2 Implications 
This study has a number of important implications. The most important of which 
is that a human factors intervention can improve the supervision of junior 
surgeons. In order to prevent avoidable patient harm, junior surgeons must be 
appropriately supervised, until such time as they gain proficiency in the 
recognition and management of patient deterioration277. The feedback from 
senior surgeons indicated that consultant-led ward rounds should occur at least 
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twice daily for emergency surgical admissions to maintain patient safety. 
Furthermore, the findings in this study indicate that escalation protocols and 
increased supervision can improve escalation of care despite only moderate 
overall adherence to the protocol. Future efforts may need to work at ensuring 
compliance with escalation protocols and the impact of 100% compliance could 
be very impressive. This human factors intervention bundle has demonstrated 
that changing the culture within a department is possible over a short to medium 
period if those at the sharp end (i.e. staff and patients) are engaged with early 
and are involved in development of the intervention294. 
 
9.5.3 Strengths and limitations 
This study explored the retention of the intervention 6 months after the post-
intervention period. This length of follow-up for a non-treatment intervention 
strengthens the findings of the study. The qualitative data from the interviews 
supplements the findings from the questionnaires, allowing a more detailed 
understanding of the impact of the intervention on staff members and culture 
within the department.  
This study also has a number of limitations. Firstly, there is no interview 
data from the six-month retention period. This may have provided further 
understanding of the factors that led to an improvement in patient safety in the 
surgical department but failed to produce an improvement in outcomes. 
Secondly, the database used to provide this data did not, unfortunately, provide 
sufficient information to appropriately perform case-mix adjustment. Without 
performing case-mix adjustment it is difficult to ensure the cohorts being studied 
are truly comparable295. Thirdly, due to logistical resources, direct observation of 
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the clinical environment during the pre and post-intervention periods was not 
performed. This may have lead to a greater understanding of how well the 
escalation protocol was adhered to by staff and if it was not followed, the reasons 
why not. Pronovost et al. have shown how improving care requires a team-based 
approach and direct observation may have been helpful in this study296. Lastly, 
this was a single-center study with a small sample so may not be wholly 
generalisable to other institutions. 
 
9.5.4 Conclusions 
Simple measures such as increased senior support and a clear escalation 
protocol can improve supervision and escalation of care in surgery and may lead 
to a change in both culture and safety practices. Future work needs to further 
evaluate the effect these measures have on process measures and outcomes and 
implement rollout of the intervention to other healthcare institutions. In 
addition, the QUIT tool could be used to measure the quality of information 
transfer during escalation of care to ascertain whether the intervention bundle 
improves this. 
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10 Thesis conclusions 
           
       
10.1 Outline 
This final chapter discusses the work presented in this thesis as a whole. Firstly, 
the background within which this research was conducted is briefly revisited. 
Following this, the aims of the thesis will be re-stated and accompanied by a 
discussion of how each aim was addressed. The key findings, important 
limitations and implications for future research work and the field of surgery are 
discussed. Lastly, the chapter will conclude with my personal reflections of 
completing the research in this thesis. 
 
10.2 Background summary and rationale for researching in this area 
The prevention of avoidable patient harm is the principle that underpins surgical 
practice and research into patient safety. There are many approaches to 
achieving this but the final aim remains the same. Traditionally, surgical 
researchers have attempted to improve patient outcomes through studies 
investigating treatment interventions and technical skills. This approach is 
commendable and significant steps forward have been taken recently, therefore 
it should continue297. Moving away from technical skills but remaining in the 
operating theatre, the WHO checklist has also succeeded in improving patient 
outcomes and can be translated to developed countries as well298,299. Items in the 
checklist do touch on the issue of non-technical skills such as leadership (senior 
surgeon and anaesthetist need to be present to complete it), communication and 
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teamwork (each team member identifies themselves and their role). However, 
away from the operating theatre, the clinical role surgeons perform on the ward 
is not well researched. Ward-based care is still perceived by some surgeons (in 
the UK at least) as being for the juniors in their team to deal with. Thankfully, 
this paradigm is changing. The training of non-technical skills is now becoming 
standard in UK medical courses and postgraduate training regimes. Whilst it is 
clear that a technically competent surgeon is paramount to good outcome, the 
post-operative care of the patient (which is so dependent on non-technical skill) 
is also crucial, hence the advent of failure to rescue and escalation of care 
research.  
In the context of a deteriorating post-operative patient on the ward, the 
recognition of complications is an important, yet difficult, skill. Similarly, once 
the complication has been recognised, communication with a senior colleague 
and a prompt response with implementation of definitive treatment must follow 
recognition of the complication to complete the escalation of care process and 
avoid failure to rescue. The situation is yet more complex in the context of 
surgery. Some complications (e.g. intra-abdominal bleeding or faecal peritonitis) 
require emergent return to the operating theatre, whilst others (e.g. venous 
thromboembolism (VTE) or pneumonia) are managed medically. In the event of 
the latter complications, a junior surgeon who can arrange appropriate 
investigations (ultrasound scan or chest x-ray) and commence initial treatment 
(anticoagulants or antibiotics) may manage the patient initially, before 
contacting their senior. However, this simplifies the situation, a patient with 
severe pneumonia may require urgent ventilator support in the ICU or a patient 
with a VTE may require surgical intervention.  
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The complexity and unpredictability of the post-operative course of a 
patient mandates the frequent involvement of senior surgeons, which is one of 
the key challenges to junior surgeons wishing to escalate care. All grades of 
clinician are constantly subject to competing demands and must learn to 
prioritise in order of clinical need. Unfortunately this skill is traditionally 
acquired as experience is accrued, one of the key challenges of this thesis is how 
to accelerate the acquisition of these key non-technical skills to improve 
escalation of care, and ultimately, patient safety. 
 
10.3 Original thesis aims and how they were addressed 
The overarching aim of this thesis was to make a novel and valuable contribution 
to the scientific evidence base concerning the escalation of care for deteriorating 
surgical patients. 
 
The original aims of this thesis were: 
 
1. To explore the link between the quality of escalation of care and patient 
outcome measures including failure to rescue. This was achieved through a 
systematic literature review to evaluate the published literature 
concerning escalation of care and failure to rescue in surgery (chapter 2).  
 
2. To identify facilitators and barriers to escalation of care in surgery. This 
was achieved through an interview study with healthcare professionals 
and a questionnaire study with patients (chapters 3 and 4). 
 
 265 
3. To risk assess escalation of care in surgery so as to identify areas with 
potential for intervention. This was achieved through a Healthcare Failure 
Mode Effects Analysis of the escalation of care process that allowed the 
identification of areas amenable to intervention (chapter 5). 
 
4. To investigate communication pathways and the role of communication 
technology in escalation of care. This was achieved using a combined 
literature review and focus group study to investigate the potential role of 
ABCS for surgical teams (chapter 6). Subsequently, a mixed-methods 
study was conducted to explore the use of WhatsApp, an instant 
messaging app, for communication in surgical teams (chapter 7). 
 
5. To develop and validate a metric aiming to assess and improve information 
transfer during escalation of care. This was achieved through 
development, validation and feasibility testing of the QUality of 
Information Transfer tool (chapter 8).  
 
6. To develop a human factors intervention bundle and assess its impact on 
supervision, escalation of care and safety culture in a UK surgical 
department. This was achieved through a pre-post intervention study 
using mixed-methods including interviews, questionnaires and clinical 
data analysis (chapter 9). 
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10.4 Summary of key findings by aim 
1. To explore the link between the quality of escalation of care and patient outcome 
measures including failure to rescue. A systematic literature review was 
conducted to identify and evaluate literature exploring escalation of care and 
failure to rescue in surgery (chapter 2)56. This review found that recognition, 
communication and response to deterioration are the key components of 
escalation care and, when performed well, may prevent avoidable patient harm. 
The review concluded that multiple factors (including organisational and human 
factors) might affect escalation of care and failure to rescue in surgery. It 
suggested that targeted interventions aiming to improve escalation of care be 
developed and implemented to enhance patient outcomes. 
 
2. To identify facilitators and barriers to escalation of care in surgery. One of the 
most striking findings from chapter 2 was the absence of research exploring the 
potential role of human factors in the prevention of failure to rescue. Several 
articles described how human factors were important in escalation of care but 
none extrapolated this to hypothesise that human factors may be critical in 
ward-based patient safety or investigated their impact on outcomes. To address 
this a semi-structured interview study was conducted with interprofessional 
surgical and ICU staff in three London hospitals (chapter 3)117. To address the 
lack of patient-centered research in escalation of care and ensure that each 
stakeholder group was included in the exploratory phase of this thesis a 
questionnaire study was conducted with patients to explore the factors that 
affect their decision to call for help and commence the escalation of care process 
(chapter 4).  
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3. To risk assess escalation of care in surgery so as to identify areas with potential 
for intervention. Chapter 2 demonstrated the importance of escalation of care to 
patient safety and the prevention of harm. Chapters 3 and 4 identified the factors 
that may facilitate or impede the escalation of care process and also suggested 
some preliminary areas amenable to intervention. To allow a more structured 
and considered approach, chapter 5 involved an HFMEA that aimed to identify 
the areas of greatest risk in the escalation process and prioritise those with the 
scope for the greatest benefit from intervention277. Two principle areas 
amenable to intervention emerged. Firstly, the innovation of communication 
technology from outdated pager devices to smartphone platforms and secondly, 
human factor-based intervention into the escalation of care process. 
 
4. To investigate communication pathways and the role of communication 
technology in escalation of care. Following on from chapter 5, a combined 
literature review and focus group study identified the potential of app-based 
communication systems in surgery (chapter 6)155. The identification of 
smartphones as a preferred platform, inclusion of patient identifiable 
information and associated information governance concerns were key themes 
from the focus groups. There were also interesting differences between the 
views of doctors and nurses, who would be the primary users so these would 
need to be taken into account should the system be developed. The study 
concluded with a detailed guide to production of an ABCS. However, I realised 
that some preliminary data for communication apps would be required before 
production of any new innovation to ensure that app-based communication is 
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feasible within a surgical team with multiple, rotating members whom are often 
working in disparate locations.   
To investigate this, a mixed-methods study was conducted that explored 
the use of WhatsApp, an instant messaging service, for communication within a 
busy, acute general surgery team (chapter 7)300. This study demonstrated that 
surgeons welcome app-based communication and reinforced the importance of 
the correct hospital infrastructure to such a system. Furthermore, the potential 
for pan-team communication and constant senior supervision helped to flatten 
the hierarchy within the team and improve escalation of care. 
 
5. To develop and validate a metric aiming to assess and improve information 
transfer during escalation of care. As one of the key components of the escalation 
of care process, it is surprising that the quality of information transfer to a senior 
colleague is not currently measured. To address this paucity within the literature 
and allow the impact of future interventions in the escalation process to be 
measured, the QUality of Information Transfer (QUIT) was developed, validated 
and assessed for feasibility in a mixed simulated and clinical study in chapter 8. 
The QUIT tool was found to be face, content, construct and concurrently valid. It 
was also found to be reliable and feasible for use in the clinical environment. The 
QUIT tool can be used to assess interventions in the escalation of care process 
and structure training for junior surgeons to improve their communication skills. 
 
6. To develop a human factors intervention bundle and assess its impact on 
supervision, escalation of care and safety culture in a UK surgical department. To 
follow-up on the recommendations from the HFMEA in chapter 5 and evidence 
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accrued in chapters 2,3 and 4 a human factors intervention bundle was 
developed to help a struggling surgical department improve supervision and 
escalation of care for their junior clinical staff (chapter 9). A pre-post 
intervention study utilising participant interviews, questionnaires and clinical 
data was conducted and positive effects were seen. The quality of supervision 
and escalation of care and the safety culture within the department appeared to 
improve and remained at a high-level more than 6 months post-intervention. 
There were no differences seen in patient outcomes however, reflecting the 
difficulty involved with changing institutional culture and gathering sufficient 
high-quality data to analyse outcome measures without using retrospective, 
administrative databases.  
 
10.5 Summary of limitations in this thesis and the lessons learnt 
The limitations of the individual studies within this thesis have been discussed at 
the end of each chapter. The section that follows presents the overarching 
limitations of this research within the field of surgery and leads into a discussion 
of the plan for future work. The sub-sections will be divided and discussed 
according to the different types of methodology used in this thesis. 
 
10.5.1 Methodology type 1: Literature review 
I conducted a systematic literature review in chapter 2 and non-systematic 
reviews in chapters 6 and 8. The principal limitation of these is common to all 
literature reviews; namely that the quality of the literature review is dependent 
on the quality of the included articles. The inclusion of articles with 
methodological limitations also limits the findings of the overall review. 
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However, I felt it was important throughout this thesis to include all types of 
research methodology so did not exclude articles based on their quality. Most 
research rating scales; such as the Jadad or Newcastle-Ottawa, do not include 
criteria for qualitative research so the Alberta Heritage scale was chosen as it is 
an exception to this rule57,301,302. The quality assessment of literature is a subject 
of debate; Neyarapally et al. explored quality assessment scales for pharmaco-
epidemiological studies and found that critical elements were frequently 
missing303. Therefore, until the science of quality assessment is more exact, the 
uses of existing scales or simply including literature based on relevance to the 
research hypothesis seem to be perfectly acceptable approaches, I selected the 
latter option. The majority of the limitations of this area of research stated in 
chapter 2 were addressed by later studies in this thesis. 
 
10.5.2 Methodology type 2: Qualitative and mixed-methods 
Semi-structured interviews were employed in chapter 3, 7, 8 and 9. Interviews 
can be a very valuable source of rich qualitative data and I enjoyed learning and 
using these techniques in this thesis119. However, it must be remembered that 
these studies are usually limited by small sample sizes and the subjective nature 
of participant’s views. Mitigating for these limitations by including an 
interprofessional sample from multiple centres seems the best approach to 
address this limitation. The use of interview techniques to help with the 
development and evaluation of complex interventional has previously been 
successful and was a valuable methodology used in this thesis (chapters 7, 8 and 
9).  
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Focus groups were utilised in chapters 5, 6 and 9 and I found this 
methodology to be particularly valuable when a research question was likely to 
be the subject of debate. Observing and recording the interactions between 
participants allows a deep understanding of the issues being discussed and steps 
that can be taken to address them. However, focus groups are limited by the 
presence of dominant personalities, something the facilitator must mitigate, and 
the lack of discussion of potentially sensitive issues. A participant in an 
individual interview may be more candid than they would be in a focus group. 
The application of mixed-methods has been shown to be useful in elucidating the 
details of how and why an intervention may or may not be successful and also to 
uncover the opinions of study participants, something which administrative data 
is not able to achieve304. Mixed-methods were employed in chapters 5, 7 and 9 
and allowed a level of understanding and contextual findings that would not 
have been possible otherwise. 
 
10.5.3 Methodology type 3: Questionnaire 
Questionnaires were utilised in chapters 4 and 9 of this thesis. Chapter 4 used a 
questionnaire to identify facilitators and barriers to escalation of care for 
patients. The questionnaire was developed by the research team and myself and 
was easy to administer and comprehend leading to an excellent response rate. 
However, given another opportunity to conduct this study I would have done it 
differently. The specific examples of deterioration given are hypothetical in 
nature and, with hindsight, it may have been more valuable to have given 
questionnaires to patients who had already suffered a complication that asked 
what methods they used to call for help and what factors affected that decision. 
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This would bring the study into the real world and away from the hypothetical, 
which would be valuable. However, it may have decreased the sample size. 
Furthermore, I would also have interviewed a sample of patients in chapter 3 to 
help develop the items in the questionnaire, which may have increased their 
relevance. A contrast is seen with the questionnaire in chapter 9 which was 
based on the interview results and the published literature287. 
 
10.5.4 Methodology type 4: HFMEA 
The main limitations of the HFMEA conducted in this thesis are discussed in 
chapter 5. I have participated in a further two HFMEAs since the one in chapter 5 
and remain convinced that it is a useful and comprehensive method for 
prospectively assessing risk in the hazardous healthcare industry. There are 
limitations regarding subjectivity, mathematical validity and application. Shebl et 
al. eloquently discuss these limitations in their validity assessments of FMEA as a 
research methodology. However, I found it to be very useful as HFMEA allows 
the researcher to generate interventions, which are not only possible but also 
feasible. Essentially, HFMEA not only generates a list of interventions but also 
effectively prioritises them into those with the greatest potential for 
improvements in care quality and patient safety. Had I realised earlier on during 
this thesis how complex the process of information transfer during escalation of 
care is; I may have broken this process down into additional steps to add to the 
comprehensiveness of chapter 5. 
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10.5.5 Methodology type 5: Simulation 
Chapter 8 was predominantly a simulated study. Using simulation is not 
equivalent to testing a metric or intervention in the clinical environment. A 
limitation we sought to address in phase 3 of the QUIT study. However, phase 3 
supplied only limited evidence due to the small sample and number of centres 
involved. Ultimately, without correlating the outcomes of the study with those in 
a large-scale clinical trial, the impact of the study findings cannot be guaranteed. 
Despite this, there are many advantages to simulation; the most important being 
the avoidance of implementing untested interventions on real patients, even in 
the setting of ethically sound research. The utilisation of a high-fidelity, validated 
simulation environment combined with very strong evidence for the validity of 
the QUIT tool from study 8 is reassuring and simulation appears to be the most 
appropriate environment for initial validation, and interventional, studies in 
surgery. The uptake of simulation in surgical training has increased in recent 
years because educators and researchers have realised its true value and I will 
continue to use it when appropriate305,306. 
 
10.5.6 Methodology type 6: Interventional 
The two interventional studies in this thesis appear in chapters 7 and 9. Chapter 
7 involved the implementation of WhatsApp in an emergency surgical team but it 
was not a comparative study and this is discussed in detail in chapter 7 and 
earlier on in this chapter. Chapter 9 involved the implementation of a human 
factors intervention bundle within a surgical department in the UK.  This was no 
small undertaking as this intervention affected all clinical and some non-clinical 
departmental staff of all grades. A common theme in both chapters was the 
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approach to engaging with participants on the content of the intervention prior 
to its implementation. I was lucky enough to have the support of senior 
management and an intervention of some nature would have been introduced 
despite any staff objections. However, extensive engagement with staff and the 
fact I involved them in planning the interventions meant that the 
implementation and evaluation was a smooth and effective process. Instituting 
change in healthcare is a difficult process that must overcome barriers and 
numerous articles have discussed the cultural responses to potential change in 
healthcare307-309.  
 
10.6 Strengths of research methods utilised in this thesis 
The structure of this thesis is one of its main strengths. The more qualitative 
work in the early chapters gave me excellent background on escalation of care, 
failure to rescue and the surgical ward. The middle chapters involved more 
focused analysis to identify areas and strategies for intervention in the escalation 
of care process. The final three chapters involve interventions to improve 
escalation of care and development of a metric to measure the impact of these 
interventions. This thorough approach to researching and immersing oneself in 
understanding a problem prior to intervention facilitated the identification of the 
findings in this thesis. It is always tempting to view the lack of any improvement 
in outcomes as a failure (as seen in chapter 9). However, I firmly believe this only 
serves to illustrate the complexity of working in a busy, resource-strained 
industry with a longstanding culture of hierarchy and blame.  
The main learning point from this thesis is the multiplicity of factors that 
affect escalation of care and patient safety on surgical wards and how strategies 
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to improve care must be developed with the utmost care and attention. There 
are multiple limitations to the interventional methodology used in this thesis; 
these limitations are common to many interventional studies. With more time I 
would have liked to compare the response times between pagers and WhatsApp 
in chapter 7 which may have leant greater validity to the findings. Furthermore, I 
would also have liked to obtain more comprehensive data for chapter 9. If 
greater detail on potential confounders could have been obtained then 
multivariate regression analysis of the outcomes may have produced more 
sensitive findings. However, the lack of improvement in patient outcomes seen in 
this thesis may simply be a reflection of the amount of work remaining if patients 
are to consider themselves safe from avoidable harm when undergoing surgery 
in a UK hospital.  
 
10.7 Implications and future research 
Implications for patient safety: The work presented in this thesis has the 
potential to improve patient safety in surgery. Deteriorating patients treated by 
junior surgeons and nurses who feel empowered to follow through with their 
instincts and are able to escalate care to supportive, approachable senior 
colleagues are less likely to suffer ongoing deterioration and avoidable harm. 
Surgical teams that adopt the learning points in this thesis will also be furnished 
with improved communication technology and transparent escalation protocols, 
increasing their clinical effectiveness and efficiency. The research in this thesis 
may well have a snowballing effect due to the nature of current working 
conditions in the NHS in the UK. Senior surgeons and nurses (who are usually 
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more permanent staff than junior clinicians) can encourage an improved safety 
culture, supervision and escalation of care.  
During the course of their rotations the junior surgeons can feed off this 
changing culture and take their learning to their next rotation.  None of this will 
be simple but the recent explosion of research exploring patient safety and 
institutional culture suggests that there are enough interested parties to make it 
stick. Even if the interventions suggested in this thesis are not widely 
implemented, the earlier studies may make surgeons, nurses and managers who 
follow the emerging literature aware of the factors that can facilitate and impede 
escalation of care and patient safety. At the very least they will then be better 
equipped to ameliorate the negative consequences of barriers to escalation of 
care and supervision in surgery. 
Implications for training programmes and surgical education: The work in 
this thesis touched on surgical education and training in chapter 8 and, given 
more time, is an area I would have really liked to explore further. The earlier 
studies in this thesis underlined the importance of communication and 
information transfer during escalation of care and chapter 8 demonstrated the 
rigorous methodology required to develop and validate an assessment tool in 
surgery. Despite the plethora of research articles exploring the use of simulation 
for education, training and metric development, few of these have been adopted 
formally into undergraduate or postgraduate training programmes. Surgery has, 
along with anaesthesia, been the specialty exception. As seen in chapter 8 the 
ACS has included simulation based scenarios to teach trainees both technical 
skills (e.g. laparoscopic cholecystectomy) but also ward-based skills.  
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The clinical scenario in chapter 8 was adapted from the ACS training 
curriculum and detailed a patient with a pulmonary embolism. The scenarios 
provided within the curriculum are very detailed and include caveats. For 
example, if the trainee doesn’t provide the simulated patient with oxygen they 
continue to deteriorate. There are other scenarios including post-operative 
bleeding, sepsis and other common post-operative complications and this is an 
invaluable learning resource for trainees. The Royal Colleges of Surgeons in the 
UK uses the ACS-accredited ATLS course, which has a large simulation 
component and have started to introduce simulation into their other courses, 
human factors in clinical simulation being an example (www.rcseng.ac.uk). This 
progress is set to continue, as simulation becomes a common training paradigm. 
One of the main projects I intend to conduct following this thesis is to use the 
QUIT tool from chapter 8 to investigate the impact of several different training 
and educational interventions aiming to improve junior surgeon’s assessment 
and information transfer skills.  
Deliberate and mental practice are methods of improving and retaining 
skills that have been acquired through practice regimes and have been 
researched in the areas of technical skills and stress management in surgery310-
313. These valuable educational tools have not been explored on the surgical 
ward. I hypothesise that they may be particularly useful strategies for the junior 
surgeons to train themselves to manage acutely deteriorating patients with post-
operative complications. I plan to conduct several simulated and clinical studies 
with junior surgeons and nurses to establish the impact of deliberate and mental 
practice on their escalation of care skills. Just as ATLS teaches a systematic 
Airway, Breathing, Circulation approach to assessing and managing trauma 
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patients, I believe that deteriorating patients should be assessed and managed 
within a similar structure to ensure a consistent approach and good outcomes. 
Implications for communication technology in surgery: The work in this 
thesis also described the deficiencies of current communication technology in 
use within surgical teams in hospitals. Chapters 3 and 5 described how 
communication technology for escalation of care was limited and recommended 
intervention and innovation in this area. A detailed literature review in chapter 6 
described the deficiencies of current communication devices and recommended 
the implementation of smartphone technology for communication in surgical 
teams. Following this, chapter 7 describes how smartphone technology could be 
implemented in surgical teams and the role it played in supervision, escalation of 
care and patient safety. Despite this work, I envisage that communication 
technology in surgery will continue to be used in an ad-hoc fashion by surgeons 
in the immediate future. Due to their innovative nature and concerns 
surrounding information governance, hospital information technology 
departments are currently reluctant to allow the inclusion of patient identifiable 
data on smartphones and apps.  
The more forward thinking hospitals will allow clinical communication on 
smartphones (see chapter 7), but only within specific limits, such as using the 
patient’s initials rather than name.300 The issue with these limitations are that 
end-users are unlikely to fully switch over to smartphone communication unless 
apps are allowed to include patient identifiable data, which was identified as a 
key recommendation for an ABCS in chapter 6155.   
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Despite these concerns, things must change. Therefore, the mHealth workgroup 
at Imperial College have started work on a project to produce an app-based 
communication system for surgical patients called ‘Hark’.  
This app began production in late-2013 and is in the final testing phase (a 
simulated study will be conducted throughout 2015). This app was produced 
according to a ‘clarify, design, evaluate’ framework314. The clarify phase included 
research to uncover issues with current methods of communication and involved 
a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research (see chapters 3, 5, 6 and 7). 
We also conducted novel observations with a mixed team of clinicians and 
specialist mHealth designers, an approach designed to ensure a user-centered 
problem solving method of research. After this, the design phase has involved 
the software and securities designers producing iterations of the app which are 
piloted tested within the team, following a PDSA cycle225. At the end of the design 
period we had a prototype app, which all team members were happy with and 
was ready for formal testing. We have designed a randomised controlled-trial to 
explore the performance of the app during handover and escalation of care 
scenarios compared to the current bleep system and will use the QUIT tool to 
score the referrals. The combination of the mental/deliberate practice studies 
and this comparative communication study represents a continuation of the 
main interventional themes within this thesis and constitutes a robust plan for 
future work in this research area. 
 
10.8 Personal reflections 
My position as a clinical researcher is unusual in that the majority of UK 
surgeons who undertake a PhD do so just before or during their specialist 
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training (ST3 and above). I, however, elected to do my PhD after my foundation 
and before my core training. This gave me a unique perspective on research and 
I wanted to take advantage of this. Lots of research projects in surgery look at 
mainly registrars and consultants, neglecting the crucial role of nurses and junior 
surgeons in the care or surgical patients.  Ward-based care is an under-
researched area and the decision-making process that junior surgeons undergo 
when faced with a deteriorating patient had always fascinated me. The main 
reason I was interested in escalation of care as the basis of my thesis was that I 
had been faced with escalation scenarios on the wards many times during my 
own clinical practice, and it is really difficult. I’ve seen patients at 4am who are 
critically ill and known they needed senior intervention. However, despite my 
interest in this area and knowledge of how critical rapid escalation of care is, at 
the back of your mind there are still those little questions: 
Do I really need to wake up the registrar? They might be angry. 
Have I done everything I should? 
Can I wait a bit? The patient might get better… 
I think I’ve done everything they would; do I need to bother the consultant? 
There are also some questions from the other way of thinking: 
Am I out of my depth? 
Might the registrar want to know, even though I have done what I should have? 
If I don’t contact them and the patient deteriorates, is that my fault? 
You end up with a cartoon-like situation where the devil is on one 
shoulder whispering the first set of questions into your ear and your guardian 
angel is whispering the second set of questions. In the majority of cases I listened 
to the angel but not every time. That is why I believe junior surgeons need 
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training in escalation of care. Hopefully some of the research presented in this 
thesis, which has been received positively by surgical journals and peers alike, 
raises awareness of the complexity of escalation of care. I hope that this work 
empowers juniors to escalate care and persuades seniors to be approachable and 
supportive of their junior colleagues. There will be times when a patient’s care is 
escalated unnecessarily (i.e. a false negative) but this is a more desirable 
situation than if a patient’s care is not escalated when it should have been. This 
second scenario is when avoidable harm occurs and is the situation this work is 
aiming to prevent. 
I have immensely enjoyed my time at Imperial, gaining crucial skills for 
my future career as an academic surgeon (fingers crossed) and making some 
great friends over the years. I hope I have also demonstrated that junior 
surgeons can be successful in academia. I feel privileged to have been given the 
opportunity to research an area that I have always had great interest in and look 
forward to contributing to the ongoing work that is required in this research 
field. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A Escalation of care interview topic guide for junior surgeons 
(Chapter 3) 
 
Introduction: We want to ask some questions about some of the problems that we have 
been having on the wards to try & improve things. This interview and the 
questionnaires will be ANONYMOUS and CONFIDENTIAL.  
 
Scope Questions 
1. Basic 
demographics 
Please can you tell me your level and specialty? 
2. Identifying the 
problem 
Do you think there is a problem in getting senior support 
here/calling for help?  
Prompt: By calling for help, I mean junior doctors feeling that 
they are outside their limits and asking someone else to help 
them, either because they don’t know what to do next or 
because the patient is deteriorating clinically 
3. Establish 
current 
landscape                                                                 
Imagine you are on the ward during normal working hours. 
You are called by a nurse on the phone and asked to review a 
sick patient on the ward. 
 
What information do you require from a ward nurse prior to 
reviewing a patient? 
Prompt: Do you request EWS or observations before agreeing 
to a task (e.g. IV cannulation) 
 
You go to the ward, examine the patient and realise you need 
help.  Who would you call for help? (wait for answer) 
What if you get no answer? Who do you call next? 
Prompt (Team SHO, on-call SHO, Team SPR, on-call SPR, crisis 
team etc…) 
 
So when you have called for help, What response do you 
generally get from your seniors when you call for help?  
 
Would you contact the consultant directly if other team 
members are unavailable? (remember this refers to a couple 
of months ago, not now) 
Would you contact the ITU SPR if other team members are 
available? 
 
At what point would you call for help generally if asked to see 
a sick patient?  
Prompt (Before going to the ward, prior to initial assessment, 
after initial assessment, after implementing initial 
treatment/resuscitation) 
 
How do you try to obtain support?  
Prompt (Bleep, mobile phone, face-to-face) 
 
What about if is out of hours – does that change your 
responses to the above?  
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4. Prioritisation of 
tasks 
You have a list of jobs to perform in a limited time period 
(some are routine tasks – prescriptions, TTOs and some are 
reviewing unwell patients) 
Which jobs would you perform first and why? 
 
If seeing patients first, how would you decide which one to 
see first?  
Prompt: would you see the patient with the highest EWS or the 
patient who had been waiting longer? 
 
5. Barriers to 
getting support 
Do you know of a time when you or someone else had a sick 
patient and they could not get support? What happened?  
Prompt:  what happened to you and what happened to the 
patient? 
 
More generally, Can you tell me what factors you consider 
when you decide whether you need to call for help? 
 
Prompt: Clinical factors  
Unfamiliar disease? Unknown patient? 
 
Non-clinical factors  
Time of day? Gender? Hierarchy? 
Concerns regarding own competency ? Concerns regarding 
competency of a senior colleague? 
Trainee Desire for independence?  
Concerns regarding professional interest/lack of interest of a 
senior colleague?  
Availability of senior? Approachability of senior?  
Concerns regarding your professional relationship with a 
colleague? 
Technological failure of hospital bleep system? 
Failure to charge your own mobile/bleep device 
6. Facilitators to 
getting support 
Have you have any good experiences when trying to get help? 
What are the facilitators you use/have experienced when 
calling for help? 
7. Improvements The problem is that you can ask people to call for help over 
and over but simply telling them is not enough. It’s difficult. 
Do you have any ideas as to how we can improve the 
process? 
 
How can we demonstrate that things have improved? Can we 
measure anything? 
 
Would a protocol be useful? 
What do you feel about the use of new communication 
technology to distribute jobs between healthcare workers? 
8. Final points Finally, how have things changed in the last couple of weeks? 
Is it easier to get help? 
Do you feel more supported? 
Do you know who to call if there are any problems? 
Would you now call the consultant directly? 
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Appendix B Patient socio-demographic questionnaire (Chapter 4) 
Name:         Age: 
 
Gender:  Male         Female 
   
Job Status:  Employed        Unemployed        Retired          Student                           
                            Other (specify) ________________________ 
 
Ethnic group:         
 
☐ White British          
☐ White (other)          
 ☐ Mixed (White & Black Caribbean)   
 ☐ Mixed (White & Black African)  
 ☐ Mixed (White & Asian)   
 ☐ Mixed (all other) 
 ☐ Asian/Asian British (Indian)                                          
 ☐ Asian/Asian British (Pakistani) 
 ☐ Asian/Asian British (Bangladeshi) 
 ☐ Asian/Asian British (all other) 
 ☐ Black/Black British (Caribbean) 
 ☐ Black/Black British (African) 
 ☐ Black/Black British (all other) 
 ☐ Chinese 
 ☐ All other ethnic groups 
 ☐ Not given 
 
What is the reason you are in hospital? (i.e., presenting health complaint)                                   
___________________________________________________ 
                                                                                               
Were you admitted to hospital electively or as an emergency (through A&E) 
 ___________________________________________________             
 
         
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix C Focus Group Topic Guide (Chapter 6) 
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Location: 
  
Date: 
  
Time: 
  
Supplies: 
Large table and chairs 
A quiet room 
Audio recording equipment (plus back-up equipment) 
Name plates for participants 
Flip chart/ Whiteboard 
Markers 
Pens 
Financial Incentives 
  
Time Estimate: 
1 hour   
Number of Participants: 
6-12 
  
Introduction 
 Thank you for coming along today and agreeing to take part in this focus 
group. 
 Please allow us to briefly introduce ourselves; we are x and y, medical 
students at Imperial College; currently undertaking research here at St. 
Marys into current communication methods in use. I (X) will be leading the 
focus group today and asking questions, (Y) may also ask questions. 
 The aim of our focus group today is to explore methods for 
communicating with your colleagues and the technology you use. We are 
looking forward to hearing your opinions today. 
 We estimate the time take to conduct the focus group will be 1hr. 
 We would like to record the audio in this focus group for our own record, 
do we have your permission to do so? To facilitate this we would like to 
refer to you as Nurse 1/Doctor 1 to enable anonymisation and make 
transcription of the audio easier. 
 Please be aware that any information that you do provide us with will be 
pooled together. Although what you say here may be quoted in our study, 
all information will remain anonymous. We would also ask that you respect 
each other’s right to privacy and refrain from discussing the opinions of 
others outside this focus group. 
 You are welcome to refuse to answer any question or withdraw from the 
study at any time. 
General Question to Build Rapport 
 If we could begin by going around the table and each introduce 
yourselves by telling us your name and role. 
  
Explanation of Focus Group 
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 Have any of you ever participated in a focus group before? 
 For those of you who are not familiar with focus groups, focus groups are a 
research technique by which questions about your perceptions and 
opinions are asked in a group setting that allows us to learn and gather 
information from you. We encourage you to discuss answers to the 
questions amongst yourselves. We are equally interested in BOTH your 
positive and negative opinions and experiences and are not looking for a 
consensus. 
 And at this point I would like to reiterate that any information that you do 
provide will be kept anonymous. 
  
Ground Rules 
 It is important that we set a few ground rules for the duration of the focus 
group before we begin. 
 Do you have any ideas of important rules for whilst we are here in order to 
have a successful focus group this afternoon? 
*have some preset ground rules e.g. Silent when someone else is talking, all 
should participate etc. Feel free to ask any questions at any time 
  
 Do we have any questions before we begin? 
 I am going to turn the recorder on now 
  
Definition of Key Terms 
Bleep/pager – 
Communication – 
Smartphone – 
  
  
Topic 1. Evaluating the Current System 
1 To begin could you tell us what you would normally do if you thought a 
patient was deteriorating. What forms of communication would you 
normally use? 
2   (assuming they talk about bleeps/other than the communication that you 
have mentioned) Do you use any other form of communication to contact 
other physicians/nurses? Can you tell us how that works? 
     (e.g. mobile phones) 
3   Does the current pager system meet your needs? In what ways? 
4   What difficulties have you encountered, if any, with this system? Why? 
  
  
 
Topic 2. Current Smartphone/tablet usage & acceptability 
   
We’d now like to explore other methods of communication that you use. 
 
These questions should be quick, in order to give the participants the correct 
context of using smartphones before moving on to using them in the workplace. 
1   How many of you here own a smartphone? 
                     -Show of hands 
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How many of you have used a smartphone before? 
                     -Show of hands 
2   How many of you here own a tablet e.g an iPad or Google Nexus? 
  -Show of hands   
         3   Do you use apps? 
 
Probe: what? who? where? why? 
 
4   Prompt: Do you use apps for communication? 
Probe: WhatsApp? Viber? 
  
5    How would you feel about using a smartphone application for communication 
with other clinicians in the hospital setting? 
Do you think using a smartphone application for communication with colleagues 
would fit into your working style? How? Why? 
 
6    Have you ever seen other clinical staff at St Mary’s using smartphone 
applications for communication at work? How do you feel about it? Why?  
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7    Do you think that using a smartphone app for communication would have an 
impact on your job performance? In what way? Why? 
 
8    Which clinical staff do you think would be more likely to use/are using 
smartphone technology at work? 
  
9    What personal experience do you have of using smartphone apps, or other  
technologies? Why? 
  
10  What role do you think hospital management has in bringing about a 
communication system using smartphones? Why? 
  
11   How important is the availability of external support when it comes to using 
a smartphone/app at work? (e.g. technical support) 
 
12    How would you feel about using a smartphone app for communication at 
work?  
 
13    Would you use a smartphone app? Why/why not? 
  
Topic 3. Suggested specifications for a Smartphone-based communication 
platform 
If an app were made for the purpose of communicating with colleagues: 
1   Is there anything that you think could increase the likelihood of you using 
mobile technology for escalation of care? 
      What functions do you think the technology should have? 
2   We have a preliminary vision for what the process of escalation of care, 
aided by an app, may look like. Z will take you through his process now.  
      (NEED TO WRITE PROCESS) 
3    How do you find this app aided process of managing escalation of care? 
Does it work in your opinion? How? Why? 
4 Do you see any limitations associated with this process? Where? Why? Do 
you see any strengths? (risks and benefits) 
5 Would you change anything in that process? Why?    
6   Finally, we would like each one of you to brainstorm and make a list of the 
5 most important features to include in the proposed app. 
(e.g. Individual/ Team Phones? Login? Touchscreen/ Blackberry?) 
  
 
Conclusion 
That concludes our Focus Group today. Thank you so much again for agreeing to 
take part and your participation this afternoon. 
We have one final item of housekeeping to do and that is these evaluation forms, 
we have really appreciated the time you have taken to talk to us already today 
and would be even more grateful if you could fill out these forms, which include a 
section for any comments you would have like to, but were unable to make 
during the discussion today. 
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Statement of future action 
For your information, the information that you have given us will be used in a 
project looking into creating a software platform for the escalation of patient 
care. 
If you have any questions or queries at any time now or after the focus group has 
finished you can contact Dr Johnston at m.johnston@imperial.ac.uk  who will 
answer any questions you may have. 
  
 Thank you again. 
 
 
 
